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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC: 
A COMPARISON OF THE 1994, 1998, AND 2002 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
by 
Zuzana Hlaváčová 
Florida International University, 2009 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ralph S. Clem, Major Professor 
In what can rightly be said to be one of the most dramatic geopolitical shifts in 
modern times, the collapse of communist regimes in Central Europe and the former 
Soviet Union brought about dramatic changes in the entire region. As a consequence, 
wide ranging political, economic, and social transformations have occurred in almost all 
of these countries since 1989. The Slovak Republic, as a newly democratic country, went 
through the establishment of the electoral and party systems that are the central 
mechanisms to the formation of almost all modern democratic governments. The primary 
research purpose of this dissertation was to describe and explain regional variations in 
party support during Slovakia’s ten years of democratic transformation. A secondary 
purpose was to relate these spatial variations to the evolution of political parties in the 
post-independence period in light of the literature on transitional electoral systems. 
Research questions were analyzed using both aggregate and survey data. 
Specifically, the study utilized electoral data from 1994, 1998, and 2002 Slovak 
parliamentary elections and socio-economic data of the population within Slovak regions 
which were eventually correlated with the voting results by party in the 79 Slovak 
 vii 
districts. The results of this study demonstrate that there is a tendency among voters in 
certain regions to provide continuous support to the same political parties/movements 
over time. In addition, the socio-economic characteristics of the Slovak population 
(gender, age, education, religion, nationality, unemployment, work force distribution, 
wages, urban-rural variable, and population density) in different regions tend to influence 
voting preferences in the parliamentary elections. Finally, there is an evident correlation 
between party preference and the party’s position on integration into European Union, as 
measured by perceived attitudes regarding the benefits of EU membership. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 In what can rightly be said to be one of the most far-reaching and sudden 
geopolitical shifts in modern times, the collapse of communist regimes in Central, 
Eastern, and Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet Union brought about profound 
and largely unforeseen political, economic, and social changes throughout this large and 
strategically important region. 
No less an authority than Samuel P. Huntington wrote: “the likelihood of 
democratic development in Eastern Europe is virtually nil” (1984, 217). Even in 
retrospect, it is almost beyond belief that five years after Huntington’s prediction the 
Berlin Wall would come down and, in amazingly short order after that dramatic event, 
one-party authoritarian rule would be replaced by democratically elected governments, 
that socialist/command economic systems would yield to flourishing market economies, 
and formerly stodgy and retrogressive societies would become vibrant progressive 
cultures. Equally astounding is the fact that these ex-communist countries have now been 
fully integrated into the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), indicative of their new status as full-fledged members of what we 
might call the New Europe. 
Finally, as a consequence of this dramatic transition, the map of Europe has been 
redrawn, as Germany unified, the Czech Republic and Slovakia “divorced”, and the 
USSR and Yugoslavia disintegrated. By no means is the process of geographic 
realignment yet fully resolved at this writing, as a “frozen conflict” persists in Moldova, 
the Crimean region of Ukraine with its ethnic Russian majority and huge Russian naval 
 2 
base remains a potential flashpoint, and ethnic tensions simmer in several of the former 
Yugoslav states. 
For the post-communist countries, democratic transformation meant in the first 
place essential civil and political rights to free, equal participation in multi-party elections 
enjoyed by all competent members of society, and a replacement of the ineffective 
centrally planned economy, based on the dominance of state ownership, with a market 
economy. However, the transition period also has had fundamental human costs that 
affected all post-communist societies of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union as 
well. Impoverishment intensified, and income and wealth inequalities have widened. 
These social factors became common for all states in the region that were going through 
the transition process, and they in turn have had political implications. 
Besides the importance of political and economic transformation, the transition of 
the post-communist countries also represents a very important geopolitical move – the 
shift of Central European states to the West. As Jacques Rupnik notes :“…the continent’s 
geopolitical center of gravity has shifted eastward, to the center of Europe, while its 
institutional center of gravity has moved to the west” (Rupnik 2000, 121). To most of the 
people in these countries, the fundamental factor of transition was the change from being 
a satellite country of the Soviet empire to being part of the West. Thus, since the fall of 
communism, accession to the EU and NATO was one of the strategic aims of most 
Central European countries; membership in both organizations was strongly desired since 
accession would validate “the consolidation of the democratic process”  (Bielasiak 2002, 
1241).   
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This dissertation will focus on the process of transition from one-party 
(communist) rule in one of the countries of Central Europe, Slovakia1
As will be detailed later, the methodology used here to investigate questions 
relating to Slovakia’s democratic transition is that of electoral geography, whereby 
spatial patterns of party and candidate choice and voter turnout and socio-economic and 
demographic data are analyzed to reveal the correlates of those political choices. These 
.  For Slovakia, as 
for the other post-communist countries, transformation meant in the first place essential 
civil and political rights and a series of free and fair multi-party elections engaging all 
eligible and duly registered electors; concomitant changes in the economic system 
involved replacing the ineffective centrally-planned economy based on state ownership 
with a market economy. 
Until the 1980s, voters in Slovakia had no real political choices. However, the 
evolution of party systems in the post-communist countries brought a new range of 
opportunities and options to people living in this region. Post-communist countries, 
including Slovakia, accepted free elections as the basic principle of organizing power at 
the national and local level and chose the electoral system that was most suitable for their 
country. Of all of the remarkable changes that have occurred in post-communist states, as 
part of the transformation of the political system, multiparty elections are the most 
noteworthy feature and are deserving of our attention, not only for what the results imply 
for these states, but also for what this new wealth of experience with democracy adds to 
the scholarly literature. 
                                                 
1 The transitional literature uses different ways to describe former communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. For the purposes of this discussion, the term Central Europe will be used.  Central Europe 
will include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic. 
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results in turn are employed to assess hypotheses concerning voter behavior and attitudes 
drawn from the literature on electoral systems and democratization. As will be discussed 
further below, one crucial aspect of the Slovak case is the extent to which national 
elections turned on the question of EU membership. 
 
The Transition to Post-Communism: An Overview 
 The transition to post-communism began in the Soviet Union when fifty-four-
year-old Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev came to power in 1985 (Sakwa 1991, 1). With 
the goal of modernization of the system and society, Gorbachev introduced radical 
policies of restructuring (perestroika), openness (glasnost) and democratization 
(democratizatsiya) (Breslauer 2002, 54). Furthermore, Gorbachev had “attacked many of 
the old Stalinist institutions as obsolete and self-serving, while promoting greater 
freedom of expression, contested elections at local levels, and an increased role for 
market mechanisms in the Soviet economy” (Snyder 1987-1988, 93). Gorbachev was 
optimistic that the reforms would improve the failing and technologically stagnant Soviet 
economy while building a better society based on “humane and democratic socialism” 
(Brown 2001, 35). In addition, while trying to strengthen the communist system, 
Gorbachev recognized that in order to implement such ambitious reforms, 
decentralization of institutional power would be required (Amann 1990, 292). 
By allowing discussion about reform of the economic system and by permitting 
criticism of the primary features of the deteriorating economic management and planning, 
the Soviet leadership in a way acknowledged that the Stalinist model of a centrally 
planned economy was outdated and required reforms that would lead to continuous 
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growth and technological advancement. Furthermore, by supporting rejuvenation of the 
Communist Party and encouraging Central European elites to liberalize their societies 
and implement their own perestroika, Gorbachev’s policies led to fundamental political 
changes in Central European countries (Dawisha 1990, 148, 206-207; Breslauer 2002, 
60). 
 Even though Gorbachev’s primary strategy was to introduce much needed 
economic reform and thereby preserve the Soviet Union, these reforms started in turn a 
series of events that would ultimately result in the end of communist rule in Central 
Europe and indeed the collapse of the USSR itself.  In turn, the forces unleashed by 
Gorbachev were to reverberate throughout Central Europe, eventuating in the overthrow 
of communist regimes throughout the region. 
 
The Central European Experience 
From the late 1940s on, the Central European countries closely followed the 
Soviet model in political, economic, and social spheres. At the political level, the 
countries of Central Europe adopted party, government, and institutional structures 
similar, if not identical, to those of the Soviet Union. The communist parties held a 
monopoly on power in one-party political systems established in Central Europe after the 
Second World War. In the social arena, political leaders, chosen by the Soviet leadership, 
implemented policies that included free education, health care, subsidized housing, and 
assurance of employment. In the economic sphere, the Central European countries 
established state-controlled centrally planned economies geared toward heavy industry, 
collectivization of agriculture, and state ownership of industry.  Furthermore, three 
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important institutions were established – the Communist Information Bureau 
(Cominform) replacing the old Communist International, or Comintern; the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon); and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw 
Pact) to strengthen common foreign, economic, and military policy respectively among 
the countries of the Soviet Bloc (Mason 1996, 16-17). The Soviet policies implemented 
in Central European countries came attached with a number of restrictions - censorship 
on media and independent organizations, as well as the increasing role of the pervasive 
secret police. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership used force and intimidation to 
consolidate communist power in Central Europe. 
 Since the beginning of Soviet hegemony in Central Europe, the Soviets 
experienced a number of challenges and protests from Central European countries. In 
1956, demonstrations in Poland called for higher wages and better economic conditions, 
and in Hungary, demonstrators demanded the end of Soviet domination in the country 
and the return to power of former premier Imre Nagy, who was an advocate of the 
moderate communist policies (Mason 1996, 15-17, 22-23). Unfortunately, both of these 
attempts were brutally suppressed by military intervention. The events in Poland and 
Hungary were followed by the “Prague Spring” in Czechoslovakia in 1968, another 
example of a major challenge to Soviet hegemony and communist rule in Central Europe.  
However, as in the previous two cases, Czechoslovakia’s call for democracy was put 
down by Warsaw Pact troops. 
 Implementation of reforms in the Soviet Union by Gorbachev precipitated the 
dramatic changes that occurred in Central Europe (Gokay 2001, 72). As Soviet control 
over Central Europe increasingly weakened, the authority and role of the region’s 
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communist parties was undermined. By clearly abandoning the Brezhnev Doctrine that 
justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Central European countries realized 
that the Soviet Union could no longer maintain its effective control over them. Thus, the 
reform process in the Soviet Union accelerated the collapse of communist regimes in 
Central Europe, which in turn influenced still further movement away from communism 
in the Soviet Union.  
The fall of communism in Central Europe began in Poland in the late 1980s.  The 
demonstration of dissatisfied mining workers in August 1988 led by the Committee of 
Free Trade Unions for the Baltic Coast, named Solidarity (Solidarność) and the country’s 
continuing economic problems eventually pressed the Polish government to try to find 
ways of collaboration with the political opposition, and as a result in April 1989 the 
Polish’s United Workers’ Party (PZPR) lost its dominance and became the first 
communist party to cede power (East and Pontin 1997, 16).  
In Hungary, the Hungarian Communist Party also was pressed to implement much 
needed reforms due to massive public protests. Hungarian pro-reform communist leaders 
were quietly able to take over the government and implement political reforms such as 
multi-party elections and also introduce essential economic reform (East and Pontin 
1997, 53).  
At the same time, in East Germany, pressured by Gorbachev’s calls for positive 
reforms, public demonstrations, a deteriorating economy, and worsening health 
conditions of the communist leader Erich Honecker forced his resignation. As a result of 
these events, the democratic opposition took the initiative to push for reforms. These 
events culminated in the lifting of strict travel restrictions that prevented East Germans 
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from traveling to the West. This was followed by the fall of Berlin Wall on November 9, 
1989 as well as the collapse of German Democratic Republic on October 3, 1990 (Mason 
1996, 58).  
After 1989, the newly democratized Central European countries were suddenly 
confronted with the enormous task of reforming their political, economic, and social 
systems simultaneously. In the political sphere, every country had to restructure its 
political system fundamentally, create a new constitution and legislation ensuring basic 
civil liberties, organize its first democratic elections, and allow the establishment of new 
interest groups and political parties. The elimination of the dominance of communist 
parties became a priority for Central European governments and fostered the proliferation 
of new political parties and implementation of multiparty elections. The communist 
parties in the Central European countries were forced to adapt to the transformation to 
multipartism, and Lenin’s one-party ideology was replaced with democratic principles. 
With the introduction of a multiparty system, the communist parties lost their monopoly 
of power and had to become a real campaigning political subject competing for voters’ 
support (Mason 1996, 99-100).  
In the economic sphere, the collapse of socialist economies was also imminent. In 
the mid-1970’s, countries of Central Europe and the Soviet Union experienced a period 
of stagnation. This was a warning sign of an upcoming economic crisis that resulted in 
the deterioration of living standards across the Soviet Bloc. The transformation to a 
market economy in Central Europe, along with the restitution of private ownership of 
property, was therefore essential. Central European countries chose between a gradual 
step-by-step economic reform and a quick, simultaneous approach, called “shock 
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therapy” (Shaw 1999, 72-93). While trying to implement important reforms in all areas of 
life, Central European countries struggled with many problems such as economic 
deterioration, growing nationalism, and political instability. 
 
Slovakia’s Path to Post-Communism 
 To fully comprehend the development of Slovak democracy in the post-
communist era, it is imperative to understand the history of Czechoslovakia, the role of 
political parties and their linkages to voters, and to put Slovakia’s transformation to 
democracy in this larger context, which is the focus of this dissertation. 
Czechoslovakia was established as an independent country in 1918 as a result of 
the breakdown of the Habsburg monarchy and the spread of Western influence in Central 
Europe. Prior to unification, both Czechs and Slovaks were constituents of the Habsburg 
Empire.  While both of them shared compatible languages, social structures, standards of 
living, and educational levels, there were several important differences between Czechs 
and Slovaks in their administrative and political expertise, ethnic and religious structures, 
and their levels of urbanization (Henderson 2002, 1-8).  
 Czechoslovakia had extensive experience when it came to democracy. In the 
period between the two world wars, among all Central European states, Czechoslovakia 
was considered one of the most democratic countries, with a Western type of political 
system. According to the 1920 constitution, Czechoslovakia was a parliamentary 
democracy with a multi-party system. However, this changed with the German 
occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and with the establishment of a separate Slovak 
state led by Josef Tiso (Pithart and Spencer 1998, 185). This “…clerico-fascist Slovak 
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state which emerged was nothing more nor less than a puppet-satellite of Nazi Germany” 
(Dowling 2002, 59). In 1944 Czechoslovakia was liberated from Nazi rule by the Soviet 
Red Army and the Czech and Slovak lands rejoined. However, this liberation did not 
come without consequences; it dramatically increased the strength of the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia and its influence on all aspects of the country’s political and 
social life (Henderson 2002, 17). As a result of the 1946 elections, the Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia established itself as the dominant political force in the country and in 
1948 Czechoslovakia became a totalitarian country with an oppressive and rigid political 
system. 
 In the beginning of 1968 Alexander Dubček, an advocate of major system 
reforms, became the new head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Under 
Dubček’s leadership, an Action Program, the reformist program of the Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia, was introduced with the slogan “socialism with a human face 
(Dowling 2002, 107; Wheaton and Kavan 1992, 3-4). The Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia chose an innovative strategy of no longer concentrating on the 
monopolization of its power, but instead putting a new emphasis on public support. This 
process, which was two decades later labeled by Gorbachev as glasnost, resulted in the 
elimination of censorship, allowing freedom of speech and expression, and the 
establishment of various civic political and social organizations that were beyond the 
scope of the party. Such an organization was Charter 77; established in 1977, it played a 
major role in the history of Czechoslovakia’s struggle against the communist totalitarian 
regime. Among its members were elites of the future democratic Czechoslovakia who 
helped to bring down the communist dictatorship in the country, as part of the Velvet 
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Revolution.  Also, for the first time, public opinion played a significant role in these first 
attempts at democratization. Furthermore, democratic political forces outlined their 
political programs to confront the leading role of the Communist Party in the country. 
Consequently, the political system in Czechoslovakia increasingly began to bear a 
resemblance to the one of the pre-1948 period (Bankowicz 1994, 152-155). 
 However, the Soviet Communist Party grew gradually more alarmed at the 
direction Czechoslovakia was taking and made a decision to intervene and send troops to 
ensure return of Czechoslovakia to “communist normalcy”. Accordingly, on August 20, 
1968, Warsaw Pact forces took over Prague and major cities of Czechoslovakia and 
progress toward democratization was disrupted. The dramatic and, at times, horrific 
events of the Prague Spring were thus followed by the process of normalization which 
lasted for two decades. The new regime, led by communists, made a decision to keep 
Soviet troops permanently on the territory of Czechoslovakia and used internal security 
forces and other draconian instruments of state power to enforce civil obedience 
(Wheaton and Kavan 1992, 6; Bankowicz 1994, 154). 
 In 1988 the relationship between the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the 
Czechoslovak society worsened due to failing economic conditions in the country and 
also as a result of democratic transformations occurring in Poland, Hungary, and East 
Germany. There was an increase in public disapproval, which resulted in a new 
phenomenon of this era – public demonstrations.  The unauthorized demonstrations, 
headed by elites representing the old dissident groups called for freedom in 
Czechoslovakia, for profound political and economic reforms, and mainly for 
abolishment of the Communist Party and the resignation of its leaders (Wheaton and 
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Kavan 1992, 24). While the communists used brutal police force and imprisonment to 
stop demonstrators, it seemed as if that response produced even more demonstrations and 
a growing number of new opposition groups. 
 In June 1989, Charter 77 confronted the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
with the “‘Several Sentences’ in which the need for democracy, pluralism and tolerance 
in Czechoslovakia was emphasized”. Václav Havel, a main activist in Charter 77, 
became a leading figure of the Velvet Revolution. Soon afterwards, by refusing to 
cooperate with the opposition, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was totally 
marginalized, and as a result of intense public pressure the party leadership was forced to 
resign (Bankowicz 1994, 156-157). The 1989 Velvet Revolution was without doubt the 
most important milestone in the history of modern Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the Velvet 
Revolution was part of the chain reaction that brought the end of the communist 
dictatorship not only in Czechoslovakia but throughout Central Europe. 
 With the help of two major political movements, the Public Against Violence 
(Verejnosť Proti Násiliu) in Slovakia and the Civic Forum (Občanské Fórum) in the 
Czech Republic and a number of dissident groups the end of communist rule was 
successfully achieved. At the same time however, a new tendency occurred, where rising 
ethnic tensions and conflicting political agendas between Czechs and Slovaks became 
evident.  This division also continued in the 1990 election, which was the first free and 
democratic election after the country’s transition from the communist regime. According 
to the 1968 constitution, Czechoslovakia was a federal republic, consisting of the Czech 
Republic and the Slovak Republic. The country had a bicameral federal legislature 
(Federálne Zhromaždenie) elected every five years. The Federal Assembly consisted of 
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the House of Nations (Snemovňa Národov) and the House of the People (Snemovňa 
Ľudu) (Cox and Frankland 1995, 80). Furthermore, there were two Communist Parties in 
each republic running in elections separately. 
As a result of the 1990 election, the Civic Forum in the Czech Republic with 49.5 
percent of votes and the Public Against Violence in the Slovak Republic with 29.4 
percent of votes won the election (Statistical Yearbook of the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic 1991).  However, while anti-communism was a unifying force during the 1990 
election, soon after the election, due to the fragile party organization structure and the 
lack of consensus within both parties, the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence 
divided into various factions and by 1991 the two political parties disappeared from the 
political scene.  
 The common goal of ending the totalitarian system, which unified the country 
shortly after the break up of communist rule, was now no longer the crucial factor in the 
politics of Czechoslovakia. There were not only important cultural and economic 
differences between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but also different approaches in 
party representation and political style. Moreover, the Czechs believed that Slovaks were 
taking advantage of their financial resources, while Slovaks felt often used by Czechs, 
who were stronger both politically and economically (Bankowicz 1994, 163). 
Consequently, these issues had a negative effect on the relationship between the two 
republics. 
 The result of the 1992 parliamentary election was the last significant factor that 
contributed to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. In Slovakia, the leading Movement for 
a Democratic Slovakia with Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar and the Slovak National 
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Party were the strongest supporters of an independent Slovakia. In the Czech Republic 
Václav Klaus, the leader of the winning Czech Civil Democratic Party was also in favor 
of dismantling Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, scholars suggest if a referendum would 
have been held on this question at that time, the Czech and Slovak people would most 
likely have supported preservation of Czechoslovakia (Shepherd 2000, 144-145). 
However, it never came to a popular vote, and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was 
negotiated strictly by political elites. As a result of these events, on January 1, 1993, 
Czechoslovakia peacefully divided into independent Czech and Slovak Republics, the so-
called Velvet Divorce. 
 
Slovakia’s Experience Since 1993 
Slovakia’s recent political transformation since 1993, as will be made clear 
below, is part of the wider Central European experience. The communist era had a strong 
effect on Slovakia. First, it resulted in low economic growth due to the command 
structure of economy, “the widespread alienation of the population from the political 
system, distrust of political leaders, lack of interest in joining political organizations and 
the erosion of morality in the public and private spheres” (Wolchik 1997, 202). Thus, the 
establishment of democratic political institutions after the fall of communism and the 
Velvet Divorce was problematic for Slovakia. 
Slovakia experienced a number of setbacks while trying to establish stable 
democratic political institutions. The creation of political parties and groups in the 
country was a challenge that was affected by several factors. First was the country’s pre-
communist and communist past, and its impact on the political values and attitudes of the 
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citizens as well as political elites. Then, the effect of the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 
the process of building the state, and in addition the impact of personality and leadership 
on the development of the party system and Slovak politics in general (mainly the 
influence of Vladimír Mečiar) presented yet additional challenges (Dawisha and Parrott 
1997, 198-199). 
While Slovakia made great efforts towards establishing democracy, Mečiar, the 
leading figure of post-1989 Slovak politics, played a significant role in slowing down 
these efforts. Slovak politics were largely criticized not only by the domestic opposition, 
but also by the international community for following a nationalist and populist political 
program, and also for repeated violations of democratic principles by the country’s 
government. Mečiar and his party – the populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko, or HZDS) had ruled unchallenged since the country 
separated from Czechoslovakia and became an independent state. 
 Mečiar created a poor image of Slovakia in the long term and, as a result, the 
country lost its opportunity to join NATO and the European Union in the first round with 
the so-called “fast-track” group of applicants – the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Hungary. Although Slovakia was recognized for its strong economic performance on the 
one hand, the country was left off the invitation list due to its underdeveloped democratic 
institutions and Mečiar’s ethnocentric and often brutal politics. As a result, Slovakia 
depicted an unfavorable image in Western countries and failed in foreign policy issues 
due to its democratic deficit. 
After 1998, when the opposition coalition with Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda 
came to power, the situation rapidly improved. Slovakia not only recovered its 
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relationship with neighboring countries, but also began negotiations to join NATO, the 
European Union, and become a part of a democratic Europe. 
 
EU Enlargement 
For newly independent Slovakia, as well as other post-communist countries of 
Central Europe, the democratic transition was a significant geopolitical move to the West. 
For that reason, membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) became a primary foreign policy goal for the fledgling Slovak 
state. Furthermore, the European Union and other international organizations made a 
significant impact on incipient Slovak electoral and party politics. A large number of 
public announcements made by EU and NATO officials addressed to Slovak society 
helped to increase awareness of the importance of making pro-democratic electoral 
decisions and negative consequences if they did not (Korba 2003, 238-243). In addition, 
progress in European Union integration became part of the intense Slovak political 
contest.  
During the communist era there was almost no relationship between the Central 
European countries and the European Community (precursor to the EU), which was the 
result of the negative attitude of the Soviet leadership towards the Western European 
states. Thus, enlargement of the European Union eastwards represented a great historical 
opportunity for the countries of Central Europe. Enlargement aspired to fill the gap 
caused by decades of East-West confrontation and the Cold War. Enlargement also 
symbolized the moral and emotional call for a united Europe. Political, economic, and 
security dimensions are additional aspects of EU enlargement eastwards. After the fall of 
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communism in Central Europe, one way the European Union expressed its support for the 
process of democratization in the region was by providing financial and technical 
assistance to the newly introduced liberal democracies and market economies. One of the 
most significant aid programs was the PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the 
Reconstruction of the Economy) program aimed to reinforce the political and social basis 
of a liberal democratic political system (Gower 1999, 4). 
“EU enlargement is not just a trivial bureaucratic exercise; it is a powerful 
generator of historical change in the region” (Ekiert and Zielonka 2003, 9-10). As noted, 
there were several practical or tangible reasons why becoming part of the European 
Union was so important for countries of Central Europe. But issues of European identity 
were probably the most significant motives. As a result of the Cold War, countries of the 
former Soviet bloc felt that they had lost their “European” identity, so for that reason 
becoming a member of the European Union was a way to “rejoin” Europe. The “return to 
Europe” was “…not only a symbol of the transition but also the guarantor of the systemic 
reconfiguration of the post-communist decade” (Bielasiak 2002, 1241). Therefore, 
accession into the European Union became a primary foreign policy goal for the 
governments of the Central European countries. The elites from the newly elected 
governments signed all necessary international agreements to make the integration 
process as swift as possible (Grabbe 2003, 68-69).  
Furthermore, the former communist states believed that European integration 
would be the best guarantee for continuation of the path towards a united and prosperous 
Europe based on values of democracy and human rights. In addition, for almost all post-
communist states, joining the European Union was always a symbol of reintegration into 
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the world economy and pan-European markets. Membership in the EU offered vast 
economic advantages that include increased foreign direct investment and technology 
transfers as well as financial assistance programs aimed to support a long-term economic 
growth.  For those reasons all Central European countries began fundamental reforms to 
establish liberal democratic political systems and market economies. They were 
determined to fulfill all necessary requirements and obligations to become part of the 
European Union in the shortest possible time.  
 However, integration into the European Union was not an easy task; rather it was 
a major challenge as well as a complex process that demanded considerable time. It is 
important to note that no previous applicant began the integration process at such a low 
starting point as did the nations of Central Europe. Becoming a member of the European 
Union requires commitment from the government of each country and it involves a 
difficult transformation of a country’s political institutions, economy, laws, culture, and 
society. In addition, the European Union itself has a long list of rules and conditions in 
political and economic sphere fulfillment of which is a prerequisite for membership. 
From the beginning, the integration process involved several levels that had to be 
accomplished in order for Slovakia to become a permanent member of the European 
Union. The first prerequisite was Slovakia’s participation in the institutional structures of 
the European Union. The second prerequisite for European Union membership was 
adoption of the EU’s existing legislation, the acquis communautaire, which embodied the 
establishment of the institutional and regulatory framework of the EU. Moreover, this 
prerequisite of membership allowed Slovakia to access the European Union’s funds and 
programs (Cameron 2003, 24-29).  
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After the division of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Republic acquired associate 
member status, and in 1993 Slovakia signed the so-called “Europe Agreement” with the 
European Union countries as part of the framework for gradual political and economic 
integration (Škrabala 2002, 1). While the Slovak government, headed by Prime Minister 
Mečiar, publicly expressed its commitment to democratic values, in reality the European 
Union was disappointed by the actions of the Mečiar administration.  
In 1995 Mečiar submitted a formal application of the Slovak Republic for 
European Union membership to the European Commission (Škrabala 2002, 1). However, 
bad news for the future of Slovakia came in July of 1997 when the European 
Commission (EC) informed Mečiar’s government that the country had not succeeded in 
meeting adequate political conditions set by the Copenhagen European Council for EU 
membership. As a result, the Commission made a recommendation to exclude Slovakia 
from the first group of states with which European Union accession talks were to begin in 
early 1998 (Hamžík 1998, 213-219).  
The EU’s Copenhagen criteria provided the framework for the assessment of 
Slovakia’s eligibility for membership in the European Union. According to these criteria 
membership requires “…stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union” (Pridham 2002, 224). While it was affirmed that Slovakia had 
achieved positive economic progress, and would be able to meet the necessary economic 
criteria, the country did not accomplish fulfillment of the political conditions set out by 
the European Council in Copenhagen because of the “instability of Slovakia’s 
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institutions, their lack of rootedness in political life and the shortcomings in the 
functioning of its democracy” (European Commission 1997, 125-130). Although the 
European Commission pointed out that free and fair elections had been held in the 
country, the EC was not satisfied with the respect for ethnic minorities in Slovakia, 
especially when it came to exercising rights of the Hungarian and Roma minorities. 
While improvement in certain areas was highlighted, as in the case of the Hungarian 
minority, the European Commission emphasized the substantial discrimination of the 
Roma population on a daily basis, including their lack of protection from the police and 
being subjected to continuous attacks from neo-fascist “skinheads” (Newton and Walsh 
1999, 266-268).  
Other reasons that made Slovakia fail the required political criteria were the feud 
between the Slovak President and Prime Minister, disrespect for verdicts made by the 
Constitutional Court, deterioration of freedom of expression in the media, the 
unsuccessful quest for the elimination of corruption, attacks on representatives of media, 
academia, religious leaders and non-governmental organizations, and questionable use of 
police and secret service by the government (Newton and Walsh 1999, 266). 
The undemocratic practices of Mečiar’s administration also contributed to the 
deterioration of Slovakia’s image abroad. In addition, as a result of Mečiar’s authoritarian 
tactics, the relationship between the Slovak government and the European Union became 
extremely antagonistic. Not becoming part of the first group of countries set for 
negotiations for European Union membership was very unfortunate for Slovakia, since 
the country was the only one from the group of Central European states that was singled 
out for delay. Nevertheless, instead of making appropriate changes, the Slovak 
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government persistently denied all accusations voiced by the Commission and continued 
to ignore the EC’s requests for improvement, which were sent in the form of declarations 
and demarches. Perversely, Mečiar’s administration continued passing legislation that 
seemed to disregard EU rules and expectations. Consequently, it was not clear whether 
Slovakia could possibly catch up in the speedy integration with “fast track” candidates 
such as the Czech Republic and Hungary (Newton and Walsh 1999, 253-263). Although 
Slovakia’s chances to become part of the European Union were not permanently 
eliminated, it was evident that only a new government could return Slovakia to the path 
of European integration. 
As mentioned earlier, the process of Slovak accession into the European Union 
was slowed down from the start owing to the policies and practices of Vladimír Mečiar, 
who ruled the country as a Prime Minister from 1994 to 1998.  Slovakia’s failure to 
receive an invitation to the first EU accession group was largely due to Mečiar’s 
leadership. As a result, the Slovak people became more vocal in voicing their support for 
democratic principles in the 1998 parliamentary election. Therefore, some part of 
Mečiar’s defeat in that election is attributable to Slovakia’s problems with EU accession. 
After the 1998 parliamentary election, when the opposition coalition with Prime 
Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda came to power, the situation rapidly improved. Slovakia not 
only recovered its relationship with neighboring countries, but also began negotiations to 
join the European Union as a country of the “fast track” group. Thus, at the end of 1998 
the European Commission, although pleased with the results of the parliamentary 
elections, however emphasized important steps Slovakia still needed to take in order to 
achieve the necessary political progress. After fulfillment of these political changes, such 
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as adoption of the law on the use of minority languages and providing stability of 
political institutions, the European Commission expressed its satisfaction with the overall 
status of Slovakia. 
In January 1999, as part of the preparation for European Union membership, the 
Slovak government accepted a list of 86 tasks set by the EU that would prepare different 
sectors for the integration process. By the end of the 1999, the Helsinki Summit decided 
to open negotiations with Slovakia, as well as other candidate countries, on the process of 
enlargement. Later in 2000 the European Parliament approved a resolution on 
enlargement of the European Union to countries of Central Europe by 2004 (Škrabala 
2002, 2). The hope was that the Slovak Republic would still be able to join the European 
Union in the first accession group.  
In early 2002, the European Commission released its report on progress in 
preparation for the integration of Central European and other states into the European 
Union. Based on an economic and political assessment, ten of thirteen candidate 
countries – the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Malta and the Slovak Republic - met all required criteria for EU membership. 
Based on the decision made at the 2002 Summit of the European Union in Copenhagen, 
the Slovak Republic was among ten candidates recommended for integration into the 
European Union in May 2004 (Škrabala 2002, 3).  
In May 2003, Slovakia held a referendum on EU membership asking Slovak 
citizens whether they agreed with the proposal that the Slovak Republic should become a 
member country of the European Union. Fifty-two point two percent (52.2) of eligible 
voters participated, 92.5 percent of which expressed their support for integration into the 
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European Union (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 2003). As a result, the road to 
the EU was now clear. This was a profound accomplishment for Slovakia and other post-
communist countries that were among the first group in the EU enlargement process after 
the fall of communism in Central Europe. Moreover, this was the largest enlargement in 
the history of European Union. 
On May 1, 2004 Slovakia along with nine other countries officially became part 
of the European Union. Joining the European Union was definitely a major step towards 
reaffirmation of the country’s status as a modern European state. The European Union is 
not only a central international and regional organization, but also a major source of aid, 
trade, and investment. Moreover, many Slovaks, as well as people in other Central 
European countries, hope that with accession to the European Union they will be able to 
enjoy similar benefits and standards of living as previous EU member states. Such 
benefits include political stability, the EU’s financial assistance, higher rates of economic 
growth, employment opportunities, and fair competition in a wider zone of peace, 
security and justice. 
However, in particular, European Union enlargement had an enormous influence 
on post-communist electoral politics in Slovakia. In the past decade there were consistent 
and intensive pressures and warnings from the international community, especially from 
the representatives of the European Union and NATO, to Slovak voters not to choose 
Mečiar as the country’s future leader; otherwise, there was no chance for Slovakia to 
become integrated into the democratic West. For example, prior to 2002 election US 
Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns announced: “no undemocratic movement, party or 
government has any place in NATO. We are convinced that the previous [Slovak] 
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administration did not show respect for democratic values and the rule of law… There is 
no evidence that the leadership of the previously ruling party has changed” (Korba 2003,  
238). Representatives of the European Commission and European Parliament confirmed 
that the 2002 parliamentary election symbolized for Slovakia a possibility to prove their 
interest and their readiness for European democracy. Therefore, partially as a result of 
these pressures, results of the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections demonstrated that 
Slovakia remains on the democratic path and has fulfilled all political requirements 
mandatory for membership in the European Union. European Union membership also 
became part of a strong political rivalry in Slovakia itself. As Milada Vachudova asserts, 
the stringent requirements for EU membership had a strong influence on emerging party 
systems in newly established democracies. To gain support of voters, major political 
parties used possibility of EU membership towards their advantage by adopting political 
agendas that were in line with membership requirements (July 2009, 179-180; 2008, 
861). Furthermore, mass attitudes not only contributed to the establishment of democratic 
system in Central Europe, but they also played a key role in the success of new 
institutions and reforms associated with the EU membership. Political parties had an 
important role in shaping public attitudes towards the European Union enlargement. 
Therefore, political parties matter to European Union membership. 
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
Given this background, the issue to be studied is the electoral geography of the 
Slovak Republic and what that tells us about the country’s transition to multiparty 
democracy. Within that broad subject, I first describe and then analyze regional variations 
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in voting behavior in post-communist Slovakia. The Slovak Republic, as a newly 
democratic country, provides an excellent case with which to examine how and why the 
country’s electoral geography changed during the democratic transformation. Because 
fair democratic elections are crucial for the functioning of democratic interest 
intermediation, this study concentrates on the role of political parties and their linkages to 
voters. More specifically, based on case study of Slovakia, I examine how and propose 
reasons why electoral support changed or not within various geographic regions during 
the country’s ten years of democratic transformation.  
The circumstances I investigate include two periods of transition to democracy, 
and the preparatory period for European Union accession. Accordingly, I test hypotheses 
in three different electoral settings within Slovakia: 
• The 1994 parliamentary elections 
• The 1998 parliamentary elections 
• The 2002 parliamentary elections 
Thus, the primary purpose of this dissertation is to describe and explain regional 
variations in party support during Slovakia’s ten years of democratic transformation by 
reference to social and economic characteristics of the population in the regions of 
Slovakia. A secondary purpose is to relate these spatial variations to the evolution of 
political parties in the post-independence period in light of the literature on transitional 
electoral systems. Finally, I focus in part on the manner in which a party’s stance on EU 
accession relates to its electoral strength in the regions. 
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Research Problem 
 There are two facets of the research problem: (1) explaining party and candidate 
preference, and (2) explaining differences in voter turnout. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
: Question # 1: What is the electoral geography of Slovakia and how has it changed, or not, 
during the decade of the country’s democratic transition? 
Question # 2: How do the socio-economic characteristics of the Slovak population in 
different regions influence voting preferences in the parliamentary elections? 
Question # 3: In terms of European Union enlargement, is there a correlation between 
voters’ preferences of political parties and the way the public perceives political parties in 
government either as advocates of European Union membership or in contrasting stance? 
Hypothesis #1: There is a tendency among voters in certain regions to provide continuous 
support to the same political parties/movements over time. 
Hypothesis #2: Socio-economic characteristics of the Slovak population (gender, age, 
education, nationality, employment, income, type of household) in different regions tend 
to influence voting preferences in the parliamentary elections. 
Hypothesis #3: There is a correlation between party preference and a party’s position on 
integration into European Union, as measured by perceived attitudes regarding the 
benefits of EU membership. 
Significance of the Study 
The Slovak Republic, as a newly democratic country, went through the 
establishment of the electoral and party systems that are the central mechanisms to the 
formation of almost all modern democratic governments. There remains a large gap in 
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research on the electoral geography of the newly democratic countries, such as the Slovak 
Republic. Thus, the dissertation will make an empirical contribution not only to the study 
of electoral geography, but also to the understanding of political party formation in 
Central Europe and, in particular, Slovakia. Further, the results of this study will inform 
existing theory or concepts by testing relationships between socio-economic correlations 
and voting patterns, and by explaining regional variations in the spatial pattern of party 
support. In addition, my dissertation tests correlations between party preference and a 
party’s position on European Union membership, proving that integration into the 
European Union has a significant impact on domestic politics in Slovakia. 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter 1 provides the historical context in which Slovakia made its transition to 
multiparty democracy. The discussion starts with a brief synopsis of the Soviet 
experience, and continues with the struggle of the Central European countries to 
democratize that slowly began under communist regimes and consolidated after the fall 
of communism. Furthermore, the case of Czechoslovakia is introduced, including a short 
history of the country, followed by the discussion of Velvet Divorce and the unstable 
period of Mečiar’s government in the now-independent Slovakia. The chapter also 
highlights the enormous importance of the EU in post-communist electoral politics. In 
addition, Chapter 1 presents the general statement of problem area, research purpose, 
research problem, research questions and hypotheses, and significance of study. 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review of party formation, the choice and 
implications of electoral systems, and the determinants of voting behavior, in general and 
in the post-communist states. The chapter discusses the main types and elements of 
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political parties and electoral systems chosen by countries of Central Europe after they 
began their process of democratization. Furthermore, the strengths and weaknesses of 
various kinds of electoral systems are illustrated. In addition, the chapter identifies the 
effects electoral systems may have had on party formation in Slovakia and other 
countries in transition. 
Chapter 3 provides the review of the literature on electoral geography as a 
methodology using aggregate data, including comparisons with studies employing survey 
or individual level data, and a detailed discussion of the methods and data used in the 
study. 
Chapter 4 presents the case of Slovakia. A description of the Slovak electoral 
system and different types of political parties in Slovakia is presented. Furthermore, the 
electoral geography of Slovakia based on the 1994, 1998 and 2002 Slovak parliamentary 
elections is discussed and analyzed. The chapter explains the electoral geography of 
Slovakia and how has it changed during the ten years of Slovakia’s democratic 
transformation. Explanations of party and candidate preference, as well as differences in 
voter turnout are offered. The chapter also provides conclusions on how the socio-
economic characteristics of the Slovakia’s population in different regions affect voting 
preferences in the parliamentary elections. In addition, in terms of European Union 
enlargement, the chapter makes conclusions on whether there is a correlation between 
voters preferences of political parties and the way the public perceives political parties in 
government either as advocates of European Union membership or in contrasting stance. 
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Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the major findings and conclusions and relates the 
same to the aforementioned literature. This chapter also offers specific implications for 
regional variations in voting behavior in post-communist Slovakia.  
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CHAPTER II 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, PARTIES, AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 
POST-COMMUNIST STATES 
Democracy is a political system characterized by regular competitive elections, 
multiple parties and candidacies, and freedom of the press. (Parrott 1997, 4). Therefore, 
the implementation of competitive elections is a precondition for any democratic system, 
and essential to the long-term legitimacy of the liberal democratic state. After the fall of 
communism in Central Europe, all post-communist elites acknowledged their 
commitment not only to democratization but also to the creation of democratic electoral 
systems and liberalization of electoral rules. Further, all of the states of Central Europe in 
fact held multiparty elections subsequent to the end of communist rule according to 
whatever electoral system that each had adopted. These elections provide us with a 
wealth of data with which to study the effects of electoral systems, the genesis of post-
communist parties, and the determinants of voting behavior. A large, and growing, 
literature has emerged on the transition to democracy in the region, and relevant studies 
will be reviewed in this chapter. 
The choice of an electoral system has several profound implications for the 
manner in which democratization occurs, including issues of representation and the 
formation of political parties, these, of course, similarly being crucial to competitive 
elections. Accordingly, we first review the general literature on electoral systems and 
then specifically discuss their implementation in the post-communist states of Central 
Europe. In addition, in light of this review, the chapter discusses party formation in the 
post-communist countries and identifies the effects electoral systems may have had on 
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party formation in the transition countries. Furthermore, a review of literature on models 
of voting behavior in the post-communist countries and factors that influence voter 
choices is provided. Finally, each of the foregoing is related directly to the case of 
Slovakia to provide the conceptual context for the data analysis that follows. 
 
Electoral Systems 
As Farrell notes, “Electoral systems determine the means by which votes are 
translated into seats in the process of electing politicians into office” (2001, 4). Thus, the 
electoral system is the major institutional aspect that affects the development and nature 
of the country’s party system. Scholars argue that the nature of the electoral system 
influences the type of party system and the number of parties that develop by affecting 
strategic thinking of voters and political elites. Further, electoral systems define how 
political systems will function and ensure their legitimacy. Countries select their electoral 
system to assemble powerful and steady governments, fulfill voters’ preferences, and 
elect competent candidates (Farrell 1997, 2-3). Electoral systems not only shape the 
number of major political parties operating in a country, but they are also the subject of 
struggle and manipulation by politicians, because of their effect on political outcomes.  
Recent change in Italy’s electoral system is an example of such manipulation by 
political leaders. Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi, the media mogul and businessman 
who has influenced practically every sphere of Italian economic and social life, pressed 
for change from a mixed to a proportional representation electoral system. Berlusconi’s 
government modified Italy’s electoral system less than four months before the 2006  
election. The new electoral system was established with very low thresholds, 4 percent 
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for a political party and 2 percent for coalition, thus encouraging political parties to join 
the coalitions. Furthermore, Berlusconi’s political party Forza Italia was formed only a 
few months prior to the 1994 election and still was able to win the election. Clearly, the 
dramatic changes occurring in post-communist countries have some similar features with 
the changes happening in long-standing electoral democracies such as Italy (Belluci 
2008, 185-188; Hopkin 2004, 5). 
According to Arend Lijphart, there are three main types of electoral systems used 
in the post-communist countries of Central Europe: majority-plurality, proportional 
representation (or PR), and semi-proportional electoral systems (1994, 10): 
Majoritarian systems can be divided into three subtypes - plurality, two-ballot, 
and the alternative vote systems. There are a large number of districts in all majoritarian 
systems that are often equal or close to the size of the legislative assembly. In 
majoritarian systems there is an evident tendency for favoring large political parties, 
which causes disadvantages to small parties, and consequently results in 
disproportionality of electoral outcomes (Lijphart 1994, 18-21). Furthermore, in a weak 
party situation the majoritarian system undermines the status of parties by allowing the 
proliferation of independents. In summary, majoritarian systems are not only less 
representative, but they are also a discouraging factor to the formation of a multi-party 
system. On the positive side, by providing two-party majority governments, majoritarian 
systems are much more stable than multiparty coalitions in PR systems (Moser 2001, 32). 
Proportional Representation (PR) systems are not only the most common type of 
electoral systems, but moreover they were chosen by many post-communist countries due 
to the fact that with a PR system a country could achieve greater proportionality and 
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probably better minority representation than with a majoritarian system. For example, 
small political parties have a much better chance to receive representation (i.e., to win 
legislative seats) in a PR system than in a majoritarian system, where in most cases only 
two political parties compete. Maurice Duverger argues that “proportionality results in a 
multiparty system; the more proportional the system, the greater the number of political 
parties” (1963, 205). The main limitations of a PR system are its failure to promote the 
nationalization of parties in regions; its emphasis on charismatic leadership; its tendency 
to promote ideological extremism and polarization; and the proliferation of parties, e.g., 
Russia with 43 parties in 1995. However, Lijphart asserts that proportional representation 
systems allow better representation of minorities, implying that proportional 
representation systems are therefore the best alternative for new countries in transition 
(1994, 10-25).  
In semi-proportional electoral systems, or mixed electoral systems, 
representatives are “elected in both party-list (PR) contests in large multimember districts 
and plurality or two-round majoritarian elections in single-member districts” (Moser 
1999, 365). It is argued that mixed electoral systems have a tendency to generate 
moderate levels of disproportionality and multipartism. Therefore, many post-communist 
countries opted to use this type of electoral system.  
According to electoral studies, several elements of electoral systems affect not 
only proportionality of the electoral system, but also party formation in the post-
communist countries. The most important among them are legal threshold, electoral 
formula, and district magnitude.   
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Legal Threshold 
The legal threshold is the least amount of support that a political party needs to 
attain to obtain representation (seats). It is typically implemented at the national level, but 
also could be implemented at the regional or district level. This minimum could be 
characterized by the country’s electoral law as for example a minimum percentage of 
votes, or certain number of votes that a party is required to obtain in order to qualify for 
legislative seat distribution. The increased legal threshold encourages party consolidation 
by decreasing representation of small political parties. Overall, the high legal threshold 
could have the same function as low district magnitudes (Lijphart 1994, 11-12). 
 
Electoral Formula 
The second significant element of electoral systems and party formation is the 
electoral formula, which is a procedure for converting the number of votes into seats. In 
general, there are four most common electoral formulas: mixed, PR, plurality, and two-
round majoritarian. In mixed systems, which represent a combination of PR and 
majoritarian systems, voters cast two ballots in different electoral tiers. In a PR system, 
even though the electoral formula differs, there is always competition between lists of 
candidates in multimember districts, and seats are allocated in accordance with the 
number of votes in a district.  
The two-round majoritarian electoral formula is held in a single-member district, 
where the winner must get a majority of votes cast. In case no candidate receives a 
majority, a second round is held generally between the two candidates who obtained the 
highest number of votes in the first round. In addition, according to the plurality formula 
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the candidate with the most votes in a single-member district (SMD) wins the election 
despite the number of votes cast (Moser 2001, 33-34).  
 
District Magnitude 
Another element of electoral systems that can affect multi-party systems and 
overall proportionality is district magnitude – the number of representatives allocated for 
a district or constituency (Taagapera and Shugart 1989, 13). Based on district magnitude, 
a country could be divided into many electoral districts, each district sending one 
representative to the legislature (SMDs); an all-national electoral district that comprises 
all representatives; or territorial multimember districts with two or more representatives 
(Moser 2001, 33-34). Douglas Rae points out that there are three stages in the change of 
votes into seats: balloting, districting, and the electoral formula. Rae emphasizes that 
there is a difference between the term district magnitude (the number of seats in a 
district) and district size. Furthermore, Rae asserts that district magnitude has a greater 
influence on proportionality than the electoral formula (1967, 6, 114-125). 
 
Other Features of Electoral Systems 
In addition to these main elements of electoral systems, there are several other 
features that could also have an effect on party formation and proportionality of the 
system – assembly size, ballot structure, apparentement, presidentialism and the 
possibility of malapportionment.  
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- Assembly size is the dimension of the electoral system, which represents the 
total number of seats in the legislature. Assembly size can affect the outcome of party 
representation when the total number of votes is translated into seats.  
- Ballot structure is another aspect of electoral systems which can very much 
shape party formation. It can be ordinal, allowing voters to split their votes among two or 
more political parties, or categorical, if the voters can choose only one political party. 
- Apparentement is when voters choose from a group of inter-party lists and 
parties then combine the votes to allot seats. This is specific primarily for PR systems. 
The approval of use of apparentement could be very important for small parties, since 
almost all types of electoral systems are partial to larger political parties. 
- Presidential systems could have a significant influence on legislative elections 
and multi-party system, if presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently. In 
presidential elections, only large parties have a chance to nominate their candidates for 
the post, thus small parties are disadvantaged, and as a whole presidentialism could be an 
obstacle to the maturation of multi-party systems. 
- Malapportionment, or disproportionality, could occur in single-member district 
systems, where districts have uneven voting populations, or in multi-member districts, 
where magnitudes are not equivalent with the voting populations (Lijphart 1994, 12-15). 
 
Electoral Systems in the Post-Communist Countries 
The democratic transition in the post-communist countries began with the 
establishment of new electoral systems. Elections were held with multi-party 
representation, which resulted in a rapid proliferation of political parties of all types.  
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 Poland was the first Central European country that was able to break free from 
communist rule and turn the nation towards a democratic path. As many other post-
communist countries, Poland adopted a PR electoral system. Poland’s parliament was 
established with two chambers – the Sejm and the Senate. The Sejm has 460 members, 
elected for a four-year term by proportional representation. Originally, there was no 
electoral threshold established, however due to high levels of party proliferation during 
1991 election, the threshold was later adjusted to 5 percent (8% for coalitions, 
requirement waived for national minorities). Furthermore, the Polish government 
changed the number of constituencies from 52 to 41. The Polish Senate has 100 members 
elected by simple majority vote for a four-year term (IFES Election Guide – Poland  
2008, 1; IPU 2008, 1; Shvetsova 1999, 401; Millard 2003, 70).  
 The Czech Republic made a decision to continue using a PR electoral system after 
the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. In addition, the country’s parliamentary jurisdiction 
decided to favor a bicameral assembly – a parliament that is composed of a Senate with 
81 members, elected for a six-year term in single seat constituencies by absolute majority 
vote. Furthermore, the Czech National Council, renamed the Chamber of Deputies, has 
200 members, elected for a four-year term by proportional representation with a 5 percent 
legal threshold (IFES Election Guide – Czech Republic 2008, 1; IPU 2008, 1). The 
establishment of a PR electoral system in the Czech Republic resulted in the proliferation 
of political parties and movements. For example, in 1990 elections, 66 political parties, 
with no organizational structure or mass membership, entered the electoral competition 
(Wightman 1995, 240). 
 
 38 
Hungary, on the other hand, decided to adopt a mixed electoral system that 
represented a combination of PR and majoritarian electoral system. Hungary established 
a unicameral National Assembly, with 176 members elected in SMDs by majority of 
votes in two-round voting and 210 members elected in 20 territorial multi-member 
districts through proportional representation.  As in the case of Poland, the legal threshold 
in the Hungarian PR tier increased from 4 percent in 1990 to 5 percent in 1994 (IFES 
Election Guide – Hungary 2008, 1; IPU 2008, 1, Shvetsova 1999, 400). 
After the break up of communist rule, Russia adopted a mixed electoral system 
with a 5 percent threshold aimed to prevent proliferation of small parties. The plurality 
part of Russian elections surprisingly created more representation of small parties than 
the PR part and although it was expected that it would produce two-party competition; 
this did not happen due to low party identification and weak institutionalized party 
system. Currently, Russia’s Federal Assembly is comprised of State Duma with 450 
members elected in one nationwide constituency through proportional representation and 
Council of the Federation with 178 members elected in 89 multi-member (2 seats) 
districts.  (IFES Election Guide – Russia 2008, 1; IPU 2008, 1). 
The latest rounds of parliamentary elections and political developments in Central 
European countries are proof that the electoral systems in the post-communist countries 
are still transforming. In the Czech Republic, the 2006 parliamentary election resulted in 
a political crisis since the winning coalition was unable to form the government and 
secure support of the majority of deputies. Consequently, these problems may possibly 
lead to electoral reform (Plecitá - Vlachová and Stegmaier 2008, 179-184). Furthermore, 
many political parties in the post-communist states made an effort to manipulate electoral 
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laws to produce more favorable electoral results like in Poland and Lithuania (Millard 
2003, 69; Clark and Martinaitis 2008, 1). As a result, changes in electoral systems have 
major implications on party development in Central Europe. 
 
Slovak Electoral System 
After the fall of communism there was a great desire among political leaders in 
Czechoslovakia to establish new electoral legislation, to organize the first democratic 
elections, and to make some necessary adjustments in government. The new democratic 
leadership in Czechoslovakia decided to adopt a PR system that was used during pre-war 
period and in the last free elections in 1946. The decision to use this system was also 
intended to achieve greater proportionality, better minority representation, and to better 
accommodate individual personalities in the electoral system. The Czechoslovak PR 
electoral system had a 5 percent minimal legal threshold, which was required for political 
parties in order to enter the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council, and a 3 
percent legal threshold for the Slovak parliament. The number of seats elected for the 
Czech National Council was 200 and for the Slovak National Council – 150 (Shvetsova 
1999, 400-401). By 1993, when Slovakia became an independent country, the country’s 
government decided to stay with a PR electoral system. Slovakia adopted a list PR that 
involves each party presenting a list of candidates to the electorate, where voters opt for a 
party, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the national vote. 
Winning candidates are then taken from the party lists. 
According to the first electoral law of independent Slovakia (80/1990), the 
country has a one-chamber parliament. The legislative body of the Slovak Republic is the 
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National Council (Národna Rada), which passes legislation and shares with the 
government (Vláda) the right to initiate laws. The National Council has 150 members 
who are directly elected for four years through a system of proportional representation 
(IFES Election Guide – Slovakia 2008, 1; IPU 2008, 1). For administrative purposes, 
Slovakia is divided into 8 regions and 79 districts, where the highest administrative 
officials are appointed by the government. 
 In May 1998, “the Parliament adopted the law 187/1998 amending law 80/1990 
on parliamentary elections” in the Slovak Republic (Cibulka 1998, 1). The major changes 
this amendment brought were made in the system of constituencies; i.e., this is an 
example of the effect of district magnitude. Based on the ratification of the new law, 
Slovakia’s four single electoral constituencies were fused into one. According to Ľubor 
Cibulka, this change is preferable for major political parties with strong leaders, and for 
the general organization of elections, however it is a disadvantage for smaller parties and 
parties that lack strong leaders because it decreases the connection between the candidate 
and the voters (1998, 1-3).  
 In order to participate in elections a political party must have a minimum of 
10,000 members. If this requirement is not met, a party can still participate by filing a 
petition with signatures equal to the number of remaining candidates. However, these 
criteria do not affect those political parties that were in the parliament 60 days before the 
announcement of the election date or those parties that fulfilled the minimum 
membership requirement in the previous elections. The electoral threshold is 5 percent of 
the votes cast for individual parties (Sigma 1995, 2). Parties that fail to meet this 
requirement are eliminated from further election proceedings.  
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The modification of the electoral formula in 1997 was a significant event in 
Slovak electoral politics, as it would be in any country. This was the result of the 
following events: The ruling Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za 
Demokratické Slovensko - HZDS) first decided to amend the election law to create 
legislative obstacles to prevent potential victory for the opposition (Mesežnikov 1999, 
41). Changing the PR electoral system to a majoritarian or possibly mixed electoral 
system would not only considerably affect party formation in Slovakia, but it would also 
facilitate a victory for the HZDS in up-coming elections. This was clear to all political 
parties and consequently all of them opposed this radical proposed change in the electoral 
system; as a result, HZDS’s proposal failed. 
 In 1997, prior to the expiration of President Kováč’s term, there was another 
important moment that took place in Slovak electoral history (March 1998). The 
opposition was afraid that since the parliament was responsible for electing a new 
president, and Vladimír Mečiar, both a leader of HZDS and prime minister at that time, 
was not willing to approve any choice of president the opposition was proposing, the 
situation could have resulted in a political crisis. Accordingly, the opposition decided to 
push forward certain changes in presidential elections. The opposition initiated an 
amendment to the constitution on direct presidential elections. 
 Although this amendment, also called the referendum on direct presidential 
elections, was rejected by Mečiar and his supporters, the situation strengthened 
cooperation among opposition parties and resulted in the establishment of the Slovak 
Democratic Coalition (Slovenská Demokratická Koalícia - SDK). HZDS, afraid of losing 
the up-coming 1998 parliamentary election, decided to make a different amendment to 
 42 
the electoral law. With the creation of the SDK, the idea of changing the electoral system 
from PR to majoritarian or mixed electoral system was not an issue any longer, and it 
would not ensure HZDS’s victory. Therefore, HZDS came up with a new idea to modify 
the electoral threshold to 5 percent for each individual party in a coalition (Mesežnikov 
1999, 40-41). As a result of this electoral amendment, many small parties merged or 
ceased to exist. 
 
Party Formation 
Maurice Duverger’s Political Parties is one of the most important works in 
electoral studies. He formulated what we call today “Duverger’s Law”, which asserts that 
the plurality system (in single-member districts) favors a two-party system (1955, 217). 
In order to explain how some electoral rules reduce the number of political parties, 
Duverger uses the term “mechanical effect”. According to the “mechanical effect”, some 
electoral rules assign extra seats to the larger political parties and as a result disadvantage 
smaller political parties, giving them fewer seats based on proportional representation. 
The “mechanical effect” which can occur in a single election can ultimately turn into a 
“psychological effect” in the next election. The “mechanical effect” that caused the 
under-representation of small parties ends up in fewer voters’ supporting these parties in 
the next elections. It is the “psychological effect” in play that causes those people who 
previously voted for a political party to possibly stop supporting the same party assuming 
their vote would be in vain. Thus, the relationship between the “mechanical” and 
“psychological” effect decreases the number of assembly parties (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989, 65). 
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Given the fact that electoral systems vary and they each have a different impact 
on political parties, we need to examine how the parties evolve. As will be seen, the 
literature suggests that party formation in Central Europe is different than elsewhere. In 
Making Votes Count, Gary Cox points out that social cleavages are important (1997, 19). 
Furthermore, Dieter Nohlen argues that the nature of the electoral system and the number 
of political parties are both affected by the number of social cleavages (1993, 27). 
In Rethinking Party Systems: The Third Way of Democratization, Scott 
Mainwaring emphasizes a profound role of political parties in political transition. He 
argues that political parties are not only key delegates of representation, but they enable 
policy making as well. Furthermore, political parties are essential for creating a legitimate 
democratic system (1999, 11-14). Mainwaring suggests that the party system is 
institutionalized when “actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise 
that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior will prevail 
into the foreseeable future” (1999, 25). Furthermore, party institutionalization is a 
complex process that includes electoral, social, attitudinal and organizational dimensions 
of party life. Mainwaring differentiates between more and less institutionalized party 
systems. He argues that in more institutionalized party systems political parties have deep 
roots in society, party organization is important, political figures make parties legitimate 
and party systems are much more stable. However, Mainwaring points out that this is not 
the case of the post-communist states where party roots are weak, parties lack 
organizational and ideological unity, and “personalism” plays an important role in these 
party systems (1999, 21-60). 
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Cox argues that “different electoral systems produce different party systems” 
(1997, 23). Furthermore, Cox notes that strategic voting and strategic coordination play 
an important role in electoral politics and party formation. In her study of party strategies 
and voter behavior in Central European mixed electoral systems, Tatiana Kostadinova 
points out that political parties as well as voters act strategically in the elections. In 
addition, many political parties “form coalitions based on assessments of the magnitude 
and the distribution of their electoral support”(2006, 131). 
The sequence of founding elections has been a major determinant of party 
formation in the post-communist states (McFaul 2001, 1159). First democratic elections 
held while a communist regime is still in power produced two polarized camps, one 
communist and the other anti-communist, that are very volatile and lack social bases. 
Czechoslovakia benefited from holding its first democratic elections soon after the fall of 
communism and, as a result, has had more developed political parties and more stable 
party systems. 
As Kitschelt et al. point out, electoral contests for legislative office and the related 
establishment of electoral parties is one of the essential features of the democratic process 
(1999, 2). András Bozóki and John T. Ishiyama argue that the development of new 
political parties in Central Europe was largely influenced by the communist past and also 
by the evolving political landscapes. These legacies influenced communist successor 
parties in various ways. First, the communist past left diverse organizational 
consequences for the new political parties. While some political parties were better off in 
terms of inherited physical resources such as money, membership and buildings, other 
political parties were not.  Furthermore, the communist regime also influenced the type of 
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competitive environment facing new political parties. In addition, another heritage of the 
communist past was based upon who won out in the internal transition strife that occurred 
within each of the successor political parties (2002, 10). 
 
Party Formation in the Post-Communist Countries 
The post-communist countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union had 
many similar features in party formation, but also differences that were specific to the 
country’s development and which differentiated these countries from one another. 
Von Beyme characterizes party formation in the post-communist countries of 
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union by the following models: first, after the 
transition from communist rule, some countries tried to restore the electoral and party 
system that was used in the pre-communist period. This redevelopment was evident in the 
cases of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, but because of the long period of totalitarian 
rule, many countries could not follow this example, as they did not have any memory or 
extensive experience of a democratic party system (1998, 4). The “historical parties” 
which were able to redevelop failed in the post-communist era. The reasons were as 
follows: Communism systematically eliminated loyalty to political party, ownership, 
income and status. Therefore, “historical parties” were only able to attract voters whose 
allegiances were dependent on factors the communist regime was unable to eliminate. 
Another factor that caused the failure of historical parties was their long absence from the 
politics of these states. Although the pre-communist political parties had an important 
role in pre-war politics, the pressure from the Soviets ultimately established one-party 
rule that eliminated multiparty systems in these countries. The third factor was the 
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devastating and complete control of society. In addition, some of the “historical parties” 
were tainted by Fascism during the interwar period (Wightman 1995, 241-243).  
As discussed by Von Beyme, the second model of party formation in Central 
Europe was the establishment of a new system of political parties that was, in fact, most 
common for all post-communist countries (1998, 4). Another typical feature of party 
system development in the post-communist countries was the emergence of many new 
political parties that led post-communist countries to the democratic path and then 
disappeared within a few years after the transition. After the end of communist rule, 
many diverse political parties and movements were established that represented very 
broadly based, ideologically diffused and loosely organized social movements, which 
dominated the political scene without any significant competition in the first years of the 
transition. These opposition movements, such as Civic Forum in the Czech Republic or 
Public Against Violence in Slovakia, were among the political parties that quickly 
dropped from the post-communist political scene. 
The period after transition was also a transforming time for many communist 
parties in the region. Former ruling communist parties understood that in order to remain 
active in politics they needed to adjust to new democratic rules. Some communist parties 
changed their names, or re-organized themselves into different political parties, in order 
not to remind people of their former past. Other communist parties, such as the one in the 
Czech Republic – the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia - refused to follow this 
example and retained their original name. Overall, former communist parties created new 
and more moderate reform policies that were aimed to ensure winning most of their 
voters back. However, the communist parties were not in a favorable position in the post-
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transition period due to the fact that there was widespread aversion towards communism, 
especially during the first years after the transition. This aversion was supported not only 
by post-communist political parties, alliances or unions, but it was in the minds of 
majority of the population in these countries (Wightman 1995, 241-251).  
The first phase of party formation in the post-communist countries was the most 
important time for these states. At this stage, elections were held with multi-party 
representation, which resulted in a rapid proliferation of political parties of all types. Free 
and democratic elections with a high party representation were definitely successful for 
many post-communist nations. But unfortunately, countries such as Romania and 
Bulgaria were not able to achieve this goal at the same time as other countries in 
transition; in their first multi-party elections, ex-communist parties were able to win 
elections and take over new post-transition governments.  
 Also, there were the diverse effects that electoral systems had on party formation 
in the post-communist countries. Hungary and Russia had adopted the mixed electoral 
system, but its effect on the formation of a multi-party system was different from the 
beginning. In Hungary, the mixed electoral system with 5 percent threshold in the PR tier 
brought a low level of disproportionality and relative stability to the country’s party 
system. Although Russia had also adopted a 5 percent threshold in its PR tier, which was 
supposed to prevent proliferation of small political parties, the results were quite the 
contrary. The plurality part of the Russian party system, instead of two-party competition, 
produced higher proliferation of small political parties than the PR part of electoral 
system. Therefore a high level of disproportionality in the party system occurred in 
Russia (Moser 1999, 372). 
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Although, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland were among those post-
communist countries that were successful in their first round of elections, several 
problems still existed: building-up a new party system, party representation, and dealing 
with the proliferation of political parties. As George Wightman points out, by the late 
eighties and early nineties, there were 66 parties registered in Czechoslovakia, in excess 
of 100 parties in Poland, and approximately 65 in Hungary (1995, 240). The 
transformation process and party development in these states is still not complete. 
Although some countries like Hungary and the Czech Republic achieved relative stability 
of their party systems, the future rounds of parliamentary elections in these countries will 
determine whether the consolidation of party systems has occurred in the post-communist 
countries or not.  
 
Slovak Parties 
During the Stalinist era, several historical political parties that were active in 
Czechoslovakia during the interwar period, such as the People’s Party, were forbidden 
after World War II. Other political parties, for example the Democratic Party, which was 
very active during 1945-1948, were eliminated after 1948. The formation of political 
parties and interest groups was also influenced by the reform period of 1968. The 1968 
reforms and their consequent repression by the Soviet leadership had a great influence on 
political life in Czechoslovakia. However, the major changes occurred mainly in 1987, 
once Gustav Husák was replaced by Miloš Jakeš, and after the Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev began implementing his new policies of glasnost and perestroika. As a result, 
there was a dramatic increase in political participation among groups of people who were 
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not previously politically active, especially young people. Consequently, wide support for 
democratization spread across the country and eventually contributed to the abolishment 
of the Communist Party (Wolchik 1997, 203-209). 
After the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia, many new political parties were 
formed in order to compete in the elections. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia lost 
its role as a leading political party in the country, but by reforming its structure and 
agenda it remained active, although insignificant, in every election. After the 1990 
election the communist party disappeared from the political scene and its former 
members founded the Party of the Democratic Left (Strana Democratickej Ľavice - SDĽ). 
A new Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunistická Strana Slovenska - KSS) split from 
SDĽ and was re-established in 1991 (Grzymala-Busse 2002, 51-66; Rybář and Deegan-
Krause 2008, 1).   
The Slovak people proved to be supportive of democratization in the country, 
especially regarding the establishment of a market economy and creating a democratic 
political system. However, attitudes towards political parties were somewhat negative 
from the beginning. After the break up of the communist regime during the period of 
1989-1991, one of the most important issues for the new democratic Czechoslovakia, 
besides choosing a new electoral system, was the formation of a new party system that 
would be able to sustain democracy. There were two main goals for a new party system 
in Czechoslovakia. First, the parties in the post-transition period had to be very different 
from the ideological and disciplined communist party, and second, to avoid a weak 
democratic system, the new party system had to present pragmatic and narrow choices to 
voters. 
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The 1989 “Velvet Revolution” was not only the last element that caused the fall 
of the communist rule in this Central European country, but it was also a result of the 
great desire among people to end communism in the country and move towards 
democracy. With the help of two major political parties – Public Against Violence in 
Slovakia and Civic Forum in the Czech Republic, this goal was successfully achieved. At 
the same time however, a new tendency occurred, where new political parties began to 
form whose appeal was mainly aimed to the electorate within one of the two republics. 
This division also continued in the 1990 election, which was the first free and democratic 
election after the country’s transition from the communist regime. The 1992 election was 
the last election of the former Czechoslovakia before the country’s division. From all the 
political parties that were able to secure enough votes to enter the parliament, there was 
the Slovak National Party (which was the only party supporting separation from the 
Czech Republic) with 7.9 percent on one side, and most of the other political parties on 
the other side, favoring federalism (Wightman 1995, 66-67). 
 As was noted earlier, the common goal of ending communist rule, which unified 
the country after 1968, was no longer the crucial factor in the politics of Czechoslovakia. 
There were not only important cultural and economic differences between the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, but also different approaches in party representation and political 
style. Thus, this had a rapid effect on the relationship between the two republics and 
resulted in the abolition of the federation with the “Velvet Divorce” in 1993. After 1993, 
with Czechoslovakia divided into the independent Czech and Slovak Republics, new 
distinctive party systems emerged in both states. 
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 The formation of parties in Slovakia was very much influenced by the general 
nature of the transformation process during these early years of independence. According 
to Mesežnikov, there were three significant factors that influenced party formation in 
Slovakia during 1996-1998 (1999, 38). First, the modernization of Slovak society and 
globalization caused changes in the country’s socio-demographic and socio-cultural 
structure, and significant shifts in voters' preferences occurred as a result.  
Second, the decreased fragmentation of political parties caused by the pre-election 
coalition strategies of the opposition parties was another factor that influenced party 
formation in Slovakia. This aspect was caused by efforts of the opposition to maintain the 
institutional framework of a democratic regime by disregarding the ideological 
differences between parties. In other words, five political parties with different ideologies 
and political strength formed the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) just to make sure 
that the ruling Movement for Democratic Slovakia would lose the 1998 parliamentary 
election. Although there were many prognoses that this kind of unnatural integration 
would not coexist for long, the effect of this strategy was successful and SDK was able to 
win the elections. The third effect on party formation in Slovakia was modification of 
electoral threshold to 5 percent for each individual party in a coalition, as a result of 
which many small parties merged or ceased to exist. 
 In comparison with the period before the breakup of Czechoslovakia, there were 
several political parties whose position remains unchanged even today. Since their 
establishment, they continue to play an important role in the political process and 
elections in Slovakia. They are the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Slovak National Party (SNS), the Party 
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of Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP), the Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ) and the 
Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK). 
By early 2002 progress in European Union integration became part of the intense 
contest of Slovak politics. Furthermore, mass attitudes have played a major role in the 
rise of democracy in Central European nations. They also continue to be significant to the 
success of new institutions and reforms linked with the process of European accession. 
As will be discussed in detail later, public opinion surveys prepared by the Statistical 
Office of the Slovak Republic illustrate that political preferences of voters are significant 
determinants that affect voters’ attitudes towards the integration of Slovakia into the 
European Union. Therefore, there is an evident correlation between party preference and 
a party’s position on European Union integration. This political rivalry could be seen 
mainly between pro-reform and opposition parties, specifically before and during the 
2002 parliamentary elections. This election was very crucial for the future of the Slovak 
Republic. As the 1994 election represented a farewell to communism, and the 1998 
election the end of Mečiar’s leadership, the possibility of Slovakia joining the European 
Union became a major factor of the 2002 parliamentary election. The results of the 2002 
Slovak parliamentary election determined that Slovakia would continue and actually 
conclude its integration process into the European Union. 
 Political parties play a profound role in influencing public attitudes towards the 
European Union. As Cichowski implies, party support shapes preferences regarding 
European Union integration (2000, 1244). Bielasiak points out that the voters often view 
political parties as representatives of a certain policy, while political parties in opposition 
are often seen as supporters of opposing views (2002, 1247). In Slovakia, supporters of 
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democratic coalition parties, such as the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union 
(SDKÚ), ANO, Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the Hungarian Coalition 
(SMK) were also among the main supporters of European Union accession, while voters 
for opposition political parties such as Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), 
Slovak National Party (SNS), True Slovak National Party (P SNS), Party of the 
Democratic Left (SDĽ) and the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) illustrated 
significantly lower support for European Union enlargement (Statistical Office of the 
Slovak Republic 2002, 1). Therefore, political parties are crucial to Slovak membership 
in the European Union. 
 
Voting Behavior 
Following the collapse of communism in Central Europe, there was an extensive 
debate over the models of voting behavior in the post-communist countries and factors 
that influence voter choices. The purpose of this section is to answer the following 
questions: Is the voting behavior in Central Europe unique or similar to the voting 
behavior in western democracies? Are there any common factors affecting voting 
behavior in the post-communist countries?  
 
Review of Relevant Studies 
There is a significant and growing literature on the analysis of post-communist 
elections in Central Europe especially as concerns Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Slovakia. Additionally, there is a smaller number of studies that incorporate electoral 
analysis across the region. My purpose here in reviewing these studies is to extract a set 
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of known indicators, which based on these studies are associated with political party 
preference. 
Anthony Downs wrote one of the first studies on the economic analysis of voting 
behavior. By utilizing rational choice theory, Downs asserts that voters make rational 
choices for their personal self-interest. Consequently, voters opt for a political party or a 
candidate whose policies will provide them with the highest value in the future.  
According to the scholarly literature there are two approaches to economic voting: 
prospective and retrospective. In prospective voting those who go to polls make their 
preferences based on prospects of future outcomes, whereas in retrospective voting voters 
make choices based on their experience with previous economic performance or the 
economic record of the political party (Doyle and Fidrmuc 2003, 4). 
Jan Fidrmuc provides an important contribution to the study of voting behavior in 
transitional states, especially in regards to the effect that economics has on political 
change in Central Europe. He states that voting in the post-communist states differs from 
elections in Western democratic countries. In his article “Economics of Voting in Post-
Communist Countries”, Fidrmuc asserts that voting results are based on voters’ 
experience with economic reforms; voters who did not benefit from economic reforms 
tend to vote for parties on the left, while voters who profited from reforms are likely to 
vote for the parties on the right of the political spectrum. Fidrmuc analyzes the second 
and following elections after the fall of communism, since he believes that issues related 
to economic reforms did not play an important role in the first post-transitional election 
during which voters were rather excited about dramatic political change and not 
concerned with economic matters (2000, 199-207).   
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Another important contribution to the analysis of post-communist political parties 
and voting behavior is work of Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslav 
Markowski, and Gábor Tóka (1999). Based on their analysis of four post-communist 
states, the authors argue that parties’ weak political structures and programs have a 
significant impact on voters’ electoral choices and their participation in democratic 
elections. There are several other factors affecting post-communist voting preferences: 
high levels of party fragmentation, lack of programmatic structuring of political parties, 
lack of voters’ party identification, as well as high volatility in voters’ support over time. 
In addition, the authors recognize that a country’s historical past has a strong effect on the 
post-transition process, viable party competition, and consequently on voting behavior in 
post-communist states. 
According to the work of Klára Vlachová there are three main models of voting 
behavior: the sociological model, the party identification model, and the rational choice 
model: 
- The sociological model is a radical or structural approach that concentrates on the 
voting behavior of social groups, mainly those organized based on age, religion and 
social class. By representing the interests of social groups, political parties establish a 
close relationship with such groups. The disadvantage of this model is that it does not 
take into consideration what effect values, attitudes, and opinions play on voting 
behavior. 
- The party identification model is a socio-psychological approach to voting that views 
voting in terms of a voter’s long-term relationship to a political party. From a 
sociological perspective, party identification could be the result of one of several factors: 
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1) positive thoughts towards a favored political party, including feelings of loyalty, 
connection, and lesser evil; 2) negative reaction towards an opposition political party, 
such as disloyalty, resentment, and greatest evil; 3) assessments supporting the favored 
political party and discarding all other political parties; 4) political values and issue 
positions of the favored political party, for example social-economic values (left-right), 
values related to political procedures (liberalism-authoritarianism), or trust in politics. 
From a psychological point of view, voters could identify with a political party because 
of different reasons. As a result, a voter’s party identification could be pragmatic, which 
is characteristic especially of the urban population, for example employees and managers 
working for larger corporations; symbolic, characteristic to rural populations with limited 
levels of education; and ideological, specific to people with high levels of education, 
organization membership and activity (2001, 484). While party identification is usually a 
long-term association between a voter and a political party, it could be weakened due to 
changes in values, a rise of new important political issues, or new events. Consequently, 
with a decreased party identification, there is a smaller chance that a voter will continue 
vote for the same political party. 
- According to the rational choice model, which is based on the economic theory of 
voting behavior, voters first acquire information on the ideology of various political 
parties and their stand on politically salient issues. Then they select and vote for a 
political party, which comes the closest to represent their values, interests, and concerns 
(2001, 480-485).  
Comparative post-communist research studies point out several other perspectives 
on voting behavior. Based on the first point of view, similar to western democracies, 
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post-communist voting behavior is influenced by socio-economic variables. According to 
the second approach, scholars believe that the economic model of voting cannot fully 
explain voting behavior. In addition, the literature acknowledges that particular 
demographic variables are closely linked to voting, for example: education, income, and 
unemployment.   
In a study of electoral behavior in the 1994 Hungarian election, András Kovács 
found that Hungarian voters behaved differently than the voters in Western democracies. 
Voters in Hungary were not likely to vote for political parties based on the parties’ 
political and economic views; rather, they base their voting preferences by determining 
which political party is responsible for not resolving country’s problems. Therefore, 
voters tend to vote for a political party that is best capable to dissociate itself from such 
responsibility. Another feature of Hungarian voting behavior is its inconsistency in 
loyalty. Furthermore, Kovács asserts that voting preferences in Hungary are “almost 
entirely determined by the positions and attitudes developed from the experience under 
communism of three and a half decades of “Kadarism2
Similarly, Zoltan Kovács and Alan Dingsdale analyze voting behavior in the 1994 
Hungarian parliamentary election. They affirm that Hungary displays distinctive 
geographic patterns in voting behavior. Taking into consideration voters’ party 
” (1996, 511-530). In contrast to 
other studies in the post-communist countries, Kovács asserts that voters’ socio-
demographic characteristics and their economic positions cannot be considered a steady 
indicator of voting behavior. 
                                                 
2 Kadarism refers to leadership of János Kádár, the Hungarian communist leader who led the country from 
1956 to 1988. 
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preference and voters’ political awareness, Kovács and Dingsdale distinguish three main 
regions: a) Western Hungary and Budapest – an overall stable and politically more 
developed region with ideologically steady voting preferences and higher voter turnout, 
b) Eastern Hungary – a less developed, politically less motivated, and overall unstable 
region with major shifts in voters’ preferences and typically low voter turnout, c) a mixed 
Central region – with some stable and other unstable districts in regards to party 
orientation. Furthermore, from an analysis of socio-demographic variables, Kovács and 
Dingsdale did not find a correlation between voting preferences and ethnicity, religion, or 
historical legacies. However, geographical analysis of electoral results confirmed the 
correlation between voting and the economic status of regions. Voters who were living in 
areas affected by the economic recession and disappearing socialist economy voted for 
the parties on the left of the political spectrum, while voters living in the prosperous 
regions voted for pro-reform political parties (1998, 456-457).  
The analysis of post-communist Polish voting behavior is the focus of Tomasz 
Zarycki and Andrzej Nowak’s study; they found that in regards to the urban-rural divide 
of the Polish political scene, the political character of the urban areas tends to be more 
liberal. Furthermore, there are significant differences in voting behavior in the rural areas. 
Zarycki and Nowak assert that there were important changes in political preferences of 
Polish voters between 1990 to 1997. According to Western standards this partisan 
volatility likely represented a total discontinuity of voters’ political affiliation.  There are 
several factors affecting political behavior in Poland. Institutional changes make voters 
alter their voting preferences to the new political system. As a result, voters act rationally 
by voting for a political party or a candidate that has a chance to receive sufficient 
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number of votes in elections. The evolution of party organizations is another factor 
influencing Polish political behavior. There are often parties that cease to exist or merge 
with other political parties, parties that change their names or political programs, and new 
parties that form. These transformations of political parties consequently force voters to 
reconsider their political preferences. Furthermore, persistent changes in voters’ attitudes 
cause variations in voting behavior. Voters change their perceptions and attitudes as a 
result of media and electoral campaigns. Zarycki and Nowak argue that between the 1991 
Polish parliamentary election and the 1995 Polish presidential contest, voter turnout 
increased from 40.7% to 70.1%. Their analysis revealed that the urban-rural divide was 
an important factor influencing such variance along with “historical roots of regional 
differentiation of voting preferences” (2000, 331-354). 
In the study of voter turnout dynamics, Tatiana Kostadinova found a unique 
dimension that applies specifically to post-communist states of Eastern Europe. First, 
voter turnout is influenced by the electoral system that country adopts. Post-communist 
elections held under proportional representation systems tend to have higher turnout rates 
than under majoritarian systems. In addition, voter turnout in the first post-communist 
election is usually the highest and tends to decline in each consequent election. 
Furthermore, voter turnout is negatively affected by large number of political parties 
competing in election (2003, 754-755). 
In the article “Past and Present in Transitional Voting: Electoral Choices in Post-
Communist Poland”, Jack Bielasiak and David Blunck suggest that voting behavior in 
post-communist countries is shaped by voters’ political attitudes and their experiences 
during the communist regime. According to their analysis, there are three ways in which 
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the pre-transition period impacts post-transitional electoral choices of Polish voters. First, 
organizational affiliations of former members of the Solidarity movement and the 
Communist Party influence voters’ voting behavior in the post-transition period. Second, 
voters’ positions on different transition-related political and economic issues shape 
voters’ support for different political parties and provide a close link between past 
attitudes and present preferences. Such issues are decommunization, which relates to the 
role old elites play in the new political regime, and issues related to the marketization of 
the economy, including “the pace of reforms, the extent of state economic intervention, or 
the provision of a social safety net” (2002, 567). Lastly, economic voting, i.e. voters’ 
evaluation of various economic concerns and their comparison of their economic 
condition in the communist period and the post-transition era, plays an important role in 
Polish voting behavior. As confirmed by a variety of public opinion polls, the country’s 
economic conditions are directly linked to voters’ electoral choices. Voters’ present 
economic outlook often relates to their previous economic status, as well as future 
prospects. Voters tend to penalize those political parties they believe are responsible for 
economic hardship and reward those political parties that offer alternative economic 
reforms that provide them with benefits (2002, 563-585). 
Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski affirm that while some scholars 
believe that the formation of political preferences and group interests occurred only after 
the fall of communism, they on the other hand confirmed that a combination of socio-
demographic variables (education, gender, religion, age, population density, former 
membership in the Communist Party or the Solidarity Trade Union) has a steady effect on 
political identities in Poland (1999, 716). 
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According to their research of voting behavior in Romania and Ukraine, Steven 
Roper and Florin Fesnic argue that the voter’s party preference is directly correlated to 
the regional variable in both countries. The authors employed a dummy variable for 
regions of Romania and Ukraine. In addition, from a number of independent variables 
that could possibly affect voting behavior, such as historical legacy, ethnicity, levels of 
urbanization, education, and gross domestic product3
Differences in urban-rural voting provide an important look into voting behavior 
as well. In his study of linkages between Russian voting behavior and social variables, 
Timothy Colton found that age, education, urban-rural factor, regional setting, and 
income were main factors that determined voters’ political choices in Russian elections. 
In his analysis, Colton asserts that rural residents tend to support communists political 
parties, while urban residents are inclined to vote for reform political parties (Colton 
2000, 101). Along these same lines, in their analysis of three Russian Duma elections, 
, the historical legacy variable plays 
a key role in shaping voting behavior and social cleavages in these countries. For 
example, difference in voting in the Transylvania region of Romania is a result of the 
historical legacies of the region, where ethnic Hungarians live in the north and ethnic 
Germans live in the south (2003, 119-131). Roper and Fesnic assert that while some 
scholars believe that “the transition history fundamentally influences voters’ perceptions 
of policies and institutions, they find that even long-term historical patterns influence 
post-communist voter choice” (2003, 129). This adds to statement made by Kitschelt et 
al. that the pre-communist past of Central European countries had an effect on the 
communist regimes in these states, which consequently has an impact on party cleavages. 
                                                 
3 Real GDP per capita is computed on the basis of purchasing power parity in US dollars. 
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Ralph Clem and Peter Craumer confirm the fact that the urban-rural variable is directly 
linked to voting for certain political parties. There are also fundamental socio-economic 
characteristics of voters that affect voting behavior in Russian regions. Particularly, the 
regions dominated by rural population are likely to vote for parties on the left - the anti-
reform parties, while the urban regions are inclined to vote for pro-reform political 
parties. This is understandable since the rural residents, who are usually less educated, 
older, poorer, and employed in the lagging agricultural sector, are more likely to be 
affected by the effects of a worsening Russian economy, and they convey their 
dissatisfaction with the economic situation by voting for anti-reform political parties - 
parties on the left. Urban residents on the other hand, who tend to be better educated, 
white collar, younger, high-income voters are more likely to support pro-reform political 
parties (2000, 478-479; 2002, 2-3). In addition, there are significant urban-rural 
variations in voter turnout across Russia. The rural areas with comparatively more older 
voters or pensioners, mainly agricultural workers, who are less educated and less paid, 
and often dissatisfied, usually demonstrate a higher voter turnout and they usually vote 
for the parties on the left. More urbanized areas tend to display a lower voter turnout and 
they tend to vote for pro-reform political parties (Clem and Craumer 1997, 382; Clem 
and Craumer 2000, 480-481). 
Clem and Craumer also analyzed the correlation between economic measures and 
voting behavior. In a study of the 2000 Russian presidential election they did not find a 
significant correlation between unemployment, inflation, change in industrial production, 
housing privatization and voting outcomes. The only economic variable that 
demonstrated some correlation to voting behavior was wages. According to Clem and 
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Craumer’s analysis, lower wages are related to political parties on the left, whereas 
higher wages are related to pro-reform political parties (2000, 478-478). Furthermore, 
Clem and Craumer assert that in addition to urban-rural variations in voting, there is also 
a regional aspect of voting behavior that they link to socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the population living in these regions. Both scholars agree that “a clear 
and remarkably stable electoral geography of Russia has emerged in the post-Soviet 
period” and that there is “a pronounced regionalization of voting behavior across Russia” 
(1997, 379-380).  
Another contribution to the study of voting behavior in post-communist countries 
is the scholarly work of Marcus A.G. Harper who focuses on three transitional countries 
– Hungary, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Harper analyses whether individual level voting in 
these countries is sociotropic or pocketbook.  According to sociotropic voting, voters 
establish their electoral choices after taking into consideration a country’s economic 
conditions. Pocketbook voting on the other hand means that voters make electoral choices 
based on an evaluation of their personal economic status. If their economic status 
deteriorated under the current ruling party they will unlikely support the same political 
party in the future election. In contrast, if voters believe that their economic situation 
improved, they will most probably give a vote to the same political party in the next 
election. Based on his analysis, Harper recognized that economic voting was evident in 
three assessed post-communist countries to some extent: however, its form differentiated 
from one political party to another. Moreover, Harper did not find sufficient evidence to 
determine whether sociotropic or pocketbook voting was evident in these countries. 
Furthermore, while some scholars established a correlation between voting preferences 
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and unemployment at the district-level, Harper did not find a link between voting choices 
and unemployment at the individual level (2000, 1191-1227). 
In her study of the Czech voting behavior, Klára Vlachová argues that since 1992 
the Czech Republic witnessed a more steady voting behavior, which resulted in the 
stabilization of the party system. As confirmed by various assessments of voting 
behavior, a majority of Czech voters opted for the same political party in 1996 and 1998 
elections. In addition, while the declared left-right political orientation plays an essential 
role when choosing between ideologically cohesive parties, the socio-economic values of 
the voter play a vital role when selecting from ideologically distant political parties. 
Voters of several political parties, for example the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the 
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), demonstrate a stronger party 
identification, which has resulted in a more stable voting behavior from these voters. 
Consequently, the electoral behavior of voters who do not feel loyal to any of the political 
parties will probably be less stable overtime. Furthermore, ODS demonstrates a 
pragmatic party identification by representing voters who are younger, urban, well 
educated, while KSCM is an example of a symbolic party identification with voters being 
older, rural, less educated (2001, 485-498). 
In their article “Values and Electoral Decisions in the Czech Republic”, Petr 
Matějů and Klára Vlachová concentrate on the effect political values and attitudes have 
on voting behavior in the Czech Republic. Both scholars assert that voters’ social 
characteristics and their political values are directly correlated with voting choices. 
Matějů and Vlachová determine that there are three main dimensions of Czech politics: 
“a value-based left-right political orientation; a dimension of demands on the 
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government; and a dimension of “anomie4
In their analysis of the development of voting preferences during post-communist 
transition in the Czech Republic, Orla Doyle and Jan Fidrmuc assert that several socio-
economic variables, as for example education and age, as well as the ideological 
orientation of voters are likely to have a steady effect on voting preferences across the 
time. Furthermore, Doyle and Fidrmuc state that economic factors as for example 
unemployment, income, and employment status shape voting behavior in the later phases 
of the transition. They argue that voting behavior in the post-communist countries is 
unique and different from voting behavior in established democracies.  Doyle and 
Fidrmuc offer the following explanations to support their argument. First, they point out 
that voting in developed countries is usually retrospective, however retrospective voting 
does not necessary apply to countries in transition since the majority of political parties 
are either newly formed or recently went through major transformations, therefore they 
cannot be assessed based on their previous economic policies. Second, the uncertainty 
” (1998, 265). The feeling of anomie could be 
seen as a root of political apathy and/or protest, which results from voters’ dissatisfaction 
and isolation from politics. In the case of the post-communist states, the feeling of 
anomie is linked to the collapse of the communist system that brought to people new 
personal freedoms and new levels of responsibility, to which it was hard to adjust. The 
collapse of the old system was also accompanied by the loss of a sense of social security. 
Ultimately, the feeling of anomie has a significant impact on voting behavior in the post-
communist countries (1998, 249-269).  
                                                 
4Anomie is defined as: social instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and values or personal 
unrest, alienation, and uncertainty that comes from a lack of purpose or ideals. 
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that the transition process brought along in the post-communist countries made voters 
insecure about the future effects of economic reforms and what costs and benefits the 
transition will bring to them. As a result, this uncertainty shapes voting behavior in the 
post-communist states. Moreover, the beginning of the transition process is a time of 
major economic turmoil, where stakes are extremely high for voters, therefore economic 
factors play a major role in voters’ preferences (2003, 2-3). Also in this regard, Mathias 
Dewatripont and Gerard Roland point out that once voters obtain new information 
regarding the outcomes of economic reform they are likely to adjust their expectations 
and possibly alter their support for the economic reform. This adds to the argument of the 
scholarly literature that voting behavior and voters’ electoral choices are likely to change 
during transition process (1995, 1207-1223).  
In their analysis of the Czech voting behavior, Doyle and Fidrmuc found that 
socio-demographic characteristics of voters are linked to voters’ electoral choices and 
have an impact on their voting behavior. They suggest that education and age shape 
voting preferences in the Czech Republic. Well-educated, younger voters tend to vote for 
pro-reform parties, as for example Civic Democratic Party (ODS), since they are more 
likely to benefit from the transformation and they easier adjust to change. Whereas 
elderly, less educated voters, who were negatively affected by the process of transition, 
vote for the left-wing political parties such as Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and 
Communist Party (KSČM), which are more likely to represent their interests and best 
assist them with the adjustment to a dramatic shock that transition brought along (2003, 
10). This supports the argument made by Vlachová earlier on that voters’ socio-
demographic indicators are directly correlated with voting preferences. From an 
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economic point of view, Doyle and Fidrmuc found signs of prospective voting among 
Czech voters. They confirmed, that from economic variables, unemployment is closely 
correlated with political parties on the left. Doyle and Fidrmuc furthermore assert that 
economic variables such as economic status and income are less likely to shape voting 
behavior in the early transition period, however they play a more significant role in the 
later phases of transition. (2003, 11-14). 
In his analysis of voting behavior in post-communist countries, Fidrmuc utilizes a 
number of economic variables (wage, unemployment, employment) and socio-
demographic variables (age, education, religion, and population density) that allows him 
to draw conclusions regarding their impact on voters’ electoral choices. He indicates that 
wages are directly linked to vote for nationalist parties, whereas they are negatively 
correlated to voting for pro-reform parties. Unemployment on the other hand decreases 
the number of electoral votes for nationalist parties, while it increases support for 
political parties on the left of the political spectrum. A positive effect on the left-wing 
parties is understandable since unemployment was an adverse outcome of post-
transitional economic reform, which affected voters in a negative way. Furthermore, 
entrepreneurs who represent the private sector tend to vote for pro-reform parties, 
whereas their support for nationalist and left wing parties is negatively correlated. 
From socio-demographic indicators, Fidrmuc confirms an increase of electoral 
votes for pro-reform parties and insignificant support for nationalist and left-wing parties 
in urban areas. In addition, retired voters who were particularly affected by negative 
outcomes of economic reforms are likely to vote for nationalist and left-wing parties in 
Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary, while they tend to vote for pro-reform parties in the 
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Czech Republic. In summary, “uneven distribution of benefits and costs of reform creates 
winners and losers, and thus constituencies supporting or opposing radical economic 
reform” (2000, 215). 
Lars Johannsen also studies emerging urban-rural cleavages in transition states. 
He draws similar conclusions as other scholars of transition. According to his research, 
urban voters tend to vote for parties supporting market reform and a decreasing role of 
the government in welfare. While urban voters are more interested in political life, rural 
voters are the ones with the highest level of participation in voting. He argues that there 
are three main lessons to be learned from previous scholarly work on cleavage structures 
and political development. First, previous research confirms that economic and political 
transformation shapes voters’ attitudes and public opinion on the role government in 
economic and social matters. Second, some scholars believe that post-transitional 
cleavage structure is historically embedded, while others argue that it is structurally 
rooted. The third lesson to be learned is that because political parties do not have close 
ties with voters, the political elites remain playing a crucial role in influencing the 
government and policies (2003, 297-307). 
Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield study the structure of political cleavages 
in post-communist countries. Specifically, they analyze the effect that social and 
economic issues have on voting behavior and ideological orientation of political parties in 
the Czech and the Slovak Republics. Evans and Whitefield argue that there are diverse 
issue cleavages shaping voters’ electoral choices in both countries – specifically the 
subject of ethnic rights of the Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic, which resulted 
in more intense political conflict, and questions of market economy and voters’ attitudes 
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towards the West in the Czech Republic (1998, 115-139). Stephen Whitefield separately 
argues that voters did not lose the ability to have structured and multifaceted attitudes 
during the communist regime. In addition, voters were able to formulate opinions about 
how their attitudes relate to political parties and their programs (Whitefield 2002, 181-
200). 
In another study of the Czech Republic, Orla Doyle and Patrick Paul Walsh found 
evidence of significant regional patterns in voting for pre-reform parties and parties on 
the left of the political spectrum throughout the country’s transition from communism. 
Doyle and Walsh assert that there are two clear voting patterns observed in the Czech 
Republic: instability within smaller and center-left parties and stability within communist 
and pro-reform political parties. While scholars agree that the economic voting 
characteristic of Western democracies tend to be retrospective, Doyle and Walsh did not 
find indications of retrospective voting in the Czech Republic. Their analysis confirms 
that voting behavior in the first Czech election after the fall of communism as well as in 
other countries in transition was prospective instead. Because the majority of political 
parties, except the Communist Party, did not exist since the Second World War, voters 
were unable to form their political views on a variety of issues based on their past 
experiences. Instead, voters had to evaluate how economic issues, such as the 
establishment of a new market economy, will affect them in the future, and based on their 
predictions they consequently formed their voting preferences (2005, 25-27).  
Socio-economic and demographic factors play a role as key determinants of 
voting behavior in post-communist states. Doyle and Walsh use the following socio-
economic and demographic indicators to determine voting patterns in the Czech 
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Republic: the unemployment rate, average wages, the number of entrepreneurs, 
employment in agriculture vs. industry, higher education, roman-catholicism, population 
density, and the number of retirees. Doyle and Walsh found that regions with well-
educated voters display a higher support for pro-reform political parties. In addition, there 
is a positive correlation between regions with a high percentage of roman-catholic voters 
and private entrepreneurs and pro-reform parties. According to their analysis, voters 
living in predominantly agricultural regions tend to vote for the parties on the left 
(communists) or the center-left (social democrats). Doyle and Walsh moreover point out 
that average regional wages do not have a significant effect on voting behavior in the 
Czech Republic. Based on their assessment, Doyle and Walsh found that voting for the 
pro-reform parties is negatively correlated with the unemployment rate, whereas support 
for the communists and other parties is positively correlated with the unemployment rate 
(2005, 8-25).  
The majority of studies focused on economic voting in the transitional countries 
do not assess the first post-communist election since they believe that this particular 
founding election was simply a choice between communism and democracy, therefore 
theories of economic voting are not relevant in this case.  In contrast, Doyle and Walsh 
confirm that although regional economic issues, which were a direct consequence of the 
economic reforms, impacted voting preferences in the second and all subsequent 
elections, these voting (2005, 6).  
During the subsequent elections in the Czech Republic, voters’ preferences and 
positions on economic reform and issues started changing since voters became more 
politically aware, experienced, sophisticated and essentially better educated about how 
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the electoral process works. Voters learned that if they vote for an extreme or small party, 
there is a small probability that such a party will gain seats in the parliament and 
consequently that their interests will not have an advocate in the government. Therefore, 
their best chance for representation is to vote for a political party that has good prospects 
of receiving a sufficient number of voters to enter the parliament (2005, 10). 
The post-communist transition process brought along challenges and adversity 
which resulted in a prevalent discontent among voters and provided a competitive edge to 
those political parties which proclaimed that they have fast and simple solutions to solve 
this situation. In addition, communist parties have taken advantage of voters’ 
dissatisfaction with the economic reforms and consequently reestablished themselves in 
the political arena to appeal to voters predominantly impacted by the transition process 
(Jasiewicz 1998, 186).  As a result of the abrasive economic conditions in the post-
communist countries, voters are likely to vote for those political parties that promise 
social and financial safety in the future.   
By utilizing the cases of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Kevin Deegan Krausse 
evaluates voters’ political opinions and their effect on voting choices and consequently 
on the stability of the democratic system. According to his analysis, there is a difference 
between Czech and Slovak voters in terms of the issues voters focus on when assessing 
political parties. While in the Slovak Republic, voters analyze parties based on issues of 
democracy and the nation, in the Czech Republic voters focus on socio-economic 
questions instead. Krausse uses three models to analyze the relationship between voters’ 
opinions and voting outcomes: left-right model, the factor model, and the spatial model. 
According to the first approach, the left-right orientation is more evident within the 
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individual parties in Slovakia, whereas it is apparent at the party level in the Czech 
Republic. The factor approach assesses voters’ positions on particular issues such as 
religion, economy, and transformation. Krausse argues that the factor approach does not 
work in Slovakia’s case, whereas it works well in case of the Czech Republic. Lastly, 
Krausse points out that the spatial model provides a synopsis of voters’ electoral choices 
and consequently helps us better understand the correlation between the preferences and 
issues (2000, 23-46). 
In his book Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic, 1990-1999, Joshua A. Tucker provides an impressive cross-regional 
analysis of the twenty parliamentary and presidential elections in the selected post-
communist countries. In his assessment, Tucker utilizes two types of factors – socio-
demographic and economic cleavages, as well as new political developments that could 
have an impact on the range of support for a variety of political parties. From socio-
demographic indicators Tucker uses the percentage of urban residents, population 
employed in agriculture vs. industry, percentage of elderly population, and size of the 
region, whereas from economic variables he employs wages, unemployment, and 
economic growth (2006, 78-125). 
While some scholars utilize a model of retrospective voting, Tucker employs 
information-based model of voting instead. This approach depends on a forecast of how 
those voters who were most likely satisfied with the economic situation at the time of 
election will possibly vote in the new election (2006, 120-121). 
Tucker presents two models of economic voting in post-communist states that 
foresee the impact of cross-regional difference in voting outcomes on the allocation of 
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party votes – the Referendum Model and the Transitional Identity Model.  “The 
Referendum Model produces the Incumbency hypothesis, which predicts that incumbent 
parties should perform better in areas of the country where economic conditions are 
stronger. The transitional Identity Model produces two hypotheses: the New Regime 
hypothesis, which predicts that parties closely associated with the transition away from 
communism ought to perform better in areas of the country where economic conditions 
are better; and the Old Regime hypothesis, which predicts that parties closely associated 
with the prior ruling communist parties ought to perform better in areas of the country 
where economic conditions are worse” (2000, 76). In his analysis Tucker affirms that that 
there is evidence that some political parties continually receive voters’ support in regions 
that have more economic losers (Old Regime parties) while another group of political 
parties obtains a majority of votes in the regions that have more economic winners (New 
Regime parties).  While scholarly research on voting behavior in Western democracies 
asserts the significant role of rural-urban divide, center-periphery divide, labor patterns, 
and ethnic cleavages, the post-communist literature believes that pertinent socio-
economic cleavages have a key impact on voting behavior in the post-communist states.  
In the beginning of this section we asked two questions: Is voting behavior in 
Central Europe unique or similar to the voting behavior in Western democracies? Are 
there any common factors affecting voting behavior in the post-communist countries?  
We can conclude that there are three main differences between voting behavior in 
post-communist states and the Western democracies (Tucker 2006, 27-30). First, post-
communist elections tend to have a large number of competing political parties, 
specifically in the early stages of the transition, which is not typical for the established 
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Western democracies. Second, voters have less knowledge about the parties. This is 
understandable since post-communist voters have less experience with electoral process 
and voters are unable to evaluate political parties based on their previous performance 
since many of them did not previously exist. Therefore, in contrast to voters in Western 
democracies, post-communist voters do not have strong attachments or identification 
with the political parties. Lastly, elections in post-communist countries occur during 
times of transition, which brings along positive as well as many negative effects and thus 
has a significant on voters’ electoral choice and can lead to volatility in electoral 
outcomes.  
Furthermore, there are features common to post-communist voting behavior. First, 
transitional scholars found evidence of correlations between socio-demographic variables 
and voting preferences in all post-transitional countries. Voters’ electoral choices are 
shaped by socio-demographic variables, especially levels of education, age, and 
urban/rural residence. Thus, well-educated, young, urban voters tend to vote for pro-
reform parties, whereas elderly, less educated, rural voters are more likely to vote for the 
left-wing parties. Secondly, from an economic point of view, post-communist studies 
found fairly consistent signs of prospective voting among transitional voters. Voters who 
did not benefit from economic reforms and who see little chance of improving their 
circumstances are likely to vote for parties on the left, while voters who profited from 
reforms tend to vote for the anti-reform parties. Lastly, scholars recognize that regional 
patterns of voting behavior emerged in the majority of transitional countries. 
In summary, after the fall of communism in Central Europe, the selection of an 
electoral system had several profound implications on democratization in these countries, 
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especially on the representation in competitive elections. Furthermore, party formation in 
the post-communist countries represented significant time for these states. For the first 
time, elections were held with multi-party representation, which produced a rapid 
proliferation of political parties of all types. The choice of an electoral system and 
changes in electoral rules played diverse effects on party formation in the post-
communist countries, including, as we have seen, Slovakia. Furthermore, socio-economic 
and demographic correlates of party or candidate preference have had an influence on the 
manner in which voting behavior evolves. In the next chapter, the socio-economic 
correlates of voting, as described in the literature cited above, will be operationalized 
with variables drawn from Slovak statistical and electoral data to test these propositions. 
In addition, as established in the literature, there have been important inter-regional 
differences in party and candidate competition within the Central European countries. 
Thus, the concept and reality of electoral geography is a subject of discussion of the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER III  
ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY AND DATA AND METHODS 
This chapter provides a review of the literature on electoral geography, the 
principal methodology used herein, and its two main approaches: place versus cleavage 
models. The second component of this chapter is a detailed discussion of the data and 
methods used in the study; the significance of the unique compilation of data is 
emphasized. 
 
Conceptualization of View on Electoral Geography 
As a branch of political geography, electoral geography examines the spatial 
dimension of elections. Electoral geographers have concerned themselves with the spatial 
organization of electoral areas, boundary definition, mapping election results, and 
explaining election results in terms of certain behavioral processes such as voting 
preferences and voter turnout.  
 
Place Approach 
David Reynolds claims that the study of electoral geography concentrates on one 
of the three topics: “the geography of voting, where the objective is to explain the spatial 
pattern of voting in terms of some other mapable characteristic(s); geographical 
influences on voting, where the object is to explain voting (typically the decision-making 
of individual voters) on the basis of ‘spatial’ contexts; and the geography of 
representation, which explores the means through which votes are converted into ‘seats’ 
in alternative electoral systems” (1990, 22). In addition, Archer and Shelly point out that 
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there is another important topic discussed in the electoral geography literature – 
“electoral dynamics and historical change in the geographies of elections” (1985, 11-28). 
In Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society, John 
Agnew maintains that political behavior is primarily geographical and, therefore, the 
focus should be on place itself. He believes that “place-based political life” is a key factor 
affecting voter’s decisions (1987, 6, 41). Agnew further contends that the territorial (or 
sense of place) aspect has been established as a dimension in addition to social and 
political cleavages. In his other major scholarly work, Place and Politics in Modern Italy, 
Agnew uses the case of Italy to argue that "the geographical context of place channels the 
flow of interests, influence, and identities out of which emanate political activities such 
as organizing movements, joining parties, and voting” (2002, 26). By focusing on the 
notion of place, Agnew points out that the geographical perspective can provide a better 
insight into the changing dynamics of politics and society in Italy. Agnew also states that 
place plays a key role in shaping political outcomes. In his study, Agnew uses a number 
of different empirical methods to explain the geography of Italian political behavior, 
including large-scale quantitative studies, local analysis involving interviews and local 
written reports, as well as available testimonies of popular and elite political interests and 
identities. Agnew acknowledges that there are other views in current political thought 
that could be useful, but he asserts that a place-based approach is the most valuable 
concept to incorporate strengths of other theoretical perspectives and to best explain the 
role place plays in shaping political behavior (2002, 26-27). Furthermore, Agnew 
emphasizes four key themes in the study of place and politics. According to the first 
theme, “place is a topological space in which diverse geographical scales intersect 
 78 
through local and external networks to produce the milieus of everyday life in which 
people invest meaning as a source of their political identity… The second theme of 
historical contingency addresses the importance of putting places in a historical frame of 
reference… The third theme is that political action is not solely the result of the volition 
of autonomous individuals or the group memberships to which observers allocate them 
but that individuals never exist apart from the historical-geographic contexts of their 
lives… Finally, …there is evidence… of an increasing disjuncture between the political 
spaces that are relevant to contemporary practical interests and identities and the state-
based territories…” (2002, 219-220). 
 
According to the literature on electoral geography, there are four main theories of 
place.  
• The first is the theory of modernization-nationalization, which focuses “on 
‘neighborhood effects’ (the effects of distance on information flows) and ‘partisan cues’ 
(information about parties) in order to explain electoral behavior” (Cox 1969, 96-100). 
Cox concludes that the nationalization of electoral behavior is a result of modernization 
(industrialization and urbanization).  
• Demographic-welfare theory was introduced in the 1970s as an answer to the 
growing social issues and regional political movements in Europe and North America. 
Cox argues that political behavior can be characterized according to the “spatial 
distribution of social groups and their access to public goods and services” (Agnew 1990, 
16).  
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• The theory of uneven development, which also focuses on spatial aspects of 
political behavior. According to this view, the most significant reason for transformation 
is “the uneven economic development of the country in relation to long-cycles of the 
world economy and internal migration patterns” (Agnew 1990, 16-17). 
• Micro-sociological theory of place is linked to the French school of social 
geography. In an analysis of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland, John Agnew 
claims that since all places have their own history and traditions, places provide the social 
framework in which political expression is established. (1987, 159) 
As Alexander Murphy argues, place plays an important role in electoral 
geography and the "ideology" of place significantly influences voting and the issues that 
are relevant to voters. The strategies for elections used by political parties and candidates 
are also affected by ideologies of place since political parties often study voting 
preferences in different regions with the goal of attracting voters in particular places. 
Murphy points out that the role of place in the political process is not only in terms of 
representing a spatial unit, but also in differentiating areas of socio-political identification 
(1990, 228-229). Murphy accentuates that the focus of electoral geography should be on 
the role of place in the geographical analysis of elections. Murphy demonstrates his 
model by examining the changes in electoral politics in Belgium and proving that these 
changes are place-based and not in accordance with Lipset and Rokkan’s cleavage model 
(1990, 227-241). 
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Cleavage Model 
Lipset and Rokkan contend that there are four types of cleavages that voters and 
political parties tend to organize around: urban versus rural interests, territorial (center 
versus periphery), labor and capital (worker versus owner/employer), and functional 
(church versus state or various religious interests) (1967, 3-64). The Lipset-Rokkan 
model was mostly used in the study of Western democracies. For example, in the study of 
Irish parliamentary elections and referenda, John O’Loughlin and Anthony Parker 
confirmed that cleavages have been evident in the country’s electoral politics for more 
than 80 years. Similar evidence was also found in the study of Dutch electoral politics 
examined by Nico Passchier and Herman van der Wusten (O’Loughlin and Parker 1990, 
60-85).  
Many electoral geography scholars believe that the original Lipset-Rokkan 
cleavage model cannot be applied to the study of elections in post-communist states. 
Herbert Kitschelt et al. assert that the Lipset-Rokkan model needs to be updated for 
discussion of politics of post-communist countries; accordingly, they introduced a new 
cleavage model that is better suited for the study of electoral politics in post-communist 
countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. The model has two main 
dimensions: conflict between “national closure and cosmopolitan opening”, and the 
conflict between “ethnic groups in socio-culturally divided societies” (1999: 64). 
Kitschelt et al. propose that there is another dimension evident in post-communist 
countries — the conflict between opposition and proponents of the communist regime.  
As part of the last conflict, Kitschelt et al. characterize the following divides: a 
political regime divide (results from people’s status in the socio-political hierarchy, their 
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economic stature, and the experience under the communist regime), an economic 
distributive divide (supporters of planned economy versus supporters of market 
economy), a socio-cultural divide (aligned with various economic choices), a national-
cosmopolitan divide (associated with economic preferences and concept of identity), and 
finally, an ethnic divide (defined by unevenness of ethnic groups) (1999, 64-69). 
Although the differences between Western and post-communist cleavages are 
emphasized, Kitschelt et al. believe that electoral politics in post-communist countries 
will ultimately resemble the politics of the more mature Western European democracies. 
 
Socio-Economic Factors 
Socio-economic or compositional factors are known to be associated with voting 
preferences in general. Scott Mainwaring avers that voting behavior and party preference 
in elections are affected by both social cleavages such as class, education, urban/rural 
structure, religion, ethnicity, and by political cleavages – political factors that shape the 
party system (1999: 1). Therefore, socio-economic characteristics of the electorate in the 
regions, such as education, age, work force, urbanization, and wages, provide valuable 
indications as to the determinants of electoral behavior. Furthermore, based on the 
example of Germany in the early 1930s, John O’Loughlin, Colin Flint, and Luc Anselin 
illustrated how regional differences in socio-economic structural factors and the way in 
which place influenced the impact of political transformation, demonstrate in large 
measure the geographical variation in voting for the Nazi party in the crucial election of 
1930 (1994, 351-380). Moreover, there is a clear tendency of regional differentiation in 
voting in post-communist countries. Scholars emphasize the emergence of regional 
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power bases for different political parties and coalitions as well as the manifestations of 
strong regional variations in various aspects of political behavior since democratization 
began in Central Europe. In their studies of regional political patterns of post-Soviet 
Russian politics, Ralph Clem and Peter Craumer emphasize that there is a strong 
correlation across the regions between the social and demographic composition of the 
population and their voting behavior (1993, 495). The areas that are predominantly 
younger, better educated, and urbanized incline to vote for pro-democratic parties and 
leaders, while areas that have a less educated, older population, living mainly in rural and 
agricultural regions express a lower level of confidence in pro-democratic parties and 
leaders.  
In the article “Russia’s Electoral Geography: A Review”, Ralph Clem asserts that 
according to a cleavage model individuals with similar socio-economic characteristics 
tend to vote similarly.  Moreover, “…regional voting results derive primarily from the 
relative proportions of these classes in a given place” (2006, 384). Therefore, there is a 
correlation between voters’ socio-economic structure and voting results. In their 
examination of the 1994 Hungarian parliamentary election, Kovacs and Dingsdale point 
out that “geographical patterns, while showing the stability of support for the main 
parties, also reveal the subtlety of voting transformations” (1998, 456). Based on their 
study of spatial differentiation that occurred in the Hungarian electorate, the country 
could be divided into three main regions with respect to party preference and the political 
awareness of the population. There are several other studies that further analyze the 
regional patterns of electoral behavior in the post-communist states. Jean Vanlaer (1991) 
successfully illustrates the main types of political regions in Central Europe classified 
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from the point of view of electoral behavior, while Roger Bivand (1994) examines the 
regional variations of electoral behavior in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Ralph Clem and 
Marek Chodakiewics evaluate the spatial differences in the June 2003 EU Accession 
Referendum by testing the relationship between voting patterns and socio-demographic 
characteristics (2004). Furthermore, Peter Craumer and James Clem analyzed Ukraine’s 
emerging electoral geography by examining the relationship between two elements of 
voting behavior – voter turnout and voters’ preference – and socio-economic and 
demographic variables (1999, 1-26). Additionally, Joshua Tucker provides a 
comprehensive study of regional economic voting in Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic from 1990 to 1999 (2006). These studies confirm that there are 
evident regional variations in voting behavior across Central European states. In addition, 
the socio-economic characteristics of populations living in different regions seems to 
influence voting preferences in the elections. 
In summary, the two main approaches of electoral geography: place versus 
cleavage models explain how geography shapes political behavior. The definition of 
place and the reasons why place is included in electoral politics has important 
implications on how the electoral process works. As Shelly et al. point out, “the mapping 
of voting statistics has provided important insights into the operation of modern polities” 
(1990, 1). Agnew’s comprehensive analysis of Italian politics is a valuable contribution to 
the study of how place influences political behavior. Utilizing the cleavage model and 
using voters’ socio-economic data could be a valuable indication of electoral behavior 
and geographical variations in voting as well. Agnew’s use of different methodologies at 
successively larger scales is a challenging empirical task that is very difficult to put into 
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practice. For the study of the Slovakia’s electoral politics I will utilize a cleavage model, 
based mainly on socio-economic characteristics of the voting population. However, since 
we cannot exclusively rely on this approach, the analysis will also use reference to place 
when appropriate. 
 
Data and Methods 
The primary purpose of this study is to describe and explain the regional 
variations in voting behavior in post-communist Slovakia. Specifically, based on a case 
study of Slovakia, I examine how electoral support changed within various geographic 
regions during the country’s ten years of democratic transformation. To do this, I have 
compiled a database of electoral results and socio-economic variables ordered into 
territorially comparable units, all of which are discussed below. 
 
The Setting for the Study 
The first ten years of the Slovakia’s transformation, in which three national multiparty 
parliamentary elections were held (1994, 1998, and 2002) provides an excellent 
opportunity to conduct a study on continuity and change in the country’s electoral 
geography. Three broad questions are put to an empirical test: 
(1) There is a tendency among voters in certain regions to provide continuous support to 
the same political parties/movements over time. 
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(2) The socio-economic characteristics of the Slovak population (gender, age, education, 
religion, nationality, unemployment, work force distribution, wages, urban-rural variable, 
and population density) in different regions tend to influence voting preferences in the 
parliamentary elections. 
(3) The survey studies suggest that there is an evident correlation between party 
preference and the party’s position on integration into European Union, as measured by 
perceived attitudes regarding the benefits of EU membership. 
 
Challenges 
However, there are several data challenges involved in testing these propositions. 
Foremost is the need for a territorially comparable unit framework with electoral data and 
socio-economic data. Due to changes in the electoral constituencies, it was first necessary 
to organize the electoral data according to comparable territorial units. Additionally, there 
are no precise election data that would link voters’ electoral support, within the Slovak 
regions, with the socio-economic characteristics of the voters. As I discuss below, public 
opinion surveys provide some individual level data that tie personal characteristics to 
political preferences and which will be used in tandem with the aggregate data deployed 
here, but polling results are subject to various errors and must be used with appropriate 
caution. Therefore, in my examination of how electoral support changed within various 
geographic regions of Slovakia during the country’s ten years of democratic 
transformation, I take socio-economic data of the population within Slovak regions and 
link them with the election results by party in the individual regions.  
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Furthermore, this study utilizes both aggregate and survey data. The advantage of 
using aggregate data is that such data use empirical facts, in this case the actual electoral 
votes cast. When using aggregate data, a common error occurring in the interpretation of 
shifts in party preference between elections, addressed by the political geography 
literature, is called the “ecological fallacy”, which raises questions about imputing 
individual voting behavior from election results given in spatial units. This is a 
disadvantage when using aggregate data, and which necessitates cross-checking 
analytical outcomes with survey results. 
So to mitigate this concern, in my later analysis I use public opinion polls and 
survey data since they provide additional sources of information on individual’s voting 
preferences and voters’ socio-economic characteristics. Through public opinion polls and 
surveys, voters express their views on political parties, which could help us explain 
regional variations in voting behavior. In addition, public opinion polls and surveys shape 
the way voters think about a country’s political, economic, and cultural issues. In terms 
of European Union enlargement, the question this study examines is whether there is a 
correlation between voters’ preferences of political parties and the way the public 
perceives political parties in the government, either as advocates of European Union 
membership or in a contrasting stance. The public opinion polls and survey studies help 
us test these important correlations over time. The disadvantage of using survey data is 
that they are not always accurate and reliable, since respondents may be untruthful or 
forgetful. Therefore, to bolster the analysis I use both aggregate and survey data to get the 
best possible results. 
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A second concern is that the socio-economic data used in this study are not 
always consistent and they were not collected for the three particular years when the 
elections were held. Given that there are issues of territorial comparability, changes in 
political party lineup, and some misalignment of socio-economic data points with the 
elections, the following steps were taken to insure that the data base that forms the core 
of the later analysis is as consistent as possible. 
 
Unit Structure 
Administratively, Slovakia is divided into regions (kraj), which represent the 
largest sub-national units. The regions are then subdivided into districts (okres) and the 
districts are further divided into municipalities (obec). During the 1994 parliamentary 
election, the country was administratively divided into four regions, 38 districts, and 
2,892 municipalities. However, as of August 24, 1996, the National Council of the 
Slovak Republic promulgated a new law in which the territory of Slovakia was officially 
divided into eight regions and 79 districts. Thus, the 1998 and 2002 election results are 
based on the same number of districts (79), but these differ from the units used in 1994. 
Therefore, in order to resolve the issue of territorial incomparability and make the 
electoral results for all three elections comparable, it was necessary to re-align the 1994 
units thus:  
First, the results of the 1994 parliamentary election at the municipality level, 
which were organized according in 38 districts, were reorganized based on 79 districts as 
in the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections, which will be the standardized unit 
structure employed in this study (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: District map of Slovakia 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2009). For key to the units go to: 
http://portal.statistics.sk/mosmis/sk/run.html 
 
Second, the lists of municipalities in the three elections were compared. The 
municipalities that were not included or the name of the municipality that did not appear 
in the exact format in all three sets of data, were determined and included in a separate 
spreadsheet. Third, to confirm whether the identified municipalities were correctly 
specified or if there were any disparities, the names of municipalities were cross-checked 
with an official document published by the Slovak government called “Review of 
administrative-territorial changes, changes in names of municipalities and changes in 
names of parts of municipalities approved during the period of July 1, 1993 until 
December 31, 2002” (Brestovanská 2002)5
 
.  
                                                 
5 http://www.civil.gov.sk/archiv/ovvs/obce_SR/prehlad.doc 
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Fourth, after eliminating the highlighted municipalities that were not included in 
the sets of data for all three elections, changes were reviewed and the data were adjusted 
accordingly. If the data could not be adjusted, the identified municipality was eliminated 
from the data sets for all three elections and was not used for further analysis. Out of 
2,892 municipalities, there were only 50 that were not included in the data, representing 
1.7% of the total number of municipalities. Thus, the electoral data at the municipality 
level were compiled for 1994, 1998, and 2002 elections in territorially comparable units. 
Fifth, since the purpose of this study required the electoral data at the district level, the  
electoral results for all three elections were calculated by combining electoral results of 
municipalities.  
 
Election Results By Political Party 
 In examining the results of the 1994, 1998, and 2002 elections in the Slovak 
Republic, I also use collected aggregate data in the form of official electoral results of 
political parties published by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. The electoral 
data based on regions, districts as well as municipalities are available for all three 
elections.  
 There were 18 political parties competing in the 1994 contest, 17 parties 
participating in 1998, and 26 parties competing in 2002. Eight of the parties that were on 
the Slovak political scene since the first democratic parliamentary election in 1994 
remained in the same exact form or with a slight modification in the 1998 and 2002 
elections. From all new political parties established during the period of the three 
elections the most significant ones were the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP – Strana 
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Občianskeho Porozumenia) founded in 1998 by Rudolf Schuster, a former mayor of the 
second largest city of Košice, who used it as a vehicle for his presidential ambitions; 
SMER established in 1999 by Robert Fico, who aimed to create space for the arrival of a 
new political generation in Slovakia; and the Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) founded 
in April 2001 by Pavol Rusko, a former chairman of the largest Slovak private TV 
station. 
 In addition, there were several newly founded political parties established as a 
result of internal conflicts within their previous political parties. For example, the Party 
for Democracy (HZD – Hnutie za Demokraciu) was formed by former members of 
the HZDS, the Slovak Democratic Alliance was established by former politicians of the 
SDĽ, and the True Slovak National Party (P SNS – Pravá Slovenská Národná Strana) 
was created by former members of the original SNS. For a schematic representation of 
these party alignments, see Figure 2. 
 Furthermore, in each election there were many parties that did not meet the 
required 5 percent electoral threshold: 11 out of 18 in 1994 election, 11 out of 17 in 1998 
election, and 18 out of 26 in 2002 election. Typically, these electoral parties received 
voter support below 2 percent: 8 in 1994, 10 in 1998, and 15 in 2002. This demonstrates a 
certain lack of rational behavior among leaders of such political parties who represented 
an agenda of a very narrow electorate and a consequence, many such political parties and 
movements ceased to exist as voters shifted their allegiance to parties that stood a better 
chance of actually receiving parliamentary seats via PR. Among such fleeting parties 
were the Party Against Corruption, for Order, Labor and Money for all Decent Citizens 
(SPK – Strana Proti Korupcii, za Poriadok, Prácu a Peniaze pre Všetkých Slušných 
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Občanov), the Association for the Republic - Republicans (ZPR-REP - Združenie pre 
Republiku – Republikáni, and the United Party of Workers of Slovakia (JSPS – Jednotná 
Strana Pracujúcich Slovenska). 
 
Socio-Economic Data 
Socio-economic data for Slovakia’s population at the municipality level are 
provided by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic and they are also partially 
available electronically at the website of the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 
www.statistics.sk/mosmis/run.html. By comparing these socio-economic characteristics 
of the population with the election outcomes, we will be able to test propositions drawn  
from the literature on the determinants of voter behavior. 
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Table 1: Winning political parties of 1994, 1998, and 2002 Slovak parliamentary elections 
          1994 Election                             1998 Election                 2002 Election      
HZDS / Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia  (35.0%) 
 
ZRS / Association of Workers 
of Slovakia (7.3%) 
 
 
SNS / Slovak National Party 
(5.4%) 
 
Spoločná Voľba  / Common 
Choice (10.4%) 
 
Demokratická Únia / 
Democratic Union (8.6%) 
 
KDH / Christian Democratic 
Movement (10.1%) 
 
MK / Hungarian Coalition 
(10.2%) 
HZDS / Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia  (27.0%) 
 
SOP / Party of Civic 
Understanding (8.0%) 
 
 
SNS / Slovak National Party 
(9.1%) 
 
SDĽ / Party of Democratic 
Left (14.7%) 
 
SDK / Slovak Democratic 
Coalition (26.3%) 
 
 
 
SMK-MKP / Party of 
Hungarian Coalition (9.1%) 
 
 
 
HZDS / Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia  (19.5%) 
 
KSS / Communist Party of Slovakia 
(6.3%) 
 
ANO / Alliance of the New Citizen 
(8.0%) 
 
 
SMER (13.5%) 
 
 
SDKÚ / Slovak Democratic Christian 
Union (15.1%) 
 
KDH / Christian Democratic 
Movement (8.3%) 
 
SMK-MKP / Party of Hungarian 
Coalition (11.2%) 
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To illustrate the socio-economic structure of voters at the district level, the 
following variables are used: age structure, gender, unemployment, religion, nationality, 
work force distribution, wages, urban vs. rural structure, and population density. Each of 
these variables represents certain voter characteristics thought to be related to political 
performances and is defined as follows: 
 
Age Structure  
This variable indicates the number of people living in a particular district in accordance 
to different age groups for the year 1996: 
1. 18-24 
2. 25-34 
3. 35-44 
4. 45-54 
5. 55-59 
6. 60+ 
 
Gender 
This variable provides the ratio of men and women living in specific districts. The data 
on sex ratio are available for 2001 at the district level. 
 
Unemployment 
This variable indicates the percentage of unemployment at the district level. The data are 
available for 2001 at the district level. 
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Religion 
Four types of religious orientations are taken into consideration: Catholic, Evangelic, 
Atheist, and other. The statistics on religious orientation are available for 2001 at the 
district level. 
 
Nationality (Ethnicity) 
For the purposes of this research study, four types of nationality are considered – Slovak, 
Hungarian, Roma, and other. The data on nationality are available for 2001 at the district 
level. 
 
Work Force Distribution 
The data are available for 2001 at the district level under eleven categories: 
1. Industry 
2. Construction Industry 
3. Business 
4. Hotels & Restaurants 
5. Transportation, Postal Services, Telecommunications 
6. Finance 
7. Real Estate 
8. Public Sector 
9. Education 
10. Health & Social Services 
11. Other Services 
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Wages 
This variable illustrates the average monthly wage, in Slovak Krones (SKK), of 
employees who worked for enterprises with 20 or more employees in the following areas 
of specialization for the year 2001: 
1. Agriculture 
2. Industry 
3. Manufacturing 
4. Construction 
5. Trade 
 
Urban vs. Rural Structure 
The data on urban and rural populations are available for 2003 at the district level. This is 
the level of urbanization and is expressed as a percentage. According to law number 
369/1990, section 1, paragraph 22, city (urban area) is defined as municipality with 5,000 
or more inhabitants.  
 
Population Density (in sq km) 
The data are available for 1996 at the district level. 
 
Education 
This variable indicates the number of people living in a particular district having 
completed different education levels as of 2001: 
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1. Elementary education 
2. Secondary vocational with high school exam 
3. Secondary professional without high school exam 
4. Complete secondary vocational (with high school exam) 
5. Complete vocational (with high school exam) 
6. Complete secondary general 
7. Higher education 
8. University education 
In summary, in this chapter we not only reviewed and emphasized the important 
contributions made to the literature on electoral geography, but also explained the two 
main models in electoral geography - place versus cleavage. Furthermore, the 
methodology of how the data were gathered and transformed, and how the data will be 
used, was described along with the challenges encountered during this process.  
This dissertation builds on a pioneering work on Slovak elections published by 
the Slovak sociologist Vladimír Krivý, who has written a number of studies focused on 
voting and party preferences in the Slovak Republic. In his book What the Election 
Results Reveal: Parliamentary Election 1992-1998, Krivý illustrates a correlation 
between electoral results and one particular socio-demographic characteristic at a time: 
ethnicity, religion, education or the level of urbanization (1999).  
While Krivý’s research offers an important analysis of the Slovak parliamentary 
elections, this dissertation will be the first comprehensive longitudinal study of its kind. 
This study will use a combination of various socio-demographic variables (gender, age, 
education, nationality, religion, wage, and the level of urbanization) as they correlate to 
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electoral results to gain a thorough understanding of their influence on voting behavior in 
different regions over time.  
In addition, the study uses GIS software to map electoral results with socio-
demographic data for all electoral districts. Since the comparable electoral data for 1994, 
1998, and 2002 parliamentary elections were previously non-existent due to territorial 
incomparability, the newly acquired data is one of the main contributions of this study 
since the database of electoral results allow us to look at election results in comparable 
territorial units at the district level across time and helps us to better understand the socio-
economic correlates of voting across the Slovak regions. The compiled data also allows 
us to test proposed hypotheses. This data not only gives us the opportunity to better 
understand the Slovak electoral politics, but also represents a valuable and an important 
contribution to the field of electoral geography and provides an understanding of the 
transition process in the post-communist countries.  
Finally, basic methods of data description and analysis is employed here to 
portray the spatial patterns of voting in Slovakia’s elections and then to probe the 
relationships between the electoral results and the socio-economic variables across the 
country’s 79 districts. Straightforward measures such as percentage distributions of party 
voting by unit and cross-tabulations of party voting with urbanization levels give us the 
first approximation of these relationships. Next, a set of bivariate correlations allows us 
test the propositions about the nexus between political preferences and given socio-
economic traits of the units’ populations (e.g., between party voting and age) and 
suggests which among the several variables should be considered significant. Lastly, a 
multivariate regression analysis using the most promising variables provides us with a 
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more complete picture of how and to what degree the relevant socio-economic 
characteristics explain variations in voting outcomes. 
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CHAPTER IV 
VOTING RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN 
VOTING SUPPORT 
 Any electoral geography analysis is based on the understanding that there are 
variations, at times significant variations, among regions of the country or countries in 
question with regard to the socio-economic structure of the population, and that these 
variations will to some degree be linked to the outcomes of elections because of the 
conceptual ties between those characteristics and the choices that voters make 
(essentially, the cleavage model). Thus, if, as we have seen above, individual level data 
point to a tendency for rural voters in post-communist countries to favor post-communist 
or populist parties and/or candidates, then we can hypothesize that areas that are 
relatively more rural will evince a higher than average vote share for those parties and/or 
candidates. Or to make the same point another way, if younger and better educated voters 
incline toward pro-reform parties, then it would follow that parts of a country where such 
people represent a higher than average share of the population would disproportionately 
support pro-reform parties and/or candidates. 
 It is universally the case that we find these kinds of spatial variations in socio-
economic conditions within countries because of differing regional natural resource 
endowment (for agriculture and/or industry), better or worse ties to internal or external 
markets (i.e., ports and lines of communication such as roads, rivers, and railroads), a 
well or less-well educated work force, differences in the availability of capital, and 
government regional development policies (this, of course, being especially true in 
centrally-planned economies). Regional variations may be more or less pronounced, may 
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change over time as regions go through “boom or bust” cycles, and tend to be greater in 
larger countries, but even smaller states will have important differences in such socio-
economic measures as the level of urbanization, age structure of the population, levels of 
educational attainment, the sectoral distribution of the work force, unemployment rates, 
and wages or income. Finally, in multiethnic states we typically find different parts of the 
country with concentrations of one ethnic group or another; in fact, it is frequently the 
case that particular places are ethnic homelands, and are sometimes officially recognized 
as such. 
 Slovakia certainly conforms to the general case in this regard. As will be seen, 
although a small country in both area (roughly the size of Denmark) and population 
(around 5.5 million persons in 2009), one nevertheless finds relatively highly urbanized 
areas and also more rural, agricultural districts; modern, typically European cities (such 
as the capital, Bratislava), older industrial cities that have fallen on hard times and 
flourishing areas that have benefited from foreign investment and new industrial 
ventures; parts of the country with high unemployment and low wages and other regions 
with a much healthier economy; and significant differences from place to place in age 
structure and educational attainment. Further, Slovakia’s substantial ethnic Hungarian 
minority is concentrated in districts adjoining Hungary to the south. 
Bordering fellow European Union states from the Czech Republic in the west, 
Polandin the north, Hungary in the south, and Austria in the southwest, and with the 
former Soviet and non-EU Ukraine in the east, Slovakia is divided into eight official 
regions (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Slovak regions 
 
Source: Tatraview.com (2009). www.tatraview.com/geography.html. 
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Table 2: Slovak regions - socio-economic characteristics of the population 
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Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (1996, 2001, 2003). 
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As is evident in Table 2, these regions have different socio-economic characteristics, and 
we can use them here to orient the later discussion of spatial patterns of voting 
preferences and the relationship between those outcomes and the socio-economic 
landscape; however, it is important to note that there is a considerably wider range of 
socio-economic indices among the 79 districts that comprise the data set than among the 
eight regions, where districts are grouped and inter-district differences muted. 
Bratislavský region is located in the southeasternmost part of Slovakia and  
includes the capital Bratislava, the largest city in the country (429,000 in 2009), and has a 
relatively high population density (Table 2).This region has the highest percentage of 
urban population (83.3%), the highest percentage of people with completed university 
degrees (17.0%), the lowest rate of unemployment (5.8%), and a high percentage of 
people claiming the Slovak nationality (91.3%). The region’s work force is mainly 
employed in business (21.1%), industry (17.4%), and in real estate (14.6%). The 
Bratislavský region is also the base for chemical, textile, food, and automobile 
(Volkswagen Slovakia) industries. Furthermore, increased foreign investments have made 
this region the center of banking and trade. 
Western Slovakia includes three regions – Trnavský, Trenčiansky, and Nitriansky. 
Trnavský region has a high percentage of Hungarian ethnic population (23.7%) since its 
southern districts border with Hungary. The population is mainly employed in industry 
(29.2%), especially in the automobile (Peugeot Citroen), food, and electro-technical 
industries. The majority of the population has completed either elementary (22.9%) or 
high school education (14.4%) and they live both in rural (50.5%) and urban areas 
(49.5%). 
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Trenčiansky region, located in northwestern part of the country, is predominantly 
urban (56%) with a moderate population density. The economically active population is 
primarily employed in industry (39.5%), especially in textile, manufacturing, and food 
industries. In comparison to the national average (18.6%), the unemployment rate in this 
region is below average (12.7%) because the region has three large employers –the  
textile company Ozeta Neo and the electrical equipment production company Leoni 
Autokabel Slowakia located in the city of Trenčín and Hornonitrianske Bane, the largest 
producer of brown coal (used in thermal power plants) in Slovakia, located in the city of 
Prievidza. 
Nitriansky region is slightly more rural (51.8%). This region has the highest 
percentage of Hungarian nationality (27.6%) because the southern districts are located 
along the border with Hungary. Compared to the national average, the Nitriansky region 
has a high level of unemployment (23.1%) and a high percentage of population with only 
elementary education (24.8%). The southern part of this region includes the city of 
Komárno, which has the largest port in Slovakia situated on the river Danube, and the 
city focuses on shipyard production. Furthermore, the region has a concentration of 
chemical, electro-technical, wood processing, food, and manufacturing industries. 
Central Slovakia has two regions – Žilinský and Banskobystrický. Žilinský 
region, located in the north-central part of Slovakia has similar levels of urban (50.3%) 
and rural (49.7%) population. The majority of the economically active population is 
employed in industry (31.0%) and business (16.4%). The region is focused mainly on 
wood processing and paper industry. The latest addition to its industrial portfolio is the 
automotive industry with a plant for Kia Motors in the city of Žilina and Slovenský 
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Vodohospodársky Podnik, which is in charge of water management for all of Slovakia. 
Due to its industrial growth, unemployment in the region has remained below the national 
average at 16.4%. 
 Banskobystrický region, located in south-central Slovakia, is predominantly urban 
(52.3%), however, the population density is only 70 sq. km. This is a region with the 
third highest percentage of Hungarian nationals, again concentrated in the southern 
regions located along the Hungarian border. Historically, this area is rich in natural 
resources. During the communist period, this region was a center for heavy industry, 
especially for arms production. However, after the transition to a market economy, arms 
production was discontinued and the lack of new industries resulted in high levels of 
unemployment (23.6%). Furthermore, it’s three districts – Revúca (35.1%), Rimavská 
Sobota (35.5%), and Veľký Krtíš (33.8%) have the highest rates of unemployment in the 
country. A majority of the region’s population has completed only elementary education 
(23.2%) and most of them belong to the age category of 60 years or higher (16.2%). 
While this region has wood processing, manufacturing, metallurgical, and food 
industries, most employment opportunities are available in the city of Banská Bystrica in 
the companies Lesy SR (wood processing) and Slovenská Pošta (Slovak Post Office) and 
in the closely located municipality of Podbrezová – in the company Železiarne 
Podbrezová (the oldest metallurgical company in Central Europe). 
Finally, Eastern Slovakia has two regions – Prešovský and Košický.  
Prešovský region is located in the northeastern part of the country and is mostly rural 
(53.2%) with an average population density of 86 sq. km. The region’s urban population 
(46.8%) is primarily concentrated in or around the city of Prešov, the third largest city of 
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Slovakia (91,000 in 2009) and also in Poprad (55,000 in 2009). Prešovský region is 
characterized by a high unemployment rate (24.0%) and the highest percentage of Roma 
population in the country (4.0%) concentrated especially in the districts of Levoča (7.1%) 
and Kežmarok (8.8%). The education levels of the region’s population are relatively low 
since a relatively high percentage of its residents have completed only elementary 
education (21.8%) or high school education (14.6%). While Prešovský region has wood 
processing, textile, and food industry on a smaller scale, this region does not have any 
major industrial parks and is known more for tourism thanks to the scenic Slovak 
mountains (High Tatras), with UNESCO historical/cultural sites such as Levoča and 
Spišská Nová Ves, and Slovak folk villages Važec and Východná. 
Košický region, located in southeastern part of Slovakia, is considered more 
urban (55.7%) since it includes the second largest city of Slovakia, Košice (241,000 in 
2009. Because of its location and its proximity to the former Soviet Union and Poland, 
this region was once a center for processing of natural resources. Currently it has the 
largest metallurgical company in the country, U.S. Steel Košice, which is a dominant 
industrial center not just for this region, but also for the entire country. U.S. Steel Košice 
is also the biggest industrial employer in eastern Slovakia; as a consequence, 25.9% of 
the region’s population is employed in industry. Ethnically, all major groups are 
represented - Slovaks with 81.8%, Hungarians with 11.2%, and Roma with 3.9%. While 
the average unemployment rate for this region is 25.6%, there are two districts that have 
among the highest unemployment rates in the country – Rožňava (32.0%) and Trebišov 
(31.9%). They are located in the southern part of the region along with the Hungarian 
border, in the area that lacks any major industries. 
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In summary, Slovakia’s regions and the districts that comprise them are defined 
by their economic status and the socio-demographic characteristics of their population. 
The largest cities like Bratislava and Košice are centers for foreign investments, banking, 
trade, and have a concentration of major industries, which provide sufficient employment 
opportunities to their residents. With the large number of universities and colleges 
located in both cities, their populations have the highest education levels in the country. 
In contrast, the economic status of other regions depends on the industries that are 
situated in the area. Apart from large-scale industries located in the city of Bratislava and 
Košice, small or medium scale industries are evident across Slovak regions. Such 
industries provide the majority of the employment opportunities in surrounding areas. 
Furthermore, in several regions there are districts that formerly had a strong industrial 
base during communism, but more recently these industries were discontinued and due to 
lack of investment they were never replaced by new production. As a result, these 
districts were suddenly left with no employment opportunities, which resulted in high 
levels of unemployment. As will be seen below, the character of Slovak regions and the 
districts within them and the socio-demographic features of their population played a 
major role in regional variation in voting support in the 1994, 1998, and 2002 Slovak 
parliamentary elections. 
 
1994 Slovak Parliamentary Election: Regional Patterns 
The 1994 Slovak parliamentary election, held from September 30 - October 1, 
was the first democratic election since the Slovak Republic became an independent 
country in January 1993. Originally, the election was planned for June 1996, but due to 
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the fact that the ruling party – the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) - lost its 
majority in the parliament, the political situation in the country changed and parliament 
agreed to call for a new election.  Jozef Moravčík, former foreign minister and originally 
an ally of Vladimír Mečiar, formed a coalition government of five parties with the Party 
of the Democratic Left (SDĽ) on the left, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) on 
the right and the liberal Democratic Union (DÚ) in the center, thus covering a large 
spectrum of interests. This government, certain about its prospects, backed the early 
election. 
Elections were held in the four Slovak macro regions of the time - Bratislava, 
Western Slovakia, Central Slovakia, and Eastern Slovakia. Only parties that declared 
either 10,000 members, 100,000 votes from past elections, or 10,000 supporters (by 
petition) were able to participate in the 1994 electoral contest. A total of 18 political 
parties entered the election (Appendix 1). Results of the 1994 parliamentary contest, after 
a spirited election campaign, revealed that the populist Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS) won a plurality with 35% of valid votes (Figure 3). To create a new 
government HZDS formed a coalition together with the Agricultural Party of Slovakia 
(RSS), the nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) (5.4%), and the leftist Association of 
Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) (7.3%). This was an enormous loss for the opposition, which 
clearly underestimated the popularity of HZDS’s leader, Vladimír Mečiar. 
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Figure 3: 1994 Slovak parliamentary election - percentage of valid votes for political 
parties or political movements 
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Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)-Agricultural Party of 
Slovakia (RSS) - 35 % 
  Common Choice (Spoločná Voľba) - 10.4 %  
  Hungarian Coalition Party (MK) - 10.2 % 
  Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH) - 10.1 % 
  Democratic Union of Slovakia (DÚ) - 8.6 % 
  Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) - 7.3% 
  Slovak National Party (SNS) - 5.4% 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (1994). 
 
Geographic Distribution of Votes in the 1994 Parliamentary Election 
Within the overall national party list vote, there were significant differences 
across the country in terms of party voting strength (Figure 4). Based on the regional 
patterns of electoral support in the 1994 election, HZDS-RSS with a total of 35% of valid 
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votes had the highest share of votes in the Banskobystrický region in the districts of 
Detva (60.0%) and Žarnovica (55.7%); in Trenčiansky region in the districts of Kysucké 
Nové Mesto (59.7%), Púchov and Ilava (55.3%); and in Žilinský region in the districts of 
Bytča (59.0%) and Čadca (56.9%) (Appendix 1). The pro-reform Common Choice 
(Spoločná Voľba) acquired 10.4% of votes in the 1994 election with the majority of its 
supporters living in the country’s two largest cities - the city of Bratislava and Košice. In 
addition, Spoločná Voľba gained strong voter support in Trnavský region in the districts 
of Senica (17.0%) and Skalica (15.6%); in Prešovský region in the district of 
Medzilaborce (15.9%); and in Košický region in the district of Rožňava 
(15.6%)(Appendix 1). 
The Hungarian Coalition (MK) ranked third with a total of 10.2% of valid votes 
unsurprisingly securing the majority of its votes in southern Slovakia, where most ethnic 
Hungarians reside, specifically in Trnavský region in the districts of Dunajská Streda 
(83.2%) and Galanta (9.9%); in Nitriansky region in the districts of Komárno (71.0%), 
Nové Zámky (39.9%), and Šaľa (39.2%); and in Banskobystrický region in the district of 
Rimavská Sobota (39.2%) (Appendix 1); these districts have the highest percentage of 
ethnic Hungarians. The Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), with 10.1% of the vote, 
found its main support in Žilinský region, especially in the districts of Námestovo 
(25.8%) and Dolný Kubín (20.1%) and in Prešovský region in the districts of Kežmarok 
(25.3%), Levoča (24.4%), and Prešov (20.8%) (Appendix 1). The Democratic Union of 
Slovakia (DÚ), which garnered 8.6% of valid votes, largely mirrored the pattern of the 
other main pro-reform party, Spoločná Voľba, with most of its supporters in the city of 
Bratislava and Košice. In addition, DÚ found major support in Banskobystrický region in 
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the districts of Banská Bystrica (14.6%) and Zvolen (10.7%); in Prešovský region in the 
districts of Poprad (13.4%) and Prešov (10.6%); and in Trnavský region in the district of 
Skalica (13.9%) (Appendix 1). 
The Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), at 7.34% of valid votes, had 
widespread appeal geographically; that is, its voters were spread across the entire 
country, but especially in Banskobystrický region in the district of Revúca (19.7%); in 
Prešovský region in the district of Medzilaborce (16.8%); in Košický region in the district 
of Gelnica (13.7%); and in Žilinský region especially in the districts of Martin (13.1%) 
and Turčianske Teplice (12.6%) (Appendix 1). The last political party that exceeded the 
required 5 percent threshold for parliamentary seats in the 1994 contest was the Slovak 
National Party (SNS) with a total of 5.4% of valid votes. SNS had the predominant part of 
its electorate in Žilinský region in the districts of Tvrdošín (13.7%) and Kysucké Nové 
Mesto (10.2%); in Trenčiansky region in the district of Považská Bystrica (10.8%); and 
in Bratislavský region in the districts of Bratislava V (10.0%), Bratislava IV (9.6%), and 
Pezinok (9.2%) (Appendix 1).  
In summary, in terms of the geographic distribution of votes in the 1994 Slovak 
parliamentary election, the pro-reform political parties (Common Choice, Democratic 
Union of Slovakia, the Hungarian Coalition, and the Christian Democratic Movement) 
were predominantly represented in Bratislavský, Prešovský, Košický, Trnavský, and 
Nitriansky regions, while opposition parties (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, 
Agricultural Party of Slovakia, Association of Workers of Slovakia, and the Slovak 
National Party) had the most supporters in Banskobystrický, Žilinský, and Trenčiansky 
regions. 
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Figure 4: Official results of the Slovak 1994 parliamentary election by region 
 
Source: Slovakia Document Store (1994).  
http://slovakia.eunet.sk/slovakia/elections-94/resreg.gif. 
 
1998 Slovak Parliamentary Election: Regional Patterns 
As was noted above, the 1998 parliamentary election was a major turning point 
for Slovak politics in the post-independence period, because it demonstrated that free and 
fair elections could clear the way for an opposition coalition to assume power via the 
ballot box and bring Slovakia to the path of democratic reform. The opposition was 
aware that they needed to create a critical mass to gain a larger share of votes than the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), therefore in 1997 the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition (SDK- Slovenská Demokratická Koalícia) was established as a party with right, 
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left and center components. SDK had its origins in the Blue Coalition of the Democratic 
Party and the Christian Democratic Movement and there were five opposition political 
parties that became part of this coalition: the Democratic Union (DÚ – Demokratická 
Únia), the Democratic Party (DS – Demokratická Strana), the Social Democratic Party of 
Slovakia (SDSS – Sociálnodemokratická Strana Slovenska), the Christian Democratic 
Movement (KDH - Kresťansko-Demokratické Hnutie) and the Slovak Green Party (SZS – 
Strana Zelených na Slovensku) (Bútora and Bútorová 1999, 81). SDK became the focal 
political party in the 1998 electoral contest and its main purpose was to oppose the anti-
democratic Mečiar. 
Another party whose position was crucial in the 1998 election was the Party of 
the Democratic Left (SDĽ – Strana Demokratickej Ľavice), which decided not to join the 
SDK. It was mainly due to its prior unsuccessful participation in the coalition with SDSS 
and the Green Party (SZS – Strana Zelených na Slovensku) during the 1994 election. This 
coalition was created in order to keep SDĽ separated from an alliance with Mečiar; 
therefore, before the 1998 electoral contest, SDĽ remained an opposition faction. 
The Party of Civic Understanding (SOP – Strana Občianskeho Porozumenia) was 
a new political party that emerged in March 1998. The party was created by Rudolf 
Schuster, Mayor of Slovakia’s second largest city, Košice, a new and very charismatic 
politician. This party was viewed as “virtual” because of its publicity through commercial 
television and independent press. SOP received sufficient support from Slovak citizens 
and in September 1998 the party joined the coalition, establishing a center-left position 
within the opposition. 
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All together there were 17 political parties participating in the 1998 election 
(Appendix 2). As a result of the electoral contest, while HZDS was able to win 27% of 
votes and 43 seats in the Slovak National Council, SDK was close behind with 26.3% and 
42 seats. In addition, SDK united with other opposition parties – SDĽ with 23 seats, SOP 
with 13 seats and the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK – Strana Maďarskej Koalície) 
with 15 seats and received a constitutional majority of 93 out of 150 seats in the 
parliament (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: 1998 Slovak parliamentary election - percentage of valid votes for political 
parties or political movements  
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  Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) - 27.0 % (43) 
  Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) - 26.3 % (42) 
  Party of Democratic Left (SDĽ) - 14.7 % (23) 
  Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK-MKP) - 9.1 % (15) 
  Slovak National Party (SNS) - 9.1 % (14) 
  Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) - 8.0 % (13) 
 Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (1998). 
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After winning the election, Mikuláš Dzurinda, a leader of the right-leaning SDK, 
the largest political party in the government, was appointed as the new prime minister of 
Slovakia, replacing the anti-democratic Vladimír Mečiar, the dominant figure of Slovak 
politics since the fall of communist regime in 1989. The Slovak Republic was a 
communist country for more than forty years. The Velvet Revolution seemed to send off 
the old regime, but it also brought something similar to the previous regime – 
Mečiarism6. Thus, the 1998 parliamentary election was a challenge for the opposition to 
finally achieve democracy and choose a new government that would be able to move 
Slovakia along the democratic path. Slovak society, frustrated with the previous 
government, created intense civic mobilization, with a dramatic increase in voter 
participation from 75.7% in 1994 to 84.2% in 1998, which made a difference in the 1998 
electoral contest7
 
. In addition, although there were differences among political parties in 
the opposition coalition, due to its broad spectrum of representation, all parties agreed on 
three main goals - the necessity of renewing democracy in the country, restoring the rule 
of law, and bringing Slovakia closer to European Union and NATO. 
Geographic Distribution of votes in the 1998 Slovak Parliamentary Election 
Once again, dramatic differences were manifested from place to place in party 
voting affinities. As Figure 6 below illustrates, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, 
uniting both right and left wing elements, received the majority of its votes from voters in 
                                                 
6 Mečiarism refers to controversial leadership of Vladimír Mečiar. Mečiar tried to use all levels of power to 
control every segment of the country. 
7 Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. 1994 and 1998 parliamentary elections.  
http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=4490. 
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the northwestern parts of the country. The highest share of valid votes were shown in 
Žilinský region in the districts of Čadca (54.6%), Kysucké Nové Mesto (49.9%), and 
Bytča (49.5%); in Trenčiansky region in the districts of Považská Bystrica (46.9%) and 
Púchov (45.8%); and in Banskobystrický region in the district of Žarnovica (46.9%). 
These were the same districts where HZDS received the highest rate of valid votes in the 
1994 election (Appendix 2). 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – HZDS 
 
 2,83 - 18,50 
 18,51- 24,40 
 24,41- 31,71 
 31,72- 37,30 
 37,31- 54,61 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (1998). 
In the case of the Slovak Democratic Coalition that was formed from four 
opposition parties and received a constitutional majority of 93 votes in the Slovak 
Parliament (26.3%), the largest number of valid votes for this political party was received 
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in all five Bratislava districts and in western Slovakia in general (Figure 7). In addition to 
votes from people living in Bratislavský region, SDK had also many supporters in 
Trnavský region in the district of Skalica (49.3%) and in Prešovský region in the districts 
of Prešov (40.6%) and Kežmarok (40.5%). In comparison to the 1994 electoral contest, 
SDK was able to take over the most electorate of Spoločná Voľba and KDH and secure its 
mass support in districts where Spoločná Voľba and KDH used to be dominant (Appendix 
2). 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – SDK 
 
 11,61- 17,26 
 17,27- 19,94 
 19,95- 24,43 
 24,44 -30,38 
 30,39 -53,89 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (1998). 
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As Figure 8 below suggests, the Party of the Democratic Left, with a total of 
14.7% of valid votes in the 1998 election, found most of its supporters in central 
Slovakia. The highest rate of votes was received in Banskobystrický region in the 
districts of Banská Bystrica (26.1%), Zvolen (23.3%), Krupina (22.8%), Revúca (22.0%), 
and Brezno (21.8%); as well as in Žilinský region in the district of Liptovský Mikuláš 
(22.2%) (Appendix 2). 
 
Figure 8: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – SDĽ 
 
 2,58 - 11,56 
 11,57- 13,80 
 13,81- 15,52 
 15,53- 17,07 
 17,08- 26,13 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (1998). 
As was noted earlier, it is no surprise that the Hungarian Coalition Party had the 
most followers in the southern parts of the Slovak Republic where most of the Hungarian 
minority lives (Figure 9). Specifically, in Trnavský region the districts of Dunajská 
 120 
Streda (79.3%) and Galanta (35.9%); in Nitriansky region the districts of Komárno 
(66.4%), Nové Zámky (36.0%), and Šaľa (34.4%); and in Banskobystrický region the 
district of Rimavská Sobota (35.0%), demonstrated a majority of votes for the Hungarian 
Coalition Party in the 1998 parliamentary election. These were the same districts where 
SMK-MKP won in 1994 election (Appendix 2). 
 
Figure 9: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – SMK-SKP 
 
 0,00 - 0,05 
 0,06 - 0,10 
 0,11 - 0,19 
 0,20 - 2,71 
 2,72 - 79,32 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (1998). 
  
In the 1998 parliamentary electoral contest, the Slovak National Party, with a total 
of 9.1% of valid votes was mainly represented by voters from the central and northern 
part of Slovakia (Figure 10). Especially high rates of votes were received in Žilinský 
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region in the districts of Žilina (23.7%), Kysucké Nové Mesto (21.6%), Tvrdošín 
(19.2%), and Bytča (19.0%); in Trenčiansky region in the district of Považská Bystrica 
(17.0%); and in Banskobystrický region in the district of Detva (16.7%). According to 
regional patterns of voting, SNS continued to receive the mass of voters’ support in the 
same districts as during the 1994 electoral contest. In addition, SNS was able to gain part 
of the electorate that supported HZDS in the 1994 election (Appendix 2). 
 
Figure 10: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – SNS 
 
 0,63 - 5,22 
 5,23 - 6,51 
 6,52 - 9,03 
 9,04 - 12,13 
 12,14 - 23,68 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (1998). 
The last party that was able to obtain representation in the parliament with a total 
of 8.0% of valid votes was the Party of Civic Understanding. Thanks to the party’s 
founder Rudolf Schuster, the popular mayor of the city of Košice, a city located in the 
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eastern part of Slovakia, the majority of party’s followers were from districts located in 
eastern Slovakia (Figure 11), particularly in Košický region in all districts of city of 
Košice, Trebišov (16.1%), Rožňava (14.2%), and Michalovce (13.2%) and in Prešovský 
region in the districts of Humenné (13.7%), Snina (13.1%), and Medzilaborce (12.5%). 
The analysis of the electoral support confirms that SOP most probably received a portion 
of its votes from voters who supported Spoločná Voľba in the 1994 electoral contest 
(Appendix 2).  
 
Figure 11: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – SOP 
 
 1,43 - 4,63 
 4,64 - 5,75 
 5,76 - 6,91 
 6,92 - 9,86 
 9,87 - 28,44 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (1998). 
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In summary, in terms of the geographic distribution of votes in 1998 Slovak 
parliamentary election the pro-reform political parties (Slovak Democratic Coalition, 
Hungarian Coalition Party, and Party of Civic Understanding) received the majority of 
their votes in Bratislavský, Trnavský, Nitriansky, Prešovský, and Košický regions, while 
populist and post-communist parties (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Party of the 
Democratic Left, and the Slovak National Party) were predominantly represented in 
Banskobystrický, Žilinský, and Trenčiansky regions. This is exactly the same pattern of 
geographical distribution of votes from 1994 election. 
 
2002 Slovak Parliamentary Election: Regional Patterns 
On September 20-21 2002, the Slovak Republic held its third parliamentary 
election since it became a sovereign country in 1993. With a total of 4,157,802 registered 
voters casting ballots, overall voter participation was 70.1%. Although this was a slight 
decrease in voter participation in comparison to the 1994 and 1998 Slovak parliamentary 
elections with 75.7% and 84.2% respectively, the turnout illustrated that Slovak people 
were serious about the electoral process and the political stakes involved8
This election was indeed crucial for the future of the Slovak Republic. As the 
1994 election represented a farewell to communism, and the 1998 election the end of 
Mečiar’s leadership, the possibility of Slovakia joining NATO and the European Union 
became a major factor in the 2002 parliamentary electoral contest. There was an overall 
consensus that the results of the 2002 Slovak parliamentary election would decide 
. 
                                                 
8 Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. 1994, 1998, and 2002 parliamentary elections  - total voting 
results. http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=4490. 
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whether Slovakia would continue and actually conclude its integration process into 
NATO and the European Union (Mesežnikov 1999, 14-15). 
In the 2002 Slovak parliamentary election, a total of 26 political parties were 
registered to compete, a significant increase in the number of political parties from 18 in 
1994 and 17 in 19989
Among new political parties, there were three parties created by leaders who left 
their previous affiliations due to internal conflicts. First, the True Slovak National Party 
(PSNS – Pravá Slovenská Národná Strana) was founded in October 2001 by former 
leader Ján Slota and other former members of the Slovak National Party (SNS – 
Slovenská Národná Strana). The program of the PSNS was almost identical with the 
program of the SNS, mainly aimed against giving support to the Hungarian minority. In 
addition, the PSNS opposed Slovak membership in NATO. Another newly-formed 
political party was the Party for Democracy (HZD – Hnutie za Demokraciu) created by 
the former members of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS – Hnutie za 
Demokratické Slovensko), and the Slovak Democratic Alliance established by the former 
.  From the complete number of political parties, 13 of were new 
political subjects formed during 1998-2002. The two most important among the new 
political parties were the Alliance of New Citizens (ANO – Aliancia Nového Občana), 
founded in April 2001, and SMER established in 1999. ANO aimed to promote free 
enterprises by reducing the influence of the Slovak state on the economy, while SMER, 
with its leader Robert Fico, was established to create space for the arrival of a new 
political generation in Slovakia.  
                                                 
9 Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. 1994, 1998, and 2002 parliamentary elections  -  registered 
political parties. http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=4490. 
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politicians from the Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ – Strana Demokratickej Ľavice). 
In all three cases because members of SNS, HZDS and SDĽ were unable to solve their 
internal conflicts, this eliminated any possibility for future cooperation between the old 
and newly established parties. 
Eight of 26 parties contesting the 2002 election were on the Slovak political scene 
since the first democratic parliamentary election held in 1994 in exactly same form or 
with a slight modification. They were: the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union 
(SDKÚ), the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Party of Hungarian 
Coalition (SMK), the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Slovak National Party 
(SNS), the Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ), the Association of Workers of Slovakia 
(ZRS) and the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS). In addition, from all parties that 
participated in the 2002 parliamentary election, two - the Green Party in Slovakia (SZS) 
and the Roma Civic Initiative (ROMA) - also competed in the 1994 election, while the 
Slovak National Unity (SNJ) and the B-Revolutionary Worker’s Party (B-RPS) 
participated in the 1998 parliamentary race.  
With a total of 19.5% of valid votes, the official winner of the 2002 parliamentary 
election became Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) (Figure 12). In 
second place was the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) with 15.1% of 
valid votes, followed by SMER with 13.5% of valid votes, then the Party of Hungarian 
Coalition (SMK) with 11.2% of valid votes, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) 
with 8.3% of valid votes, the Alliance of New Citizen (ANO) with 8.0% of valid votes, 
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and the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) with 6.3% of valid votes10
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. The results of the 
2002 parliamentary contest also illustrated that 13 political parties did not receive even 1 
percent of votes, two (SDA and SDĽ) secured less than 2 percent of votes, and three 
(PSNS, SNS and HZD) obtained less than 4% of valid votes. This demonstrated weak 
party organization, poor strategy, hubris, or a lack of situational awareness among party 
leaders from these 13 political parties who were aware of their low voters’ preferences 
from the beginning of the election campaign and their small or no chance to pass the 
required 5% threshold, which is one of the downside implications of the proportional 
representation electoral system as discussed above. 
 
Figure 12: 2002 parliamentary election - percentage of valid votes for political parties or 
political movements 
 
                                                 
10 Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. 2002 parliamentary election - percentage of valid votes for 
political parties or political movements. http://portal.statistics.sk/volby2002/webdata/engl/tab/tab3.htm. 
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  Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) - 19.5 % 
  Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) - 15.1 % 
  SMER - 13.5 % 
  Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK) - 11.2% 
  Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) - 8.3 % 
  Alliance of New Citizen (ANO) - 8.0 % 
 Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) – 6.3% 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002). 
 
From the total of 26 registered political parties, only seven were able to exceed 
the required 5 percent threshold in order to secure seats in the parliament. As the Figure 
13 below illustrates, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) was assigned 36 
seats, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) 28 seats, SMER 25 seats, the 
Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK) 20 seats, the Christian Democratic Movement 
(KDH) 15 seats, the Alliance of New Citizen (ANO) 15 seats, and the Communist Party 
of Slovakia (KSS) 11 seats in the parliament11
                                                 
11 Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. 2002 parliamentary election – numbers of seats assigned  to 
political parties. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://portal.statistics.sk/volby2002/webdata/engl/graf/graf2.htm. 
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Figure 13: Numbers of seats assigned to political parties 
 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002b). 
http://portal.statistics.sk/volby2002/webdata/engl/graf/graf2.htm. 
Based on election results, there was only one real possibility for the government 
coalition. First, no political party was willing to enter a coalition with the winner of the 
2002 Slovak parliamentary election, Mečiar’s HZDS, or the Communist Party of 
Slovakia. Also, in order to have a coalition with similar political programs and based on 
previous experiences of the former government, the center-right political parties were not 
interested in having the left-oriented SMER in its coalition either. Therefore, the 
parliamentary majority of the center-right oriented political parties with the total of 78 
seats allowed SDKÚ, SMK, KHD and ANO to create a coalition formed only from the 
right-oriented political parties. Mikuláš Dzurinda once again became the new prime 
minister and the three political parties – winning HZDS, SMER and KSS announced their 
departure into the opposition. 
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Geographic Distribution of votes in 2002 Parliamentary Election 
As was true in 1994 and 1998, there were pronounced geographical differences 
across Slovakia in the voting for the national party list (Figures 14 and 15). 
 
Figure 14: 2002 parliamentary election - winning political parties in Slovakia by districts 
 
Source: Sme.sk (2002). http://volby.sme.sk/c/674423/vitazne-politicke-strany-podla-
okresov-slovenskej-republiky.html. 
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Figure 15: 2002 parliamentary election - political parties with the highest number of 
valid votes in districts 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002c). 
http://www.statistics.sk/volby2002/webdata/slov/graf/strokr.htm. 
 
Based on the 2002 election results, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union 
received the highest share of votes in Bratislavský region in the districts of Bratislava I 
(40.7%), Bratislava IV (36.4%), Bratislava V (35.7%), Bratislava II (33.6%), and 
Bratislava III (33.2%) (Figure 16). In addition, SDKÚ’s other major supporters were 
from the eastern Slovakian district of Košice that represented 29.4% of votes. In 
comparison to the 1998 parliamentary election, SDKÚ was able to secure a majority of 
its votes in the districts that voted for the SDK in previous elections, especially in the 
district of Bratislava. In addition, the SDKÚ most probably received most of its votes 
from the Democratic Party (DS) that withdrew from the contest just few days prior, and 
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also from the Slovak Democratic Alliance (SDA) because these parties shared similar 
values. In addition, SDKÚ most likely secured part of the electorate that voted for the 
Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) in 1998. In terms of the regional distribution of 
votes, SDKÚ had the most followers in districts where Spoločná Voľba and DÚ were the 
strongest in the 1994 election and where SDK gained the majority of its support in the 
1998 electoral contest (Appendix 3). 
 
Figure 16: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – SDKÚ 
 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002). 
 
SMER, a new political party in the 2002 parliamentary election, received most of 
its votes in Prešovský region in the district of Medzilaborce (20.4%); in Trnavský region 
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in the districts of Hlohovec (18.9%), Trnava (18.3%), Senica (17.7%), and Skalica 
(17.6%); and in Žilinský region in the district of Martin (18.4%) (Figure 17). SMER was 
able to take over most of the electorate from regions where HZDS-RSS and ZRS had the 
highest rate of votes in the 1998 election and where HZDS, SDĽ, and SDK were 
dominating in the 1994 contest (Appendix 3). 
 
Figure 17: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – SMER 
 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002). 
 
ANO, also a new political party with its leader Pavol Rusko (who owned the first 
private Slovak TV station, Markíza), gained the majority of its support in Košický region 
especially in the city of Košice; as well as in Žilinský region in the district of Liptovský 
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Mikuláš (15.2%); in Prešovský region in the districts of Poprad (13.6%) and Kežmarok 
(12.3%); and in Banskobystrický region in the districts of Zvolen (12.5%) and Banská 
Bystrica (12.3%) (Figure 18). The analysis of the regional electoral support illustrates 
that ANO’s electorate came from districts that voted for HZDS-RSS, Spoločná Voľba, and 
DÚ in the 1994 election and for SDK, HZDS, and SDĽ in the 1998 election (Appendix 3).  
 
Figure 18: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – ANO 
 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002). 
 
As was the case in 1994 and 1998, the fact that the Hungarian minority lives 
along the Hungarian border in the southern parts of the country means that the Party of 
Hungarian Coalition’s voters distribution in the 2002 parliamentary election are to be 
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found in these same areas (Figure 19). As in 1998, SMK-MKP received most of their 
votes in Trnavský region in the districts of Dunajská Streda (86.2%) and Galanta 
(42.9%); in Nitriansky region in the districts of Komárno (74.6%), Nové Zámky (43.1%), 
and Šaľa (41.1%); and in Banskobystrický region in the district of Rimavská Sobota 
(37.0%). In each of these districts support for SMK slightly increased in comparison to 
1998 parliamentary election. In addition, these were the same districts where SMK-MKP 
had the highest rate of votes in the 1994 electoral contest as well (Appendix 3).  
 
Figure 19: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – SMK-MKP 
 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002). 
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The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) gained the majority of its 
votes in the 2002 parliamentary election in Žilinský region in the districts of Čadca 
(41.3%), Bytča (38.8%), and Kysucké Nové Mesto (38.7%); in Trenčiansky region in the 
districts of Púchov (38.1%) and Považská Bystrica (37.6%); and in Banskobystrický 
region in the district of and Detva (34.8%) (Figure 20). Not surprisingly, these were the 
same districts where HZDS had the most supporters in the 1994 and 1998 elections; 
however there was a major decrease in numbers for HZDS in these districts in the 2002 
contest (Appendix 3). 
 
Figure 20: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – HZDS 
 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002). 
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With a total of 8.3% of valid votes, the Christian Democratic Movement gained 
the majority of its support in Prešovský region in the districts of Kežmarok (25.3%), 
Levoča (24.4%), and Prešov (20.8%) and in Žilinský region in the districts of Námestovo 
(25.8%), Dolný Kubín (20.1%), and Tvrdošín (19.6%) (Figure 21). These are exactly the 
same regions were KDH had support from in the 1994 election. Moreover, the analysis of 
the regional electoral support illustrates that KDH’s electorate also comes from districts 
that previously voted for the Slovak National Party in the 1994 contest and for the Slovak 
Democratic Coalition in the 1998 election (Appendix 3).  
 
Figure 21: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – KDH 
 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002). 
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Receiving a total of 6.32% of valid votes, the 2002 parliamentary election was a 
great success for the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS). KSS was able to increase their 
electoral support from 0.72% in 1994 and 2.79% in the 1998 parliamentary election. KSS 
received the mass of its votes in eastern and central Slovakia, specifically in Prešovský 
region in the districts of Medzilaborce (24.9%) and Svidník (15.5%); in Banskobystrický 
region in the districts of Poltár (15.4%) and Revúca (13.8%); in Žilinský region in the 
district of Turčianske Teplice (15.2%); and in Košický region in the district of Gelnica 
(14.9%), (Figure 22). KSS received the highest rate of votes in districts which voted for 
HZDA-RSS and ZRS in the 1994 election and for HZDS and SDĽ in the 1998 electoral 
contest. 
Figure 22: Percentage of valid votes for a political party by districts – KSS 
 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002). 
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In summary, in terms of the geographic distribution of votes in the 2002 Slovak 
parliamentary election the pro-reform political parties (Alliance of New Citizens, Slovak 
Democratic and Christian Union, Hungarian Coalition, and the Christian Democratic 
Movement) were predominantly represented in Bratislavský, Prešovský, Košický, and 
Nitriansky regions, while opposition parties (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, 
SMER, and the Communist Party of Slovakia) had the most supporters in 
Banskobystrický, Žilinský, and Trenčiansky regions. This was a continuing trend in the 
geographical support of political parties previously seen in the 1994 and 1998 
parliamentary elections. The only change was in Trnavský region where SMER took over 
some of the SDK’s electorate and as a result this region illustrated balanced support 
between pro-reform and opposition political parties. 
Furthermore, as has been evident in the electoral geography literature cited 
previously, most countries evince a definite spatial pattern of political affinities, as 
expressed in voting for parties or for candidates representing parties. From the foregoing 
it is evident that Slovakia is no exception, with clear party preferences shown in specific 
areas. Further, this analysis of regional variations in voting behavior in the 1994, 1998, 
and 2002 Slovak parliamentary elections confirms that there is a strong tendency among 
voters in certain regions to provide continuous support to the same political parties over 
time. What remains is to investigate the underlying social, economic, and cultural traits of 
the regions to ascertain those characteristics of these areas that can be linked empirically 
and conceptually to voting outcomes. This is the task that I undertake in the section that 
follows. 
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Statistical Correlations and Survey Data 
With the above spatial patterns of political preference in mind, the task now shifts 
to relating these electoral outcomes to the underlying socio-economic structure of the 79 
districts. Again, we employ here aggregate data and, in the first instance, the voting 
results are compared with the socio-economic variables through a matrix of bivariate 
correlations (Tables 3-5). These statistical results are analyzed in light of the general 
literature on the socio-economic determinants of voting behavior in post-communist 
Central Europe.  Secondly, the aggregate data results are compared with findings from 
public opinion polling in Slovakia itself in 1998 and 2002 to validate (or not) the 
correlations. 
Based on the literature, we expect to find the following statistical correlations 
between socio-economic characteristics of voters and voters’ electoral choices in 
Slovakia per se: 
1. Less educated voters are inclined to vote for post-communist/populist parties. 
2. Voters with higher education are more likely supportive of pro-reform parties. 
3. Younger voters tend to vote for pro-reform parties. 
4. Older voters are more inclined to vote for post-communist/populist parties and/or 
parties that are on the left of the political spectrum. 
5. Voters of Hungarian nationality tend to vote for parties explicitly representing 
the interests of the Hungarian minority. 
6. Voters living in districts with high unemployment rates are likely to vote for 
post-communist/populist parties. 
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7. Pro-reform parties tend to be more supported in urban areas. 
8. Women voters tend to vote for pro-reform political parties. 
9. Pro-reform parties are the ones who explicitly supported European Union 
membership. 
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Table 3: Socio-economic and 1994 electoral data – Pearson correlations 
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Table 4: Socio-economic and 1998 electoral data – Pearson correlations 
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Table 5: Socio-economic and 2002 electoral data – Pearson correlations 
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Proposition 1: Less educated voters are inclined to vote for the post-communist/populist 
parties. 
In the 1994 electoral contest, the strongest positive correlations between less 
educated voters and the parties were those for the Hungarian party MK and the strongest 
negative coefficient with the pro-reform DÚ. In the 1998 election, voters with completed 
secondary vocational education showed a strong correlation with support for post-
communist/populist parties such as HZDS and SNS. Furthermore, in the 2002 contest, this 
trend continued and voters with completed secondary vocational education demonstrated 
a positive correlation again with support for HZDS. 
According to survey data (Table 6), in the 1998 parliamentary election HZDS, 
SMK-MKP and SNS drew most of their supporters from among people with primary 
education (51.3%, 40.2% and 34.6%). Another populist party, SDĽ, had equal 
representation among people with primary education and high school education without 
leaving examinations (31.5%).  
 
Table 6: Voting preferences according to voters’ education level (in %) 
Education Level/ 
Political Party 
HZDS SDK SDĽ SMK-
MKP 
SNS SOP 
Primary  51.3 18.4 25.4 40.2 34.6 15.5 
High School without 
leaving examinations 
(apprentice) 
26.7 30.3 31.5 32.9 32.1 38.0 
High School with 
leaving examinations 
(upper secondary) 
17.5 37.6 31.5 23.2 28.2 38.0 
University  4.6 13.7 11.5 3.7 5.1 8.5 
 
Source: FOCUS (1998). 
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In addition, as Table 7 demonstrates, in the 1998 electoral contest HZDS’s 
supporters were mostly among qualified (17.5%) and not-qualified (13.3%) manual 
workers, which is understandable since people that voted for HZDS were predominantly 
among those with the primary level of education. Other populist or left parties, such as 
SNS and SDĽ, received the majority of their support from qualified manual workers 
(30.8% and 24.6%), and by executive specialized workers (20.5% and 18.5%). Thus, 
survey data confirmed correlation findings based on aggregate data for the 79 districts 
that less educated voters are inclined to vote for opposition parties. 
 
 
Table 7: Voting preferences according to voters’ type of employment (in %) 
 
Employment / 
Political Party 
HZ
DS 
SDK SDĽ SMK-
MKP 
SNS SOP 
Not-qualified 
manual worker 
13.3 3.8 8.5 15.9 12.8 5.6 
Qualified manual 
worker 
17.5 20.9 24.6 15.9 30.8 26.8 
Executive 
specialized 
worker 
9.6 26.1 18.5 15.9 20.5 26.8 
Creative 
specialized 
worker 
3.3 12.0 6.9 3.7 3.8 7.0 
Director  0.9 0.8   1.4 
Entrepreneur 
without 
employees 
2.5 6.8 1.5 2.4 3.8 2.8 
 
Source: FOCUS (1998). 
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Proposition 2: Voters with higher education are more likely supportive of pro-reform 
parties. 
In the 1994 election, across the 79 districts there was a positive correlation 
between voters with higher and university education and support for the main pro-reform 
party Spoločná Voľba and an even stronger correlation with the other principal pro-
reform party, DÚ. That is, districts wherein the population was relatively better educated 
tended to vote pro-reform. This trend persisted in the 1998 and 2002 contest as illustrated 
by strong correlations between voters with higher and university levels of education and 
their support for the pro-reform SDK/ SDKÚ. In addition, the strength of this particular 
correlation increased over time. 
As survey studies confirm (Table 6), in the 1998 election SDK had most of its 
voters among people that graduated from high school with school leaving examinations 
(37.6%). In comparison to other political parties SDK received the highest preferences 
from voters with a university education (13.7%). Another pro-reform political party, 
SOP, had equal representation among people with primary education and high school 
without leaving examinations (38.0%). The Hungarian Coalition SMK-MKP had the 
majority of its voters among people with primary education (40.2%). Since SDK had the 
majority of its voters among people with the highest education levels, it is apparent that 
the party received most of its preferences from people in executive specialized positions 
(26.1%) (Table 7). Furthermore, the Hungarian Coalition SMK-MKP was equally 
supported not only by not-qualified and qualified manual workers, but also by executive 
specialized workers (15.9%), illustrating that support for this ethnic party was vertical 
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(i.e., regardless of educational attainment levels). Thus, the survey data are in agreement 
with statistical correlations based on aggregate data that voters with higher education are 
more likely supportive of pro-reform parties. Making the point another way, correlation 
coefficients between the populist or post-communist parties and higher education are 
negative or very weakly positive. 
 
Proposition 3: Younger voters tend to vote for pro-reform political parties. 
As Tables 3-5 demonstrate, there was a positive correlation between younger 
women voters in the age group 25-34 and the pro-reform Spoločná Voľba and DÚ in the 
1994 contest. There was a continuing strong relationship between younger women voters 
in age group 24-34 and the pro-reform parties SDK/ SDKÚ in the 1998 and 2002 election. 
There was an increase in the strength of this correlation from 1998 to 2002 election. 
Furthermore, younger men voters in the age group 24-34 and the populist HZDS showed 
a positive correlation in the 1998 and 2002 contest.  
 
Table 8: Voting preferences according to voters’ age (in %) 
Age /  
Political 
Party 
HZDS SDK SDĽ SMK-
MKP 
SNS SOP 
18 – 24 6.3 15.0 14.6 13.4 12.8 11.3 
25 – 34 13.8 32.1 22.3 20.7 32.1 31.0 
35 – 44 17.5 25.2 20.8 19.5 17.9 22.5 
45 – 54 16.3 12.0 17.7 17.1 15.4 16.9 
55 – 59 9.2 3.0 6.2 7.3 6.4 5.6 
60 and higher 37.1 12.8 18.5 22.0 15.4 12.7 
 
Source: FOCUS (1998). 
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According to survey data (Table 8), in the 1998 election SDK had the youngest 
supporters, with the majority of them being in the age group 18-24 (15.0%) and 25-34 
(32.1%). SMK-MKP was preferred by younger voters in the age group 25-34 (20.7%), but 
also received strong support from voters in the age group 60 and higher. Another pro-
reform party, SOP, had similarly to SDK the majority of its supporters in the age group 
25-34 (31%). Left parties SDĽ and SNS also had strong support among younger voters in 
the age group 25-34 (22.3% and 32.1%). As illustrated in Table 9, among all participating 
parties, the pro-reform SDK and SOP had strong support among households with young 
people (5.1% and 5.6%) and in young households (13.7% and 18.3%).Overall, both 
correlations and survey data confirm that younger voters tend to vote mainly for pro-
reform political parties. 
 
Table 9: Voting preferences according to voters’ household (in %) 
Type of 
household/ 
Political Party 
 
HZDS SDK SDĽ SMK-
MKP 
SNS SOP 
Young people 2.1 5.1 3.8 3.7 5.1 5.6 
Young household 7.5 13.7 10.8 18.3 14.1 18.3 
Ordinary 
household 
17.5 29.5 23.8 17.1 17.9 25.4 
Adult household 16.3 29.5 26.9 20.7 37.2 22.5 
Three generations 
household 
12.9 4.7 6.9 9.8 7.7 12.7 
Older household 11.7 6.4 12.3 9.8 7.7 7.0 
Older people 30.4 9.8 13.1 20.7 10.3 8.5 
Other 1.7 1.3 2.3    
 
Source: FOCUS (1998). 
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Proposition 4: Older voters are more inclined to vote for opposition parties and/or 
parties that are on the left of the political spectrum. 
Somewhat surprisingly, statistical correlations of older voters in the age groups 
55-59 and 60 and higher did not reveal any significant relationships with voting for 
parties of the political left, or any parties for that matter. There are probably two reasons 
why aggregate data did not support this proposition. The first reason is that there is an 
insufficient variation in the Slovak age structure. The second reason is that the data are 
not disaggregated enough to produce strong correlation. For example, rural elderly may 
be voting differently than urban elderly. However, according to survey studies, HZDS 
had the majority of its support in the 1998 electoral contest from older voters in the age 
group of 60 and higher (37.1%) and 55-59 (9.2%) (Table 8). In addition, as demonstrated 
in Table 6, voters living in older households were also voting for the populist parties SDĽ 
(12.3%) and HZDS(11.7%). Furthermore, HZDS and SDĽ had the highest share of their 
support in households with older people (30.4% and 13.1%). The pro-reform SMK-MKP 
was also supported by voters living in households with older people (20.7%), which is 
understandable since the Hungarian Coalition had most of their supporters among people 
of age 60 and higher (Table 8). Therefore, according to the individual level data, overall 
older voters were more inclined to vote for opposition parties and/or parties that are on 
the left of the political spectrum. 
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Proposition 5: Ethnic Hungarian voters favor parties explicitly representing the interests 
of the Hungarian minority. 
Ethnic Hungarians continuously illustrated the strongest correlation with 
MK/SMK-MKP, the parties explicitly representing the interests of Slovakia’s ethnic 
Hungarian minority in all three electoral contests. Indeed, the bivariate coefficients for 
percent ethnic Hungarian and the percentage of the vote for the MK/SMK-MKP are the 
highest of any statistical relationship in this study, illustrating how dramatic the ethnic 
cleavage is in the Slovak electorate. As survey studies illustrate (Table 10), this is 
consistent with the individual level data on the nationality indicator of voters in the 1998 
parliamentary election. From six political parties and movements chosen to the 
parliament, the Hungarian Coalition SMK-MKP received most of their votes from people 
of the Hungarian nationality (93.9%). All other five political parties and movements had 
the majority of their supporters among Slovak nationals. Thus, both the aggregate 
statistical correlations and survey data demonstrate that voters with Hungarian nationality 
vote for parties that explicitly represent the interests of the Hungarian minority. 
 
Table 10: Voting preferences according to voters’ nationality (in %) 
Nationality / 
Political 
Party 
HZDS SDK SDĽ SMK-
MKP 
SNS SOP 
Slovak 95.0 95.3 90.0 6.1 98.7 93.0 
Hungarian 0.8 3.4 1.5 93.9  4.2 
Other 4.2 1.3 8.5  1.3 2.8 
 
Source: FOCUS (1998). 
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Proposition 6: Voters living in districts with high unemployment rates are likely to vote 
for populist or post-communist political parties and not for the pro-reform parties. 
High unemployment rates were negatively correlated with electoral votes for the 
pro-reform Spoločná Voľba and DÚ in the 1994 election and with the pro-reform 
SDK/SDKÚ in the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary contests, indicating that voters in areas 
of higher unemployment opted for populist or leftist parties that promised more secure 
employment. This is confirmed by the fact that high unemployment rates were positively 
correlated with the post-communist KSS in the 2002 election. As survey data illustrate 
(Table 11), household income is a useful indicator of voters’ economic situation. As 
mentioned before, SDK’s voters had the highest level of education, mostly among 
executive specialized workers, therefore they also had the highest rates of income in the 
group earning 5000 Sk and more (32.5%). The leftist party SDĽ had supporters mainly 
among qualified manual workers and executive specialized workers, therefore their 
voters’ household income is represented in two groups – 5000 Sk and higher (23.1%) and 
3000-3999 Sk (21.5%). The populist HZDS and the ethnic Hungarian SMK-MKP had 
many supporters among people with low levels of education, thus their total income was 
also low, from 3000-3999 Sk (22.9% and 41.5%). Furthermore, people who voted pro-
reform SOP and for the left party SDĽ live in the household with income of 5000 Sk and 
more (28.2% and 23.1%). 
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Table 11: Voting preferences according to voters’ household income (in %) 
 
Household 
Income /  
Political Party 
 
HZDS SDK SDĽ SMK-
MKP 
SNS SOP 
1-2000 Sk 4.2 1.7 1.5 3.7 1.3  
2000-2999 Sk 17.1 12.0 13.8 9.8 12.8 14.1 
3000-3999 Sk 22.9 18.8 21.5 41.5 23.1 21.1 
4000-4999 Sk 17.5 15.4 16.9 18.3 11.5 7.0 
5000 Sk and more 15.8 32.5 23.1 12.2 21.8 28.2 
Do not want say 15.4 8.5 11.5 12.2 20.5 21.1 
Don’t know 7.1 11.1 11.5 2.4 9.0 8.5 
 
Source: FOCUS (1998). 
 
Overall, both survey data and statistical correlations agree that voters living in 
districts with high unemployment rates and those with low household income are likely 
to vote for populist or left political parties. 
 
Proposition 7: Pro-reform parties tend to be more supported in urban areas. 
In all three elections, pro-reform political parties evinced positive correlation 
coefficients, in some cases strongly so, with the level of urbanization variable, indicating 
that their support was strongest in urban areas. Specifically, there was a strong correlation 
between the urban variable and electoral votes for the pro-reform DÚ in the 1994 contest 
and for SDK/SDKÚ in the 1998 and 2002 elections. Furthermore, the strength of the 
urban correlation with pro-reform political parties increased over time. 
According to 1998 survey data (Table 12), the pro-reform SDK and SOP were 
mostly supported by voters living in urban areas, especially in the cities of Bratislava and 
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Košice (20.9%). On the other hand, the Hungarian Coalition SMK-MKP received most of 
its votes from people living in small communities of 1-2 thousand inhabitants (39.0%). 
This is understandable since SMK-MKP supporters are concentrated in the districts 
located along Hungarian border which are predominantly rural. From the populist or left 
parties, the SDĽ had the majority of its supporters from communities of 20-50 thousand 
inhabitants (20.8%) and from communities of 5-20 thousand inhabitants (16.9%),  HZDS 
was almost equally represented in all types of communities, but with prevalence in small 
communities of 1-2 thousand inhabitants (18.3%), whereas SNS received most of their 
votes from people living in communities of 2-5 thousand (20.5%).As a result of both 
statistical correlations and survey data, we can conclude that pro-reform political parties 
tend to be better supported in urban areas.  
 
Table 12: Voting preferences according to voters’ size of community (in %) 
Size of 
Community/ 
Political Party 
HZDS SDK SDĽ SMK-
MKP 
SNS SOP 
Less than 1000  11.3 7.3 10.8 20.7 11.5 7.0 
1000-2000 18.3 15.4 13.8 39.0 11.5 22.5 
2000-5000 17.5 16.2 5.4 14.6 20.5 11.3 
5000-20,000 16.3 16.2 16.9 17.1 14.1 8.5 
20,000-50,000 15.0 11.1 20.8 4.9 17.9 8.5 
50,000-100,000 11.7 12.8 15.4  14.1 14.1 
BA, KE 10.0 20.9 16.9 3.7 10.3 28.2 
 
Source: FOCUS (1998). 
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Proposition 8: Women voters tend to vote for pro-reform political parties. 
In all three elections, pro-reform parties received significant support from women 
voters. In 1994, there was a positive correlation between women voters and the pro-
reform DÚ. This trend continued in the 1998 and 2002 contests with strong correlations 
between women voters and the pro-reform SDK/SDKÚ. Furthermore, the strength of this 
particular correlation strengthened over time. Also worthy of note is the negative 
relationship between female voters and the HZDS in 1998 and 2002, indicating that the 
stridency of Mečiar’s message was not well received by women. 
According to survey studies, from six political parties and movements that 
received enough votes to enter the parliament in the 1998 election, only HZDS and SNS 
received major support from men. The other four political parties and movements had the 
majority of their voters from the female population. While in the case of HZDS, SMK-
MKP, and SOP the difference in male and female preferences was not large, on the other 
hand, SNS, SDK, and SDĽ exhibited large differences in the numbers of voters of each 
sex (Table 13). SDK was the only political party in the 1998 election that explicitly 
addressed women’s issues in its political program, therefore we can suggest that thanks to 
their attention to women’s issues they received more preferences from female voters. 
Based on available survey data and statistical correlations we can conclude that women 
voters tend to vote for pro-reform political parties. 
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Table 13: Voting preferences by gender (in %) 
 
Gender / 
Political 
Party 
HZDS SDK SDĽ SMK-
MKP 
SNS SOP 
Men 51.3 43.2 41.5 47.6 60.3 46.5 
Women 48.8 56.8 58.5 52.4 39.7 53.5 
 
Source: FOCUS (1998). 
 
Proposition 9: Pro-reform parties are the ones who explicitly supported European Union 
membership. 
On May 16-17, 2003 Slovakia held a referendum on EU membership. The 
question all participants were asked was: Do you agree to the proposal that the Slovak 
Republic should become a member state of the European Union? 52.2% of eligible 
Slovak citizens participated in the referendum of which 92.5% were in favor of EU 
membership (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1993). 
According to regional distribution of support for EU membership, the highest 
percentage of votes were in districts of Bratislava and Košice as well as in districts of 
Dunajská Streda and Komárno (Figure 23). As indicated by regional voting data, all four 
districts were the strongholds of the pro-reform political parties (the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition and the Hungarian Coalition) in all three parliamentary elections. In contrast, 
districts that had the highest rate of vote against EU membership (Figure 24) were in the 
areas that voted for the populist HZDS in 1994, 1998, and 2002 contest. Therefore, 
regional vote for pro-reform political parties represented a shadow vote for EU 
membership. 
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Figure 23: Share of the number of participants in the referendum who answered - yes  
 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2003a). 
http://portal.statistics.sk/ref_2003/webdata/en/graf/kart2_a.htm. 
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Figure 24: Share of the number of participants in the referendum who answered - no 
 
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2003b). 
http://portal.statistics.sk/ref_2003/webdata/en/graf/kart3_a.htm. 
 
The 2002 survey data on the European Union membership indicate that less 
educated voters with elementary education (31.0%) and high school without leaving 
examinations education (31.0%); older voters, especially those in age group 60 and 
higher (39%); unqualified workers (34%); respondents living in communities of 2-10 
thousand people (39%) and 50-100 thousand people (31%); residents of Trenčiansky 
region; supporters of the Communist Party of Slovakia (50%), the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia (49%), the Slovak National Party (41%), and the Party of the 
Democratic Left (41%), were not supportive of Slovakia becoming a member of EU. In 
contrast, people with higher levels of education- completed secondary education (77%) 
and university education (86%); Hungarian nationals (79%); younger voters in groups 
18-24 (76%) and 25-29 (79%); residents living in communities with over 100 thousand 
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people, especially in Bratislavský (83%) and Košický (76%) regions which include two 
largest cities Bratislava and Košice; entrepreneurs (81%); supporters of the Slovak 
Democratic and Christian Union (95%), Alliance of New Citizen (90%), The Christian 
Democratic Movement (83%), and SMER (79%) were in favor of EU membership 
(Škrabala 2002b: 2). Overall, both voting and survey data confirm that pro-reform parties 
are the ones who explicitly supported European Union membership. 
 
Stepwise Regression 
 
 Recognizing that both conceptually and empirically there is strong evidence 
indicating multicolinearity among the socio-economic variables themselves, a stepwise 
regression analysis was performed to determine which among a basket of associated 
variables offered the best (or most parsimonious) explanation for variations in the vote 
for the major parties in the Slovak elections of 1994, 1998, and 2002. That is, in the 
literature and in the bivariate correlations it is understood or can be shown that socio-
economic variables such as the level of urbanization, educational attainment, and age 
groups tend to cluster together; in other words, more urbanized areas typically evince 
higher educational levels and younger populations. To test this proposition, sets of socio-
economic variables were regressed against the percentage of the vote in each of the 79 
districts for the leading pro-reform party in each election (Spoločná Voľba-1994, SDK-
1998, and SDKÚ-2002) and the main populist party (HZDS throughout) as the dependent 
variables using the forward exclusion method. Variables to be tested in this procedure 
were drawn from those with the strongest bivariate correlations with the understanding 
that these, as discussed above, also are well established in the literature as good 
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predictors of political party preference in post-communist elections, and are backed up 
with results from surveys. Specifically, the variables included are: level of urbanization 
(and percent rural), gender, unemployment levels, age groups, and levels of educational 
attainment. This method iteratively (i.e., “stepwise”) considers variables to be brought 
into the regression equation to determine if they add significantly to the explanation. If a 
variable does so, it is included, and if not, it is excluded. The results are presented in 
Tables 14, 15, and 16. 
 Looking at the most recent (2002) election first, it can be seen that the attainment 
of university level education and the percentage of the population in younger adult ages 
(18-24) explain a high percentage (R2) of the variation in voting for the pro-reform SDKÚ 
and, not surprisingly, relatively lower educational attainment, a higher percentage of 
men, higher levels of unemployment and a more rural population contribute the most to 
explaining variations in the HZDS vote among the districts. Precisely the same two 
variables are the strongest among the basket for the pro-reform SDK in 1998 as for the 
SDKÚ in 2002, although the statistical relationship is weaker. Again, the lower 
educational attainment and a higher percentage of men variables play the most prominent 
role in explaining the HZDS vote in 1998. The results for the 1994 election present 
something of a quandary, as the unemployment level variable is the strongest for both the 
pro-reform Spoločná Voľba and the populist HZDS (although in the case of HZDS the 
rural population variable is also retained).  It may be the case here that in the immediate 
aftermath of Slovakia’s independence, which was accompanied by severe economic 
turbulence and generally high unemployment, that districts in which other variables 
might have been important (e.g., level of urbanization and higher educational attainment) 
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in shaping the pro-reform vote also had high unemployment levels, and pro-HZDS areas 
likewise (remembering that higher unemployment levels are positively associated with 
the HZDS vote in the later elections). The presence of another pro-reform party in 1994, 
DÚ, may also have affected how unemployment related to voting. As the electorate 
“matured” politically and the different parties solidified their respective bases, and the 
socio-economic landscape of Slovakia changed with the improving economy, 
employment conditions in the pro-reform districts improved and therefore the 
unemployment variable ceased to be important, but remained a crucial support element 
for the populist HZDS. In summary, the stepwise regression analysis largely validates the 
individual bivariate relationships discussed above in detail and highlights the importance 
of certain variables for the pro-reform and populist parties, with the one exception of the 
unemployment variable and the pro-reform Spoločná Voľba in 1994. 
 
Table 14: Stepwise regression - 2002 election 
 
Dependent Variable: SDKU (Pro-Reform) 
Model Summary12  
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
University Education 
(EDU_UNIV_T) .851
a .724 .721 4.3014 
Age Group: 18-24 
(AGE_18_24_T) .867
b .752 .746 4.1057 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_UNIV_T 
b. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_UNIV_T, AGE_18_24_T 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Variables used: gender-men, gender-women, urban population, unemployment, age group 18-24, age 
group 25-34, and university education. 
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Dependent Variable: HZDS (Populist) 
Model Summary13 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Education – Secondary 
Professional without 
High School Exam 
(EDU_CSV_T)  
.579a .335 .326 7.2456 
Gender – Men 
(GENDER_PRP_M) .630
b .397 .381 6.9431 
Unemployment 
(UNEMPLOYMENT) .660
c .436 .413 6.7599 
Rural Population 
(RUR_POP) .689
d .475 .447 6.5657 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_CSV_T 
b. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_CSV_T, GENDER_PRP_M 
c. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_CSV_T, GENDER_PRP_M, UNEMPLOYMENT 
d. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_CSV_T, GENDER_PRP_M, UNEMPLOYMENT, RUR_POP 
 
 
Table 15: Stepwise regression - 1998 election 
 
Dependent Variable: HZDS (Populist) 
Model Summary14 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Education – Secondary 
Professional without 
High School Exam 
(EDU_CSV_T) 
.599a .359 .351 8.7485 
Gender – Men 
(GENDER_EAP_M) .695
b .482 .469 7.9134 
Education – Elementary 
(EDU_ELEM_T) .735
c .540 .521 7.5133 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_CSV_T 
b. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_CSV_T, GENDER_EAP_M 
c. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_CSV_T, GENDER_EAP_M, EDU_ELEM_T 
 
                                                 
13 Variables used: gender-men, gender-women, rural population, unemployment, age group 55-59, age 
group 60 plus, elementary education, and education –secondary professional without high school exam.  
14 Variables used: gender-men, gender-women, rural population, unemployment, age group 55-59, age 
group 60 plus, elementary education, and education –secondary professional without high school exam.  
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Dependent Variable: SDK (Pro-Reform) 
Model Summary15 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
University Education 
(EDU_UNIV_T) .686
a .471 .464 7.0079 
Age Group 18-24 
(AGE_18_24_T) .722
b .522 .509 6.7039 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_UNIV_T 
b. Predictors: (Constant), EDU_UNIV_T, AGE_18_24_T 
 
Table 16: Stepwise regression - 1994 election 
Dependent Variable: SP_VOLBA  (Pro-Reform) 
Model Summary16 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Unemployment .688a .473 .466 3.6865 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
Dependent Variable: HZDS_RSS (Populist) 
Model Summary17 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Unemployment .600a .360 .352 15.2792 
Rural Population 
(RUR_POP) .629
b .396 .380 14.9444 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNEMPLOYMENT 
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNEMPLOYMENT, RUR_POP 
 
 
  
In summary, this statistical analysis of electoral and socio-economic data and the 
1998 and 2002 survey data revealed that, with one important exception, relationships that 
we originally predicted were confirmed and continuous trends in these patterns generally 
                                                 
15 Variables used: gender-men, gender-women, urban population, unemployment, age group 18-24, age 
group 25-34, and university education. 
16 Variables used: gender-men, gender-women, urban population, unemployment, age group 18-24, age 
group 25-34, and university education. 
17 Variables used: gender-men, gender-women, rural population, unemployment, age group 55-59, age 
group 60 plus, elementary education, and education –secondary professional without high school exam. 
 163 
strengthened over time. This study validates the view that voters’ electoral choices are 
shaped by socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, education, nationality, 
unemployment, and urban/rural residence. The analysis also illustrated that well-
educated, young, urban voters tend to vote for pro-reform political parties and were 
supportive of Slovakia joining EU, whereas elderly, less educated, rural voters were more 
inclined to vote for the left-wing parties and were against EU membership.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
This study describes and analyzes regional variations in voting behavior in post-
communist Slovakia during the 1994, 1998, and 2002 parliamentary elections. The 
unique set of district electoral data compiled for the three Slovak parliamentary contests 
represents one of the main contributions of this dissertation. The data provide important 
empirical evidence that informs the study of electoral geography in general and adds an 
additional case study to the literature on party formation and voter preferences in the 
post-transitional countries of Central Europe, and specifically sheds light on the transition 
to multiparty democracy in the Slovak Republic itself.  
The literature on the transition to democratic, multi-party systems asserts that 
selection of the electoral system and modification of electoral rules play a significant role 
in party formation in the post-communist countries. This was definitely evident in the 
case of Slovakia; in that country, implementation of the proportional representation 
electoral system allowed multi-party representation and a rapid proliferation of political 
parties on all sides of the political spectrum in post-communist Slovakia. To sum up, 
there were total of 18 political parties that participated in the 1994 election, 17 in the 
1998 contest, and 26 in the 2002 election. While Slovakia achieved relative stability in 
terms of its party system in the first ten years of democratic transition, it also witnessed 
the establishment of many diverse, ideologically diffused political parties with loose 
organization and with very broad programs. In each of the three Slovak elections there 
were many such political parties that did not meet the required 5 percent electoral 
threshold to receive seats in the parliament: 11 out of 18 in the 1994 contest, 11 out of 17 
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in the 1998 contest, and 18 out of 26 in 2002 failed to clear the bar. Moreover, many of 
these parties received voters’ support below 2 percent: 8 in 1994, 10 in 1998, and 15 in 
2002 (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1994, 1998, 2002). Without established 
voter loyalty such parties either quickly disappeared from the Slovak political scene 
shortly after each election or shifted their allegiance to parties that stood a better chance 
of actually receiving parliamentary seats via proportional representation in the 
consequent elections.  
In comparison with the period before the division of Czechoslovakia, there were 
several electoral parties which established themselves after the fall of communism and 
whose position remains unchanged even today. Since their formation, they continue to 
play an essential role in the political process and elections in Slovakia. They are the 
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS), the Slovak National Party (SNS), the Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP), 
the Party of the Democratic Left (SDĽ) and the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK). This 
demonstrates that, despite the continued presence of the fringe parties mentioned above,  
after ten years of democratic transition Slovakia’s party system has stabilized over time. 
In addition, there were two modifications of electoral law that had profound 
implications on party development in post-communist Slovakia. The first change was the 
amendment in the system of constituencies when the country’s four single electoral 
constituencies were combined into one. As the literature indicates, this modification, 
which is an example of the effect of district magnitude, mainly affected small political 
parties and those parties that lacked strong leadership since it diminished the link 
between voters and party candidates. The second change in the Slovak electoral rules was 
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a modification of the electoral threshold to 5 percent for each individual party or 
coalition. As a result of this modification in the electoral law many small political parties 
merged or ceased to exist and overall this amendment contributed to the consolidation of 
some political parties in Slovakia, albeit still allowing for the formation of new parties as 
evidenced by the increase in the number of parties between the 1998 and 2002 contests. 
These modifications in the electoral law also influenced the regional distribution in voter 
support since the regional vote for political parties that were not able to secure the 
required 5 percent of votes to obtain seats in the parliament in one election shifted to 
another party or movement in the consequent election. For example, as Table 1 indicates, 
the Democratic Union had relatively strong support in the 1994 election, however after 
modification in the electoral threshold the party decided to join the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition to ensure that it would receive representation in the parliament in the following 
electoral contest. Thus, the party’s regional support was reallocated to the Slovak 
Democratic Coalition.  
Both changes in electoral rules were initiated by the populist HZDS, a large 
political party with a strong leadership, with the goal of eliminating potential competition 
in the parliamentary elections. Thus, such political manipulation resulted in pre-election 
strategic coordination especially among pro-reform political parties. Consequently, both 
amendments in electoral rules had significant implications for Slovak electoral politics 
and party formation during the country’s ten years of democratic transformation.  
In regards to party formation, the scholarly literature indicates the important role 
that political parties play in the transition process and highlights different aspects specific 
to party formation in the post-communist states. Such features of party formation include 
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the emergence of new political parties that led countries to the democratic transition and 
then disappeared within a few years after the transition. This directly applies to the case 
of Slovakia, where the Public Against Violence party spearheaded the country’s 
democratic transformation right after Velvet Revolution, dominated the country’s 
political scene without any major competition in the first years of the transition, and then 
dropped from the political scene a few years later. Another aspect of the post-communist 
party formation that is relevant to this study is the role of historical political parties in the 
political process; since there were few active political parties in Slovakia during the 
interwar period, the country’s 1968 reforms had an in impact on the formation of political 
parties and interests groups. Additionally, according to the transitional literature on voter 
turnout dynamics, voters’ participation in the first post-transitional election tends to be 
the highest, whereas the voter turnout in each consequent election is likely to decline 
(Kostadinova 2003, 754-755). 
 To properly understand voter turnout in the Slovak Republic it is important to 
evaluate voters’ participation in the parliamentary elections starting from the first post-
communist elections, when Slovakia was still part of Czechoslovakia. The analysis of 
voter turnout indicates that voter participation while Slovakia was part of Czechoslovakia 
was 95.4% in the 1990 election and 84.2% in the 1992 electoral contest. After Slovakia 
became an independent country, voter turnout was 75.7% in the 1994 parliamentary 
election, 84.2% in the 1998 electoral contest, 70.1% in the 2002 election, and 54.7% in 
the 2006 contest (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006). The 
voter turnout data clearly indicate that participation in the 1990 parliamentary election 
was the highest, as we would expect, and then turnout decreased with each following 
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parliamentary election except the one held in 1998 (in that case, as we noted above, 
frustration with the previous government of the populist Mečiar created intense civic 
mobilization, which made a difference in the 1998 turnout. While there was a 25% 
decline in voter participation in the 2002 election in comparison to the 1990 
parliamentary contest, the 2002 voter turnout demonstrated that the Slovak people still 
recognized the importance of the electoral process and their role in affecting political 
outcomes, especially right before a decision was made regarding EU enlargement. This 
supports arguments made by the transitional literature that while the first post-communist 
election shows the highest voters’ participation, the voter turnout decreases in all 
subsequent elections. 
 
There were two main purposes set for this study. The first main purpose of this 
dissertation was to describe regional variations in party support and then analyze those 
patterns by relating them to socio-economic characteristics of the population in the 
districts of Slovakia to further our understanding of the correlates of voting in this post-
communist state. A secondary purpose was to relate these spatial variations to the 
evolution of political parties in the post-independence period in light of the literature on 
transitional electoral systems.  
As a result of a comprehensive analysis this dissertation answers three main 
research questions that were posed at the beginning of the study: 
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: Question 1: What is the electoral geography of Slovakia and how has it changed during 
the decade of the country’s democratic transition? 
  The hypothesis related to the first question was that there is a tendency among 
voters in certain districts to provide continuous support to the same political 
parties/movements over time. As the scholarly literature indicates, there are distinctive 
regional patterns of voting behavior found in the post-communist states of Central Europe 
and the states of the former Soviet Union. Further, these patterns, such as the “Red Belt” 
in post-Soviet Russia (wherein voters overwhelmingly and consistently favored the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation) or the tendency in that same country for the 
urbanized regions of the Northwest, Urals and Moscow regions to support pro-reform 
parties and candidates, are persistent. By taking into consideration voters’ party 
preference, scholars assert that there is a continuous regional support for the same 
political parties across time and that these regional bases provide parties with their 
principal constituencies. In summary of this point, the post-transitional literature 
highlights the emergence and persistence of regional power bases for various political 
parties. Thus, a country’s regions and districts can be linked to support for a particular 
political party over time. Additionally, scholarly work asserts that socio-economic 
characteristics of populations living in different regions tend to influence voting 
preferences in the electoral contests. 
 This dissertation utilizes the cleavage model, based mainly on socio-economic 
characteristics of the Slovak population. Analysis of the three Slovak parliamentary 
elections reveals that the spatial patterns in partisan voting behavior found in other post-
communist states are also valid for the case of Slovakia. By comparing voting results 
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from the 1994, 1998, and 2002 Slovak electoral contests in the 79 Slovak districts, this 
dissertation reaffirms that there is a continuous regional variation in voter support over 
time, and, furthermore, that there are established regional power bases for the pro-reform, 
ethnic (i.e., Hungarian) and populist/leftist parties. Furthermore, while the Slovak vote 
varies across different regions and districts, regionally, support for political parties 
remains the same across time. By employing socio-economic variables of Slovak voters 
and linking them to electoral vote (see below), this dissertation confirms that the 
population composition and the cleavages within it in the Slovak districts shape political 
behavior in the country. Yet, based on my results, the influence of place-specific or even 
idiosyncratic factors cannot be discounted, and indeed suggest that forcing a distinction 
between the cleavage and the place approaches is not warranted; for example, if the 
mayor of Slovakia’s second largest city launches a new political party and garners the 
lion’s share of votes in his home district, it is difficult to explain this by reference only to 
the cleavage model. The complexity of the interconnectedness of demographic or socio-
economic traits of a population on which the cleavage model is based and the real-world 
events or personalities or local political cultures that are external to the empirical facts 
challenges even the most mature scholars, as illustrated by John Agnew’s classic work on 
Italy. 
 
Question 2: How do the socio-economic characteristics of the Slovak population in 
different regions influence voting preferences in the parliamentary elections? 
The hypothesis linked to this question was that the socio-economic characteristics 
of the Slovak population (gender, age, education, nationality, employment, income, type 
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of household) in different regions tend to influence voting preferences in the 
parliamentary elections. 
As detailed in previous chapters, the literature on voting behavior and factors that 
influence voter choices in the post-communist countries, studies drawn both from 
aggregate and individual level data, suggests that there is a correlation between socio-
demographic variables and voting preferences in the post-communist countries. Various 
scholarly works indicate that post-transitional voting is shaped by socio-economic 
variables such as education, income, unemployment, age, urban/rural residence, and 
ethnicity. Furthermore, the literature demonstrates that urban, younger, well-educated 
voters are more likely to vote for pro-reform parties, whereas rural, less-educated, elderly 
voters tend to vote for the parties on the left or for populist parties.  
The statistical correlations between and among Slovak socio-economic data and 
election results in this dissertation confirm what the transitional literature suggests – that 
with one important exception (older age), voters’ electoral choices in Slovakia are indeed 
shaped by socio-demographic variables, especially education, nationality, unemployment, 
and urban/rural residence. My analysis of the Slovak data set compiled for this 
dissertation demonstrates that well-educated, young, urban voters living in areas with low 
unemployment rates tend to vote for pro-reform political parties, while less educated, 
rural voters, living in the areas with high unemployment rates support parties on the left 
of the political spectrum. A stepwise regression analysis, which sorts out the relative 
influence of variables within a data set, revealed that levels of unemployment and higher 
education and the presence of relatively more young people relates most strongly to a 
higher vote share for the pro-reform parties, whereas higher unemployment, a greater 
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proportion of men, and a larger rural population were important in the performance of the 
populist HZDS. In addition, Hungarian nationality exerts a powerful influence on voting 
behavior in Slovakia as well, where Hungarian voters who live in the southern districts 
located along with Slovak-Hungarian border are strongly supportive of political parties 
that explicitly advocate for ethnic Hungarian interests. The only discordant note in this 
analysis is the failure to confirm the almost universal association between older voters 
and leftist or populist parties that cater to them. As suggested above, this may be due to 
insufficient variation in the older population variable across the 79 regions. Finally, as we 
have seen, these results are in keeping with cross-tabulations drawn from surveys, 
lending additional credence to the findings derived from the aggregate data employed 
here. 
 
Question # 3: In terms of European Union enlargement, is there a correlation between 
voters’ preferences of political parties and the way the public perceives political parties 
in government either as advocates of European Union membership or in contrasting 
stance? 
The hypothesis related to this question suggests that according to survey studies 
there is an evident correlation between party preference and a party’s position on 
integration into European Union, as measured by perceived attitudes regarding the 
benefits of EU membership. 
The scholarly literature asserts that EU membership had a strong effect on 
emerging party systems in the post-communist countries and that party support shapes 
preferences related to EU integration (Vachudova 2008, 2, 861; Cichowski 2000, 1244). 
 173 
The 2002 survey data on Slovakia’s integration to the European Union indicate that older 
and less educated voters, unqualified workers, voters living in smaller communities of 2-
10 or 50-100 thousand people, who are supporters of leftist political parties tend not to be 
in favor of Slovakia becoming part of EU. In comparison, these same surveys indicate 
that younger and more educated voters, Hungarian nationals, residents living in large 
communities with over 100 thousand people, and who support pro-reform political parties 
tend to favor EU integration. After linking available survey and referendum data with 
compiled aggregate electoral data for three Slovak parliamentary elections in 79 electoral 
districts, it is evident that the EU membership vote is the exact reflection of the regional 
party vote, and that there is a strong relationship between party preference and a party’s 
position on integration into European Union, as measured by perceived attitudes 
regarding the benefits of EU membership. Therefore, EU integration had a profound 
impact on party politics of Slovakia. 
Viewed at this writing from a distance of some 20 years, the speed and scope of 
the profound events that reshaped the politics and, in the case of Slovakia, the map of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are truly amazing. Slovakia’s 
transition to democracy and a market economy, and accession to NATO and the EU, are 
part of one of the most far-reaching geopolitical shifts of modern times, and our 
understanding of these events and processes both in that country and in the region writ 
large, now with the benefit of hindsight, are a challenge to scholars to make sense of. 
Hopefully, researchers with an interest in the politics and electoral geography of post-
communist countries will find that this dissertation makes a valuable contribution to the 
body of scholarship on these subjects. Likewise, it is to be hoped that those seeking to 
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understand the political dynamics of post-communist Slovakia will likewise find these 
results useful, adding to the excellent work done by Slovak scholars such as Vladimír 
Krivý and others. 
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Bratislavský Region                  
Bratislava I 0.7 0.1 2.1 3.1 12.9 20.5 0.9 0.0 7.4 2.1 1.2 0.2 7.3 18.1 21.8 1.5 0.1 
Bratislava II 0.7 0.2 3.9 5.5 13.0 17.7 1.5 0.0 5.1 2.2 1.4 0.1 8.7 11.5 27.2 1.3 0.1 
Bratislava III 0.7 0.1 4.0 2.3 12.7 17.3 1.3 0.0 5.3 2.2 1.6 0.1 9.3 12.3 29.4 1.2 0.1 
Bratislava IV 0.6 0.1 4.4 2.0 14.5 18.6 1.6 0.0 6.3 2.5 1.5 0.1 9.6 12.3 24.8 1.1 0.1 
Bratislava V 0.7 0.2 4.9 3.2 15.7 18.6 2.1 0.0 5.7 2.5 1.3 0.1 10.0 10.5 23.3 1.1 0.1 
Malacky 1.3 0.3 7.2 0.2 11.3 9.7 2.1 0.0 4.0 1.1 3.8 0.5 6.4 10.8 38.9 2.2 0.2 
Pezinok 0.6 0.1 4.8 0.2 9.9 10.1 1.3 0.0 4.1 1.8 1.9 0.1 9.2 10.5 43.4 1.9 0.1 
Senec 0.9 0.2 4.7 22.5 9.7 8.4 1.7 0.0 2.6 1.4 2.8 0.2 6.0 7.8 29.3 1.7 0.1 
Trnavský Region                  
Dunajská Streda 0.8 0.2 0.9 83.2 4.6 2.1 0.6 0.0 0.7 0.3 1.1 0.5 0.7 1.1 2.9 0.2 0.1 
Galanta 0.9 0.2 5.2 39.9 7.0 4.4 1.0 0.0 1.7 0.6 3.8 0.6 4.1 4.3 25.1 1.2 0.1 
Hlohovec 0.6 0.2 7.9 0.2 8.2 6.1 1.4 0.0 3.1 0.9 1.7 0.2 6.7 12.0 48.5 2.1 0.1 
Piešťany 1.0 0.1 5.8 0.2 9.9 9.4 1.4 0.0 4.2 1.4 1.3 0.1 9.4 12.0 41.1 2.7 0.1 
Senica 1.9 0.4 7.1 0.1 17.0 8.7 1.6 0.1 3.4 0.7 2.3 0.3 4.4 14.4 35.1 2.4 0.2 
Skalica 5.7 0.6 7.4 0.1 15.6 13.9 1.4 0.3 4.2 0.5 4.1 0.3 3.0 20.4 20.6 1.9 0.1 
Trnava 0.7 0.2 6.3 0.1 10.7 8.7 1.9 0.1 2.9 1.2 2.0 0.2 7.3 13.4 42.6 1.6 0.1 
Trenčiansky Region                  
Bánovce nad Bebravou 0.7 0.1 6.9 0.1 10.8 3.9 1.5 0.1 2.1 1.0 2.8 0.2 7.1 9.7 51.0 1.9 0.1 
Ilava 0.6 0.2 4.4 0.0 8.0 6.6 1.4 0.1 2.8 1.0 1.5 0.1 7.2 7.9 55.3 2.9 0.1 
Myjava 2.1 0.4 12.2 0.1 13.6 7.2 1.5 0.0 6.8 1.0 2.0 0.2 4.5 2.4 45.4 0.5 0.1 
Nové Mesto nad Váhom 1.5 0.2 8.6 0.1 10.6 7.3 1.8 0.1 3.8 1.4 2.3 0.2 4.6 9.9 44.7 2.6 0.1 
Partizánske 0.5 0.1 5.4 0.1 9.0 4.6 1.4 0.0 1.7 0.9 1.6 0.1 8.2 11.2 52.6 2.3 0.1 
Považská Bystrica 0.6 0.2 4.5 0.1 6.3 6.4 1.0 0.0 3.1 0.9 1.9 0.0 10.8 8.5 52.9 2.6 0.1 
Prievidza 0.5 0.2 8.0 0.2 9.0 6.9 1.2 0.0 2.7 2.4 2.3 0.1 7.5 6.2 51.0 1.7 0.1 
Púchov 0.8 0.1 4.7 0.1 6.1 7.1 1.2 0.0 2.5 0.9 1.8 0.1 7.3 9.1 55.3 2.6 0.1 
Trenčín 1.0 0.2 4.6 0.1 10.2 8.4 1.5 0.0 3.8 1.5 1.5 0.0 7.0 11.6 46.0 2.4 0.1 
Nitriansky Region                  
Komárno 1.1 0.2 2.0 71.0 6.3 4.0 0.8 0.0 1.6 0.3 1.8 0.2 2.0 1.3 7.0 0.2 0.1 
Levice 1.1 0.3 5.5 29.6 11.9 5.9 1.6 0.0 3.6 0.9 2.8 0.5 4.7 5.4 24.8 1.4 0.2 
Nitra 0.8 0.2 7.3 7.7 9.3 7.2 1.2 0.0 3.5 1.1 2.2 0.4 6.1 9.7 41.2 2.0 0.2 
Nové Zámky 1.1 0.1 4.9 39.9 8.7 4.9 1.0 0.1 2.1 0.6 2.3 0.2 4.9 3.7 24.0 1.4 0.1 
Šaľa 1.2 0.2 4.7 39.2 8.8 6.4 1.2 0.0 2.3 0.9 4.0 0.9 3.9 5.0 19.8 1.3 0.2 
Topoľčany 0.7 0.1 4.9 0.1 7.5 4.9 1.0 0.0 1.7 0.8 2.3 0.1 8.1 9.7 56.4 1.7 0.2 
Zlaté Moravce 0.7 0.1 6.7 1.0 6.3 3.6 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.9 2.0 0.1 9.2 9.8 53.4 3.1 0.1 
Žilinský Region                  
Bytča 0.6 0.4 4.2 0.0 5.5 4.9 1.0 0.0 1.7 0.5 1.7 0.0 8.2 10.0 59.0 2.1 0.1 
Čadca 1.2 0.2 8.6 0.1 4.7 5.5 0.8 0.0 1.3 0.6 1.5 0.0 6.8 9.6 56.9 2.2 0.1 
Dolný Kubín 0.7 0.4 6.4 0.1 10.2 8.0 1.2 0.0 3.7 1.5 2.0 0.1 5.4 20.1 35.3 4.9 0.1 
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Kysucké Nové Mesto 0.6 0.3 5.6 0.0 5.4 3.9 0.7 0.0 1.4 0.8 2.1 0.0 10.2 7.8 59.7 1.4 0.1 
Liptovský Mikuláš 0.7 0.2 10.1 0.2 13.9 8.2 1.4 0.0 5.3 1.1 2.7 0.2 4.7 5.8 44.0 1.3 0.1 
Martin 0.8 0.3 13.1 0.2 12.5 11.5 1.7 0.0 4.6 2.4 2.4 0.3 4.9 6.5 36.9 1.7 0.1 
Námestovo 0.5 0.3 5.9 0.0 4.3 5.8 0.9 0.0 1.7 0.8 1.0 0.0 7.6 25.8 38.8 6.5 0.1 
Ružomberok 0.5 0.2 8.2 0.2 6.6 7.4 0.9 0.0 3.4 1.0 1.9 0.3 5.9 15.5 40.9 7.0 0.1 
Turčianske Teplice 0.8 0.2 12.6 0.2 12.0 7.1 1.1 0.1 2.7 1.3 3.9 0.1 3.8 5.7 46.1 2.2 0.2 
Tvrdošín 0.4 0.1 3.5 0.0 3.6 4.8 0.7 0.0 1.7 0.9 0.7 0.0 13.7 19.6 42.0 8.0 0.1 
Žilina 0.5 0.5 4.6 0.1 7.2 9.4 1.0 0.0 3.7 1.2 1.5 0.2 9.1 10.1 48.6 2.3 0.0 
Banskobystrický Region                  
Banská Bystrica 0.8 0.3 8.9 0.3 12.2 14.6 1.4 0.0 5.8 2.5 2.6 0.2 5.8 7.3 35.3 1.8 0.1 
Banská Štiavnica 0.6 0.2 9.4 0.1 7.4 6.6 1.5 0.0 2.9 1.0 3.8 0.7 5.5 8.1 49.4 2.7 0.1 
Brezno 0.6 0.2 11.2 0.1 8.4 6.4 1.5 0.0 2.6 1.4 2.9 0.4 6.0 5.4 50.8 1.8 0.1 
Detva 0.4 0.2 6.5 0.1 5.0 3.9 1.0 0.0 2.7 1.1 2.3 0.5 6.4 5.5 60.0 4.5 0.1 
Krupina 0.4 0.2 6.9 0.3 12.8 5.3 1.1 0.0 2.8 0.8 2.3 0.6 4.5 9.1 48.8 3.8 0.2 
Lučenec 1.1 0.3 6.9 25.2 8.8 10.3 1.1 0.0 2.8 1.1 4.9 0.7 4.4 3.3 27.1 1.7 0.2 
Poltár 0.6 0.4 11.3 0.2 10.0 5.6 1.1 0.0 2.8 1.0 5.7 1.1 6.0 4.0 47.2 2.6 0.2 
Revúca 1.2 0.4 19.7 11.6 14.1 6.1 2.0 0.0 3.6 1.0 6.3 2.7 3.3 4.9 22.1 0.7 0.1 
Rimavská Sobota 1.1 0.3 8.8 39.2 10.4 6.0 1.2 0.1 2.0 0.7 3.9 1.1 2.8 1.9 19.3 1.0 0.2 
Veľký Krtíš 0.9 0.3 7.3 29.0 11.6 7.5 1.4 0.0 2.2 0.8 4.4 1.1 2.4 3.2 26.3 1.5 0.2 
Zvolen 0.7 0.2 9.6 0.4 10.7 10.7 1.4 0.0 4.9 1.8 2.9 0.3 6.3 6.4 42.1 1.6 0.1 
Žarnovica 0.5 0.3 10.6 0.1 6.5 4.4 1.2 0.0 2.1 0.7 2.6 0.2 5.9 6.7 55.7 2.5 0.1 
Žiar nad Hronom 0.4 0.2 7.8 0.1 6.8 6.7 1.6 0.0 3.8 1.4 2.6 0.3 8.0 5.4 52.8 2.0 0.1 
Prešovský Region                  
Bardejov 1.3 0.3 11.1 0.1 13.0 6.6 1.2 0.0 3.9 1.5 3.2 2.0 3.2 17.7 32.5 2.2 0.2 
Humenné 1.0 0.3 11.7 0.2 10.3 6.8 1.0 0.1 2.6 1.4 5.2 1.4 2.9 15.6 35.1 4.3 0.2 
Kežmarok 2.1 0.3 9.5 0.2 10.4 8.3 2.0 0.0 3.0 1.3 3.1 4.2 2.9 25.3 24.6 2.5 0.2 
Levoča 1.2 0.3 10.0 0.1 8.0 7.7 1.2 0.1 3.4 1.4 2.6 2.3 3.1 24.4 31.3 2.9 0.2 
Medzilaborce 1.9 0.2 16.8 0.0 15.9 5.6 0.9 0.1 1.9 0.7 13.8 0.8 0.9 7.8 31.1 1.4 0.1 
Poprad 0.5 0.2 9.8 0.3 13.8 13.4 2.2 0.1 5.9 2.6 3.8 -0.6 4.6 11.6 29.9 1.7 0.1 
Prešov 1.3 0.3 10.3 0.2 13.0 10.6 1.2 0.1 4.1 2.9 2.9 1.0 2.5 20.8 25.8 2.9 0.1 
Sabinov 1.3 0.3 11.5 0.1 9.1 5.1 1.3 0.1 2.2 1.7 3.0 3.2 2.8 18.1 35.2 4.8 0.2 
Snina 2.2 0.3 10.2 0.1 8.6 4.4 1.0 0.0 1.8 1.1 8.8 1.0 3.5 9.2 45.7 1.8 0.3 
Stará Ľubovňa 1.9 0.3 8.8 0.1 15.0 4.6 1.3 0.1 1.4 1.1 3.2 2.1 1.9 19.3 33.6 5.2 0.2 
Stropkov 1.1 0.2 12.1 0.1 8.1 4.7 0.7 0.1 2.0 0.7 5.8 1.4 2.8 12.0 44.4 3.5 0.2 
Svidník 1.5 0.3 12.9 0.1 12.4 4.0 0.9 0.1 2.4 0.9 6.9 1.8 1.5 10.3 42.7 1.1 0.2 
Vranov nad Topľou 1.1 0.3 12.7 0.1 9.7 4.5 0.9 0.1 3.8 0.9 4.9 2.3 2.4 12.0 40.8 3.3 0.2 
Košický Region                  
Gelnica 1.9 0.6 13.7 0.1 13.2 5.7 1.3 0.1 2.7 1.0 8.1 2.1 2.7 12.5 32.5 1.5 0.3 
Košice I 1.9 0.4 5.8 6.1 15.6 21.0 1.5 0.2 7.3 2.1 2.5 0.8 3.0 13.3 17.3 1.1 0.1 
Košice II 1.9 0.4 9.3 3.6 15.9 18.8 1.7 0.1 6.8 2.3 2.5 1.2 3.3 11.2 19.9 1.1 0.1 
Košice III 2.0 0.4 10.9 3.1 17.9 17.3 2.2 0.2 6.7 2.3 2.8 0.8 3.5 9.8 18.9 1.2 0.0 
Košice IV 1.9 0.5 8.8 5.3 15.3 17.7 1.7 0.2 7.1 2.1 2.7 0.5 3.2 12.8 18.5 1.8 0.1 
Košice - okolie 1.8 0.4 10.1 16.8 11.7 10.6 1.5 0.1 2.9 1.1 3.4 2.5 2.1 12.1 20.5 2.2 0.2 
Michalovce 1.5 0.3 7.6 8.8 12.5 7.0 1.2 0.1 2.8 1.1 3.9 2.2 2.7 9.6 36.3 2.1 0.2 
Rožňava 1.6 0.3 9.0 31.9 15.6 5.7 1.8 0.1 3.5 0.9 4.7 2.2 2.9 2.7 15.9 1.0 0.2 
Sobrance 1.9 0.3 7.3 0.1 13.1 5.0 1.2 0.1 1.5 0.8 4.2 1.1 2.2 11.6 47.2 2.3 0.3 
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Spišská Nová Ves 1.3 0.4 12.2 0.1 12.1 7.0 1.5 0.1 3.6 1.6 3.6 2.8 3.5 15.3 32.9 1.7 0.2 
Trebišov 1.6 0.4 7.0 28.1 13.1 6.1 1.3 0.1 2.2 0.6 3.6 0.5 1.7 8.8 23.1 1.7 0.2 
 
# Abbreviation Full name of political party / movement 
1 HZPČS Hnutie za prosperujúce Česko + Slovensko 
2 SD Sociálna demokracia 
3 ZRS Združenie robotníkov Slovenska 
4 MK Magyar Koalíció - Maďarská koalícia, Magyar Kereszténydemokrata 
Mozgalom – Maďarské kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, gyüttélés 
Spolužitie, Magyar Polgári Párt - Maďarská občianska strana 
5 SP.VOĽBA Spoločná voľba - Strana demokratickej ľavice, Sociálnodemokratická 
strana Slovenska, Strana zelených na Slovensku, Hnutie 
poľnohospodárov Slovenskej republiky  
6 DÚ Demokratická únia Slovenska 
7 SPK Strana proti korupcii - za poriadok, prácu a peniaze pre všetkých 
slušných občanov 
8 ZPR-REP Združenie pre republiku – Republikáni 
9 DS Demokratická strana 
10 NS Nové Slovensko 
11 KSS Komunistická strana Slovenska 
12 ROISR Rómska občianska iniciatíva v Slovenskej republike 
13 SNS Slovenská národná strana 
14 KDH Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie 
15 HZDS-RSS Koalícia Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko a Roľnícka strana 
Slovenska 
16 KSÚ Kresťanská sociálna únia Slovenska 
17 RSDSS Reálna sociálnodemokratická strana Slovákov 
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Bratislavský Region                  
Bratislava I  17.7 0.1 0.0 2.7 0.3 0.0 5.0 53.9 5.7 0.2 0.2 0.0 12.8 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Bratislava II  20.6 0.1 0.0 4.6 0.4 0.1 5.8 43.7 7.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 15.2 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Bratislava III  22.9 0.1 0.0 1.9 0.4 0.1 5.9 43.0 7.9 0.2 0.2 0.0 15.3 1.7 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Bratislava IV  18.4 0.1 0.0 1.6 0.5 0.1 6.5 46.6 7.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 16.6 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Bratislava V  15.6 0.1 0.0 2.5 0.5 0.1 6.2 47.2 7.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 18.2 1.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Malacky  24.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.2 6.8 36.8 9.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 15.7 3.9 0.2 1.0 0.1 
Pezinok  28.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 7.0 31.9 11.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 17.1 1.8 0.1 0.4 0.1 
Senec  19.7 0.2 0.0 17.7 0.6 0.3 5.4 33.8 6.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 12.3 2.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 
Trnavský Region                  
Dunajská Streda  2.8 0.5 0.0 79.3 0.1 0.0 1.4 11.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Galanta  19.2 0.4 0.1 35.9 0.5 0.1 4.1 21.2 5.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 9.1 2.7 0.1 0.8 0.1 
Hlohovec  37.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.2 5.6 24.6 11.6 0.2 0.3 0.0 15.0 2.9 0.1 1.4 0.1 
Piešťany  33.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 6.2 31.6 10.8 0.2 0.3 0.0 13.9 1.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 
Senica  29.5 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.3 5.8 34.1 6.7 0.3 0.4 0.1 16.2 3.5 0.2 1.2 0.2 
Skalica  19.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.3 4.4 49.3 4.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 12.6 5.5 0.2 1.6 0.1 
Trnava  32.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.2 4.6 30.2 10.9 0.2 0.3 0.1 17.0 2.4 0.1 0.8 0.1 
Trenčiansky Region                  
Bánovce nad Bebravou  40.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 2.8 17.7 10.9 0.4 0.4 0.1 19.9 4.0 0.1 2.0 0.1 
Ilava  44.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 5.7 18.9 13.9 0.3 0.3 0.0 11.9 2.0 0.1 1.8 0.1 
Myjava  36.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.4 0.2 5.9 19.2 8.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 20.0 4.1 0.2 2.8 0.2 
Nové Mesto nad Váhom  39.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 5.7 23.1 9.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 15.9 3.8 0.1 1.1 0.2 
Partizánske  36.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 5.1 22.0 13.7 0.3 0.5 0.1 16.8 2.9 0.1 1.4 0.1 
Považská Bystrica  46.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 4.3 16.7 17.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 9.8 2.3 0.1 1.4 0.1 
Prievidza  37.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.1 6.3 18.7 15.8 0.2 0.3 0.0 15.9 2.6 0.1 1.2 0.2 
Púchov  45.7 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 5.5 18.4 14.8 0.3 0.4 0.0 9.4 2.3 0.1 2.3 0.2 
Trenčín  38.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.1 7.7 25.5 10.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 13.6 2.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 
Nitriansky Region                  
Komárno  6.5 0.7 0.1 66.4 0.2 0.0 2.9 15.2 1.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 4.6 1.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 
Levice  18.9 0.4 0.1 25.6 0.5 0.1 6.1 23.2 5.9 0.2 0.3 0.1 15.5 2.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 
Nitra  31.1 0.2 0.1 6.3 0.6 0.1 5.8 25.1 9.9 0.2 0.2 0.0 17.2 2.2 0.1 0.8 0.1 
Nové Zámky  19.2 0.5 0.1 36.0 0.3 0.1 4.3 19.9 6.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 10.5 1.7 0.1 0.5 0.1 
Šaľa  15.1 0.5 0.1 34.4 0.4 0.2 4.9 24.8 4.9 0.2 0.1 0.0 11.6 2.2 0.1 0.6 0.1 
Topoľčany  42.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 4.3 20.0 12.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 14.4 3.3 0.1 1.1 0.2 
Zlaté Moravce  42.4 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.2 4.6 17.8 15.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 13.2 2.9 0.1 1.2 0.1 
Žilinský Region                  
Bytča  49.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 3.3 15.0 19.0 0.1 0.7 0.0 7.6 1.9 0.1 2.0 0.2 
Čadca  54.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 3.0 12.5 16.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 7.8 1.8 0.1 2.9 0.2 
Dolný Kubín  30.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.1 6.7 30.1 11.7 0.3 0.8 0.1 14.1 2.9 0.1 1.7 0.2 
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Kysucké Nové Mesto  49.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 2.9 11.6 21.6 0.3 0.4 0.1 9.3 2.3 0.1 1.0 0.2 
Liptovský Mikuláš  29.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 8.8 21.1 12.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 22.2 3.5 0.1 1.4 0.1 
Martin  26.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.2 10.3 24.4 11.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 19.1 3.8 0.1 2.5 0.1 
Námestovo  39.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 4.9 27.4 14.7 0.3 0.9 0.0 7.5 1.6 0.1 2.0 0.3 
Ružomberok  30.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 5.7 30.1 14.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 13.8 2.1 0.1 1.6 0.1 
Turčianske Teplice  32.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.2 7.6 16.7 11.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 21.4 5.8 0.1 3.3 0.2 
Tvrdošín  35.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 3.0 25.8 19.2 0.3 1.2 0.1 7.0 1.2 0.1 4.9 0.5 
Žilina  36.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 4.5 21.6 23.7 0.2 0.3 0.1 9.8 1.5 0.0 1.0 0.1 
Banskobystrický Region                  
Banská Bystrica  22.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.1 5.7 30.1 10.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 26.1 2.7 0.1 1.5 0.1 
Banská Štiavnica  34.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 8.9 21.0 10.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 17.0 4.1 0.1 2.9 0.2 
Brezno  31.9 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.2 6.3 17.4 14.8 0.2 0.3 0.1 21.8 3.6 0.1 2.4 0.1 
Detva  42.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 4.8 14.8 16.7 0.2 0.6 0.0 13.4 3.6 0.1 2.5 0.2 
Krupina  31.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 6.0 19.2 12.2 0.3 0.8 0.1 22.8 3.7 0.2 2.4 0.2 
Lučenec  18.7 0.6 0.1 23.2 0.5 0.2 7.5 21.8 6.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 15.5 4.0 0.1 1.2 0.1 
Poltár  33.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 7.9 14.8 11.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 18.6 8.4 0.1 3.5 0.2 
Revúca  21.3 0.5 0.2 10.2 0.3 0.6 10.1 19.0 6.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 22.0 5.1 0.2 3.6 0.3 
Rimavská Sobota  14.2 1.4 0.1 35.0 0.4 0.2 7.0 15.4 5.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 13.5 4.2 0.2 2.1 0.2 
Veľký Krtíš  20.3 0.8 0.1 25.0 0.3 0.2 6.0 19.1 5.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 16.0 5.2 0.1 1.2 0.2 
Zvolen  26.4 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 6.9 24.4 11.7 0.2 0.2 0.1 23.3 3.7 0.1 1.9 0.0 
Žarnovica  46.9 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 4.3 13.5 12.7 0.2 0.5 0.0 14.1 4.2 0.1 2.0 0.2 
Žiar nad Hronom  37.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 5.7 19.0 16.0 0.3 0.4 0.1 15.5 3.0 0.1 1.0 0.3 
Prešovský Region                  
Bardejov  29.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 9.5 28.7 5.7 0.1 0.3 0.1 18.8 4.1 0.1 2.0 0.2 
Humenné  28.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 13.7 27.9 6.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 16.0 5.0 0.1 1.7 0.1 
Kežmarok  26.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 9.3 40.5 6.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 10.8 2.3 0.2 2.8 0.5 
Levoča  23.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 9.7 36.4 7.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 16.0 3.8 0.1 1.6 0.2 
Medzilaborce  29.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.2 12.5 14.2 2.7 0.1 0.2 0.0 20.4 10.3 0.3 8.3 0.4 
Poprad  22.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.1 9.6 34.6 8.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 18.6 2.9 0.1 1.7 0.1 
Prešov  21.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 10.4 40.6 5.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 17.2 2.4 0.1 1.0 0.1 
Sabinov  32.5 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.2 10.2 27.2 6.9 0.2 0.4 0.1 13.0 2.7 0.2 5.3 0.2 
Snina  36.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 13.1 17.3 6.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 13.8 7.3 0.2 4.7 0.2 
Stará Ľubovňa  37.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.2 9.0 23.6 6.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 15.6 3.3 0.2 3.0 0.4 
Stropkov  41.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 9.6 19.9 6.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 13.0 5.0 0.1 3.6 0.2 
Svidník  41.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 9.9 17.3 3.8 0.1 0.2 0.0 17.1 6.6 0.1 2.2 0.2 
Vranov nad Topľou  31.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 11.4 21.8 8.3 0.1 0.3 0.9 15.1 6.7 0.2 2.5 0.3 
Košický Region                  
Gelnica  35.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.3 12.5 17.2 7.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 15.5 7.4 0.2 2.9 0.2 
Košice I  13.3 0.2 0.1 4.0 0.3 0.1 23.8 38.8 4.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 12.9 1.9 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Košice II  15.1 0.2 0.4 2.5 0.3 0.0 24.3 35.6 4.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 14.8 1.9 0.1 0.4 0.0 
Košice III  13.0 0.2 0.1 2.1 0.2 0.1 28.4 33.7 4.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 15.2 1.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 
Košice IV  14.3 0.1 0.2 3.6 0.3 0.1 25.4 35.9 4.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 13.6 1.7 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Košice - okolie  17.7 0.4 0.3 13.2 0.4 0.2 21.9 27.1 4.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 10.7 2.9 0.1 0.6 0.2 
Michalovce  27.2 0.1 0.1 7.8 0.3 0.1 13.2 21.7 6.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 16.9 3.8 0.1 1.5 0.2 
Rožňava  17.2 0.6 0.2 25.2 0.4 0.2 14.2 17.4 4.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 14.2 4.3 0.2 1.2 0.2 
Sobrance  39.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 12.0 17.2 8.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 15.4 4.0 0.2 2.0 0.3 
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Spišská Nová Ves  26.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 10.6 26.6 9.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 20.5 3.6 0.1 1.1 0.2 
Trebišov  17.4 1.4 0.1 23.9 0.2 0.1 16.1 20.8 3.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 11.0 3.5 0.5 0.8 0.3 
 
# Abbreviation Full name of political party / movement 
1 HZDS Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko 
2 MĽHZP 
Maďarské ľudové hnutie za zmierenie a prosperitu -Magyar 
Népi Mozgalom a Megbékélésért és a Jólétért 
3 NaAS Národná alternatíva Slovenska 
4 SMK-MKP Strana maďarskej koalície - Magyar Koalíció Pártja 
5 NSK Naše Slovensko 
6 B-RRS Béčko - Revolučná robotnícka strana 
7 SOP Strana občianskeho porozumenia 
8 SDK Slovenská demokratická koalícia 
9 SNS Slovenská národná strana 
10 NEI Nezávislá iniciatíva (NEI) Slovenskej republiky 
11 SĽS Slovenská ľudová strana 
12 HTC Hnutie tretej cesty 
13 SDĽ Strana demokratickej ľavice 
14 KSS Komunistická strana Slovenska 
15 JSP Jednotná strana pracujúcich Slovenska 
16 ZRS Združenie robotníkov Slovenska 
17 SNJ Slovenská národná jednota 
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Bratislavský Region             
Bratislava I 0.8 40.7 0.1 1.0 8.9 11.6 1.2 2.8 0.0 2.9 5.9 10.6 
Bratislava II 0.9 33.6 0.1 1.0 11.7 13.6 0.6 3.0 0.0 3.8 8.7 7.0 
Bratislava III 1.0 33.2 0.1 1.0 12.3 14.8 0.8 3.2 0.0 4.6 4.4 7.8 
Bratislava IV 0.9 36.4 0.1 0.9 13.1 11.4 0.8 2.9 0.0 3.9 4.2 8.0 
Bratislava V 1.1 35.7 0.1 1.0 13.7 10.3 0.8 2.7 0.0 3.8 5.9 6.5 
Malacky 1.2 24.5 0.2 1.2 16.7 17.5 0.2 3.8 0.1 6.6 0.7 7.2 
Pezinok 1.0 23.9 0.2 1.2 16.0 19.7 0.5 4.5 0.0 4.4 0.9 8.2 
Senec 0.9 20.1 0.1 1.1 10.6 13.4 0.4 3.2 0.0 4.0 25.9 5.9 
Trnavský Region             
Dunajská Streda 0.6 4.0 0.1 0.3 1.8 1.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.7 86.2 0.7 
Galanta 0.8 9.6 0.1 0.8 10.2 13.3 0.2 2.9 0.1 4.0 42.9 3.5 
Hlohovec 0.9 11.6 0.4 1.1 18.9 29.4 0.3 4.9 0.1 6.2 0.4 9.7 
Piešťany 0.9 17.7 1.1 1.3 15.6 24.5 0.3 4.8 0.0 4.1 0.7 10.1 
Senica 1.4 17.3 0.3 2.5 17.7 22.9 0.2 2.8 0.1 7.2 0.4 11.3 
Skalica 1.3 23.9 0.2 2.6 17.6 13.6 0.3 2.2 0.1 8.7 0.4 13.5 
Trnava 1.0 16.4 0.2 1.2 18.3 22.7 0.3 6.5 0.1 4.8 0.5 11.4 
Trenčiansky Region             
Bánovce nad 
Bebravou 0.9 7.3 0.1 2.5 17.5 29.7 0.2 3.5 0.0 9.2 0.1 9.2 
Ilava 1.5 10.0 0.1 1.3 16.5 33.2 0.2 3.8 0.0 5.6 0.2 8.3 
Myjava 1.1 14.2 0.3 2.6 17.6 30.1 0.4 4.1 0.0 6.0 0.1 2.0 
Nové Mesto nad 
Váhom 1.3 13.2 0.4 2.1 14.5 28.3 0.3 6.1 0.1 6.8 0.3 8.3 
Partizánske 0.8 10.0 0.2 1.6 16.9 27.1 0.2 3.6 0.0 6.7 0.3 10.8 
Považská Bystrica 1.5 8.4 0.1 0.9 13.6 37.6 0.2 3.8 0.0 5.6 0.2 7.9 
Prievidza 1.0 10.5 0.1 1.8 16.2 29.6 0.3 3.8 0.1 6.6 0.5 6.1 
Púchov 0.9 10.1 0.1 1.1 15.4 38.1 0.2 3.1 0.0 4.3 0.2 8.9 
Trenčín 0.9 15.8 0.1 1.3 15.5 30.0 0.4 3.9 0.0 5.2 0.5 9.8 
Nitriansky Region             
Komárno 0.7 5.0 0.1 0.4 4.3 4.3 0.2 1.1 0.1 1.7 74.6 0.8 
Levice 0.9 10.5 0.1 1.3 12.3 13.4 0.3 3.0 0.2 5.2 31.6 4.8 
Nitra 0.9 13.8 0.1 1.4 16.6 24.5 0.4 3.5 0.0 4.6 8.1 7.5 
Nové Zámky 0.7 7.6 0.1 0.9 10.1 14.5 0.2 1.9 0.1 3.1 43.1 3.6 
Šaľa 0.8 11.7 0.1 1.0 11.2 11.5 0.3 1.8 0.3 2.8 41.1 3.6 
Topoľčany 0.9 8.5 0.2 1.3 17.5 32.6 0.2 4.2 0.0 7.1 0.2 9.5 
Zlaté Moravce 0.7 7.0 0.1 1.3 16.1 31.0 0.2 4.9 0.0 7.7 1.1 9.5 
Žilinský Region             
Bytča 0.5 5.8 0.1 1.0 10.3 38.8 0.2 4.5 0.0 3.7 0.1 9.8 
Čadca 0.5 5.8 0.1 1.0 15.4 41.3 0.2 7.3 0.0 4.3 0.1 8.2 
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Dolný Kubín 0.6 13.2 0.1 2.7 14.5 19.5 0.4 4.7 0.0 5.7 0.3 19.9 
Kysucké Nové Mesto 0.5 5.7 0.0 1.7 12.3 38.7 0.3 4.2 0.1 4.8 0.2 7.3 
Liptovský Mikuláš 0.8 12.0 0.1 1.9 15.1 19.4 0.3 3.5 0.1 10.1 0.5 5.2 
Martin 1.0 17.9 0.3 1.8 18.4 17.0 0.4 3.7 0.0 8.7 0.6 5.9 
Námestovo 0.5 7.1 0.2 1.0 12.6 27.1 0.1 6.1 0.0 2.0 0.1 23.6 
Ružomberok 0.7 12.3 0.1 0.9 12.1 22.2 0.4 3.4 0.1 6.8 0.4 15.9 
Turčianske Teplice 1.2 10.6 0.1 1.9 14.8 23.0 0.2 3.7 0.0 15.2 0.2 4.7 
Tvrdošín 0.4 6.9 0.1 1.1 12.0 24.5 0.2 9.7 0.0 2.5 0.2 22.9 
Žilina 0.6 13.9 0.1 0.9 12.3 28.7 0.3 3.6 0.0 3.2 0.4 8.4 
Banskobystrický 
Region             
Banská Bystrica 1.2 21.3 0.1 1.8 15.2 15.8 0.6 3.4 0.2 7.0 1.1 6.3 
Banská Štiavnica 0.9 11.5 0.2 2.4 15.2 24.1 0.5 3.7 0.9 8.8 0.8 8.9 
Brezno 0.9 10.3 0.2 2.1 16.4 20.6 0.3 3.9 0.5 10.0 0.4 5.6 
Detva 0.7 6.9 0.1 1.0 11.2 34.8 0.2 5.3 0.5 8.3 0.2 7.2 
Krupina 0.8 8.6 0.2 1.9 15.4 23.5 0.3 3.3 1.4 8.6 0.6 10.2 
Lučenec 1.2 11.3 0.8 1.2 10.0 12.4 0.3 2.8 0.7 7.0 29.2 2.6 
Poltár 0.8 6.4 1.6 1.3 11.8 15.0 0.3 22.1 0.8 15.4 -0.2 3.8 
Revúca 1.3 8.9 0.2 1.6 13.5 14.1 0.2 2.2 1.4 13.8 11.6 3.2 
Rimavská Sobota 1.3 6.2 0.6 2.5 11.0 8.3 0.3 3.9 3.3 6.8 37.0 1.5 
Veľký Krtíš 1.3 9.0 0.5 1.0 11.4 14.6 0.2 2.1 0.5 8.7 31.2 2.4 
Zvolen 1.0 16.0 0.1 1.8 15.9 18.4 0.5 3.4 0.3 9.6 0.9 5.7 
Žarnovica 0.6 5.6 0.1 2.1 13.0 33.5 0.3 3.8 0.5 10.5 0.3 6.8 
Žiar nad Hronom 1.0 10.4 0.1 1.1 14.1 29.2 0.5 4.3 0.2 7.8 0.6 6.2 
Prešovský Region             
Bardejov 1.1 13.9 0.4 3.3 14.3 20.5 0.2 2.2 0.1 9.7 0.3 15.8 
Humenné 0.8 11.2 0.2 1.8 14.5 20.4 0.2 1.9 0.1 12.9 0.4 14.8 
Kežmarok 1.7 16.7 0.3 0.9 9.0 18.3 0.1 2.2 0.6 4.1 0.2 18.5 
Levoča 1.2 16.1 0.3 1.3 11.7 15.9 0.3 3.0 0.4 5.9 0.3 19.0 
Medzilaborce 1.2 7.4 0.2 3.3 20.4 19.4 0.2 2.2 0.0 24.9 0.3 4.5 
Poprad 1.1 20.5 0.2 1.0 13.8 14.7 0.4 3.1 0.3 6.1 0.8 11.3 
Prešov 1.1 21.4 0.2 1.5 12.7 14.0 0.3 2.4 0.2 7.2 0.6 15.6 
Sabinov 1.9 11.7 0.3 1.3 13.9 23.1 0.2 2.3 0.3 6.6 0.1 15.2 
Snina 1.0 8.5 0.2 2.9 17.1 25.5 0.1 3.5 0.1 13.4 0.2 10.3 
Stará Ľubovňa 1.5 9.9 0.2 2.2 14.6 26.6 0.2 2.7 0.2 8.0 0.2 14.0 
Stropkov 1.1 7.9 0.1 1.9 14.7 27.8 0.1 2.5 0.1 13.0 0.2 11.9 
Svidník 1.1 7.9 0.2 2.6 16.1 25.6 0.1 2.7 0.2 15.5 0.2 8.9 
Vranov nad Topľou 0.9 8.3 0.2 1.4 14.0 24.6 0.2 2.0 0.3 12.5 0.2 13.5 
Košický Region             
Gelnica 2.1 10.2 0.4 2.6 13.9 20.1 0.2 3.5 0.9 14.9 0.3 7.9 
Košice I 1.0 29.4 0.8 1.0 11.6 8.4 0.5 1.7 0.1 6.0 9.5 7.7 
Košice II 1.0 26.1 0.7 0.9 13.8 9.1 0.4 1.9 0.0 6.5 6.6 7.4 
Košice III 1.2 25.4 0.6 0.7 16.2 8.5 0.4 1.8 0.0 6.2 5.7 6.3 
Košice IV 1.1 26.5 0.9 0.9 12.9 9.3 0.4 1.9 0.0 6.5 8.5 8.1 
Košice - okolie 1.4 14.9 0.6 1.1 11.6 11.6 0.2 1.6 1.0 6.3 20.2 8.5 
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Michalovce 1.0 10.7 0.5 1.4 14.7 20.0 0.2 1.7 0.6 11.2 8.2 8.6 
Rožňava 1.0 9.1 0.2 1.8 10.2 9.5 0.4 1.5 0.4 8.2 36.9 1.4 
Sobrance 1.3 6.7 0.3 1.5 15.6 28.2 0.2 2.4 0.3 11.5 0.1 9.5 
Spišská Nová Ves 1.4 15.9 0.2 1.6 13.8 18.1 0.3 2.5 0.3 8.1 0.3 11.2 
Trebišov 1.3 8.7 0.3 1.4 11.3 12.4 0.1 1.4 0.2 7.6 29.4 7.3 
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Bratislavský Region              
Bratislava I 0.0 0.1 0.1 5.4 0.0 0.2 3.1 0.1 0.3 3.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 
Bratislava II 0.0 0.1 0.2 6.7 0.0 0.4 2.8 0.1 0.3 3.6 0.1 0.0 1.6 
Bratislava III 0.0 0.1 0.1 6.9 0.0 0.4 2.7 0.2 0.4 3.9 0.2 0.0 2.0 
Bratislava IV 0.0 0.1 0.2 8.0 0.0 0.5 3.2 0.1 0.4 3.2 0.1 0.0 1.6 
Bratislava V 0.0 0.1 0.1 8.1 0.0 0.5 3.3 0.1 0.3 3.3 0.1 0.0 2.1 
Malacky 0.0 0.4 0.1 8.9 0.1 0.6 2.4 0.2 0.4 3.4 0.3 0.1 3.0 
Pezinok 0.0 0.2 0.2 7.7 0.1 0.5 2.1 0.1 0.5 4.3 0.2 0.0 3.4 
Senec 0.0 0.2 0.1 6.5 0.3 0.5 1.3 0.1 0.3 3.2 0.2 0.1 1.7 
Trnavský Region              
Dunajská Streda 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Galanta 0.0 0.5 0.1 4.3 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.6 2.7 0.2 0.1 1.4 
Hlohovec 0.0 0.7 0.1 4.5 0.1 0.4 1.5 0.1 0.9 4.9 0.4 0.1 2.3 
Piešťany 0.0 0.3 0.3 7.3 0.1 0.4 1.9 0.1 0.6 4.7 0.2 0.0 2.9 
Senica 0.0 0.3 0.7 6.0 0.1 0.5 2.1 0.2 0.5 3.4 0.3 0.1 1.7 
Skalica 0.0 0.9 0.5 7.6 0.1 0.4 1.7 0.1 0.7 2.6 0.3 0.1 0.7 
Trnava 0.0 0.4 0.2 4.9 0.1 0.5 2.3 0.2 1.2 3.8 0.2 0.0 2.9 
Trenčiansky Region              
Bánovce nad 
Bebravou 0.0 1.0 0.1 5.7 0.1 0.4 1.5 0.2 0.8 6.5 0.3 0.0 3.1 
Ilava 0.0 0.4 0.2 5.9 0.1 0.4 1.5 0.2 0.8 5.3 0.2 0.1 4.1 
Myjava 0.0 1.1 0.3 8.4 0.2 0.6 2.0 0.2 0.6 5.8 0.4 0.1 2.0 
Nové Mesto nad 
Váhom 0.0 0.9 0.1 5.7 0.1 0.5 2.2 0.2 0.6 5.0 0.4 0.1 2.3 
Partizánske 0.0 0.5 0.2 6.6 0.1 0.5 1.5 0.2 1.0 6.8 0.3 0.0 4.0 
Považská Bystrica 0.0 0.5 0.2 4.7 0.1 0.4 1.7 0.2 0.8 5.6 0.2 0.0 5.6 
Prievidza 0.0 0.8 0.1 7.3 0.1 0.5 1.8 0.2 1.2 6.3 0.2 0.0 4.8 
Púchov 0.0 0.9 0.1 4.6 0.1 0.4 1.2 0.2 0.8 5.0 0.2 0.0 4.0 
Trenčín 0.0 0.3 0.1 5.8 0.1 0.5 1.8 0.2 1.0 3.9 0.2 0.0 2.7 
Nitriansky Region              
Komárno 0.0 0.1 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Levice 0.0 0.4 0.2 8.0 0.1 0.3 1.4 0.1 1.1 2.6 0.4 0.2 1.6 
Nitra 0.0 0.4 0.2 6.7 0.1 0.3 1.5 0.1 1.1 4.8 0.3 0.2 3.1 
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Nové Zámky 0.0 0.3 0.1 6.2 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.7 3.4 0.2 0.3 1.7 
Šaľa 0.0 0.3 0.2 5.7 0.1 0.4 1.5 0.1 0.9 2.7 0.2 0.3 1.4 
Topoľčany 0.0 0.5 0.1 5.8 0.1 0.4 1.2 0.2 0.5 5.5 0.2 0.0 3.1 
Zlaté Moravce 0.0 0.6 0.1 6.2 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.7 7.4 0.3 0.0 3.5 
Žilinský Region              
Bytča 0.0 0.3 0.1 3.9 0.0 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.8 3.3 0.2 0.0 15.1 
Čadca 0.0 0.7 0.1 3.2 0.1 0.3 1.1 0.3 0.4 3.4 0.4 0.0 5.8 
Dolný Kubín 0.0 0.8 0.2 6.8 0.1 0.5 1.5 0.2 1.7 3.2 0.2 0.0 3.4 
Kysucké Nové Mesto 0.0 0.6 0.1 4.3 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.2 1.0 3.6 0.3 0.0 13.2 
Liptovský Mikuláš 0.0 0.8 0.2 15.2 0.1 0.5 2.4 0.1 2.5 3.0 0.3 0.0 5.6 
Martin 0.0 0.8 0.2 9.9 0.1 0.5 2.3 0.1 0.7 2.7 0.3 0.0 6.5 
Námestovo 0.0 1.3 0.1 4.5 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 6.3 0.4 0.0 5.3 
Ružomberok 0.0 0.8 0.2 8.9 0.1 0.5 1.4 0.2 1.2 6.3 0.4 0.1 4.7 
Turčianske Teplice 0.0 1.0 0.1 9.1 0.0 0.5 1.6 0.2 0.8 3.4 0.5 0.0 6.9 
Tvrdošín 0.0 0.8 0.1 4.4 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.9 6.7 0.2 0.0 4.9 
Žilina 0.0 0.3 0.1 5.3 0.0 0.3 1.3 0.1 0.8 2.4 0.2 0.0 16.9 
Banskobystrický 
Region              
Banská Bystrica 0.0 1.4 0.2 12.3 0.1 0.5 2.9 0.2 0.7 3.4 0.3 0.0 4.0 
Banská Štiavnica 0.0 0.9 0.6 10.3 0.0 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.7 3.1 0.3 0.1 4.0 
Brezno 0.0 1.5 1.3 10.8 0.1 0.5 1.9 0.2 1.4 2.9 0.5 0.2 7.4 
Detva 0.0 1.0 0.2 7.9 0.1 0.3 1.3 0.3 1.1 6.6 0.5 0.2 4.0 
Krupina 0.1 0.9 0.8 10.2 0.1 0.5 1.6 0.2 1.4 3.9 0.4 0.1 5.0 
Lučenec 0.0 0.5 0.2 9.8 0.1 0.3 1.3 0.1 1.3 4.1 0.3 0.2 2.3 
Poltár 0.0 0.9 0.2 7.5 0.1 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.9 5.1 0.4 0.3 4.0 
Revúca 0.0 1.4 0.6 11.6 0.4 0.6 2.2 0.1 0.7 1.6 0.5 1.5 6.7 
Rimavská Sobota 0.1 0.6 0.3 8.2 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.6 1.9 0.3 0.4 3.3 
Veľký Krtíš 0.0 0.8 0.1 7.3 0.1 0.4 1.6 0.1 1.0 2.3 0.3 0.4 2.4 
Zvolen 0.0 0.9 0.3 12.5 0.1 0.4 2.2 0.1 1.4 4.3 0.3 0.1 3.8 
Žarnovica 0.0 0.9 1.7 8.3 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.2 1.0 4.7 0.6 0.0 4.0 
Žiar nad Hronom 0.0 0.7 0.2 10.4 0.1 0.5 1.4 0.1 1.1 4.9 0.4 0.1 4.8 
Prešovský Region              
Bardejov 0.0 0.7 0.4 7.7 0.1 0.6 1.2 0.2 1.4 1.8 0.6 1.5 2.1 
Humenné 0.0 0.7 0.2 10.8 0.1 0.5 2.1 0.2 1.7 2.0 0.4 0.3 1.8 
Kežmarok 0.0 1.0 0.3 12.3 0.2 0.7 1.0 0.2 1.4 2.0 0.4 2.9 4.9 
Levoča 0.1 0.6 0.2 11.1 0.2 1.0 1.5 0.2 0.8 1.9 0.5 1.4 5.2 
Medzilaborce 0.0 1.4 0.2 6.7 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.1 2.4 1.5 0.3 0.1 1.2 
Poprad 0.0 0.6 0.2 13.6 0.1 0.6 2.3 0.2 1.3 2.0 0.4 0.7 4.6 
Prešov 0.0 0.5 0.3 11.2 0.1 0.6 2.4 0.1 1.6 1.9 0.4 0.7 3.3 
Sabinov 0.0 1.6 0.7 8.5 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.3 1.2 2.4 1.0 2.1 3.7 
Snina 0.0 1.2 0.6 7.3 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.9 2.8 0.5 0.3 1.9 
Stará Ľubovňa 0.0 0.8 0.5 7.0 0.2 0.6 1.7 0.3 2.4 2.5 0.6 0.5 2.5 
Stropkov 0.0 0.5 0.5 9.2 0.1 0.7 1.0 0.1 1.5 2.4 0.6 0.2 2.0 
Svidník 0.0 0.8 0.3 7.7 0.2 0.6 1.2 0.1 1.2 3.3 0.6 1.0 1.9 
Vranov nad Topľou 0.0 1.1 0.2 8.5 0.2 0.5 1.1 0.2 1.6 2.4 0.5 1.6 4.0 
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Košický Region              
Gelnica 0.0 0.7 0.3 9.6 0.2 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.8 2.2 0.6 1.3 5.1 
Košice I 0.0 0.2 0.2 12.9 0.1 0.5 3.5 0.1 0.6 1.9 0.1 0.1 2.0 
Košice II 0.0 0.2 0.1 14.7 0.1 0.6 4.0 0.1 0.8 1.8 0.2 0.3 2.6 
Košice III 0.0 0.3 0.2 15.1 0.1 0.8 4.6 0.1 0.5 1.9 0.2 0.1 2.9 
Košice IV 0.0 0.3 0.2 13.1 0.0 0.7 3.3 0.1 0.7 1.8 0.3 0.2 2.3 
Košice - okolie 0.0 0.6 0.1 11.4 0.2 0.7 1.6 0.1 0.6 1.6 0.6 0.9 2.8 
Michalovce 0.0 0.6 0.7 10.2 0.1 0.5 2.0 0.1 1.1 2.2 0.4 0.3 3.1 
Rožňava 0.0 0.6 0.2 7.4 0.1 0.3 2.4 0.4 1.5 1.3 0.4 1.2 3.7 
Sobrance 0.0 0.7 1.1 7.9 0.2 0.5 1.1 0.2 1.2 5.8 0.9 0.2 2.5 
Spišská Nová Ves 0.0 0.4 0.2 12.0 0.2 0.6 2.0 0.2 1.2 1.9 0.5 1.8 5.2 
Trebišov 0.0 0.5 0.4 10.6 0.1 0.4 1.2 0.1 0.8 1.6 0.4 0.6 2.2 
 
# Abbreviation Full name of political party / movement 
 1  SZS  Strana zelených na Slovensku 
 2  SDKÚ  Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia 
 3  SDPO  Strana za demokratické práva občanov 
 4  SDĽ  Strana demokratickej ľavice 
 5  SMER  SMER 
 6  HZDS  Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko 
 7  OKS  Občianska konzervatívna strana 
 8  HZD  Hnutie za demokraciu 
 9  ROMA  Politické hnutie Rómov na Slovensku - ROMA 
 10  KSS  Komunistická strana Slovenska 
 11  SMK-MKP  Strana maďarskej koalície - Magyar Koalíció Pártja 
 12  KDH  Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie 
 13  ĽS  Ľudová strana 
 14  ZRS  Združenie robotníkov Slovenska 
 15  ĽB  Ľavicový blok 
 16  ANO  Aliancia nového občana 
 17  B-RRS  Béčko - Revolučná robotnícka strana 
 18  ŽAR  Žena a rodina 
 19  SDA  Sociálnodemokratická alternatíva 
 20  SNJ  Slovenská národná jednota 
 21  NOSNP  Nezávislá občianska strana nezamestnaných a poškodených 
 22  SNS  Slovenská národná strana 
 23  ROSA  Robotnícka strana ROSA 
 24  ROISR  Rómska občianska iniciatíva SR 
 25  P SNS  Pravá Slovenská národná strana 
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